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ABSTRACT

PRO-SOCIAL CONSUMER AND FIRM BEHAVIOR IN IMPERFECTLY
COMPETITIVE REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL MARKETS

FEBRUARY 2019
JILL ANN FITZSIMMONS, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST
M.S., SOUTHERN NEW HAMPSHIRE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Nathalie Lavoie and Daniel Lass

In this dissertation, I combine field research, econometric methods, and economic
theory to analyze a market in which both firms’ and consumers’ choices are motivated by
social preferences. This work contributes to the fields of behavioral economics, industrial
organization, and local food systems economics. The dissertation expands the growing
literature on social preferences to incorporate firms’ choices that are motivated by utility
maximizing objectives in an environment that allows endogenous equilibrium prices and
quantities. Firms with social preferences operate in a competitive environment in which
they may face downstream market power. In particular, the research focuses on
intermediated Farm to School markets for local food in which producers’ marketing
decisions may be influenced by both market structure and the pro-social motivations
embedded in local food markets.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, I combine field research, econometric methods, and economic
theory to analyze a market in which both firms’ and consumers’ choices are motivated by
social preferences. This work contributes to the fields of behavioral economics, industrial
organization, and local food systems economics. The dissertation expands the growing
literature on social preferences to incorporate firms’ choices that are motivated by utility
maximizing objectives in an environment that allows endogenous equilibrium prices and
quantities. Firms with social preferences operate in a competitive environment in which
they may face downstream market power. In particular, the research focuses on
intermediated Farm to School markets for local food in which producers’ marketing
decisions may be influenced by both market structure and the pro-social motivations
embedded in local food markets.
I apply the findings to provide important information regarding the effectiveness
of different policy tools to enhance Farm to School markets for local foods. Markets for
local foods feature agricultural firms, whose objective functions are commonly modeled
as either profit maximizing or utility maximizing, allowing for ambiguity that is
convenient to exploit (Lin, 1978). Firms in local food markets are frequently described as
being motivated by goals that align easily with what behavioral economists refer to as
pro-social motivations: they vow support common public goods such as environmental
preservation and equitable societies (Stevenson and Pirog, 2008). Consumers in local
foods markets consistently demonstrate an increased willingness to pay for products that
contribute to pro-social goals (Fitzsimmons and Cicia, 2018), and agricultural producers,
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particularly in Farm to School markets, also demonstrate that they make decisions in
which they are willing to accept lower profits in local foods markets (Lehnerd et al.,
2018). Finally, prevailing evidence suggests that Farm to School markets are not
demonstrably profitable to producers, suggesting that participation in these markets is
motivated by something other than profit maximization (Sitaker, et al., 2010).
Local food markets consist of supply chains that both move agricultural products
and product information from upstream producers to downstream consumers, but also
transmit information from downstream consumers upwards through the supply chain.
Supply chains in markets for local foods are often referred to as “value chains,” to reflect
the common set of values that supply chain actors have in common with one another, and
that they seek to support through participation in the markets. The concept of a “value
chain” originated with Porter (1985) as managerial economists developed theories to
address the increasing role of information in modern markets. The “value” in this
application is generated at each step in the series of supply chain activities that a product
or service passes through in a given industry, linking the value created to each actor along
the supply chain. As value is created at each step in the product or services’ development,
the overall value of the final good or service is increased. The activities that Porter
viewed as adding “value” included inbound logistics, outbound logistics, operations,
marketing and sales, and service (1985). In 2008, Stevenson and Pirog applied the
concept of the long term, inter-organizational, interdependent network of economic actors
that comprise Porter’s “value-chain” to incorporate the strategic alliances among mid-tier
regional food systems actors. They identified five key characteristics of local foods value
chains:
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•

Appropriateness for situations in which economies of scale are coupled

with complex products that differentiate and add value in the marketplace
•

Capacity to combine cooperation with competition to achieve

collaborative advantages and adapt relatively quickly to changes in the market
•

Emphasis on shared vision, shared information (transparency), and shared

decision making among strategic partners
•

Commitment to the welfare of all participants in the value chain, including

fair profit margins, fair wages, and business agreements of appropriate extended
duration.
A number of papers identify that supply chain actors in local foods markets operate in
value chains that reflect these characteristics. For example, local foods value chains are
shown to be characterized by trust (Roy, Hall, and Ballantine, 2017), principles over
profit (Poulston and Yu, 2010), mutually supportive economic relationships (Conner et
al., 2010; Stevenson, Pirog, and Ostrom, 2011), and the achievement of the goals of local
foods systems (Sharma, Moon, and Strohbehn, 2014). Local food systems supply chain
actors have advanced the role of value chains, and sales of local food reached $8.7 billion
in 2015 (NASS, 2017), but as the market has grown, so has its complexity. Local foods
are increasingly marketed through intermediated supply chains, instead of directly to
consumers (NASS, 2017; Ralston, 2017). Intermediated supply chains for local food
require that supply chain information passes both downstream to consumers and
upstream to firms, and implies that firms make choices that are influenced by pro-social
preferences.
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While it is straightforward to model firms’ utility maximizing choices as a
function of pro-social preferences and exogenous prices, to date, economists have not
derived supply curves from those choices. Without supply curves, it has not been possible
to model a partial equilibrium model in which prices and quantities are endogenous, or to
model the effect of intermediary market power.
This dissertation attempts to develop a framework for understanding the
relationships among market forces that operate to improve economic efficiency and those
that operate to achieve pro-social values in a way that allows prices and quantities to be
endogenous. In addition to contributing to theory that advances the application of
behavioral economics to firms in a competitive market environment, I seek to provide
policy makers with a framework through which the effect of policies to promote local
foods can be evaluated. To provide a concrete application, most of this dissertation
focuses on understanding the key components of a specific value chain – the Farm to
School market for local foods. The second chapter veers from the Farm to School
application to provide empirical evidence of how human values can influence consumer
decision making in markets for local foods.
In the second chapter this dissertation, “Consumers’ Human Values and
Preferences for Social Outcomes of Regional Food Attributes,” written with Gianni
Cicia, (2018) we investigate heterogeneity in consumers’ human values and willingness
to pay (WTP) for social outcomes of credence process attributes that might have some
positive social impact on purchases of early potatoes in Italy and Germany. Consumers’
identification with cross-cultural human values is measured according to the Schwartz’
Portrait Values Questionnaire, and the distribution of preferences for product attributes

4

that claim a positive social impact among respondents with different human values is
modeled using mixed logit analysis. Parallel survey studies were conducted in each
country with the intention of comparing the impact of human values using the Schwartz
Values framework on willingness to pay for early potatoes with several credence process
attributes that may signal a positive social outcome as a result of purchase (price, country
of origin, carbon footprint certification, ethical certification, and method of production).
This paper aims to help clarify the role, if any, that pro-social consumer values have in
influencing the willingness to pay for specific food credence process attributes that claim
to have a social impact. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to focus on the
role human values have in influencing the willingness to pay for specific extrinsic
credence food attributes.
In the third chapter, “Food Service Authorities’ Motivations to Buy Regional
Food,” and fourth chapter, “Market Channel and School Meal Costs in Farm to School
Programs” written with Jeffrey O’Hara, I analyze school food authorities’ local food
procurement choices. The third chapter uses primary historical data from the
Massachusetts Farm to School program to analyze how different social forces converge
to promote a common goal of increasing the volume of local food in Massachusetts’
schools. The paper identifies the role of state government, non-profit organizations,
agricultural business organizations, public health and nutrition organizations, food
service organizations, and economic development agencies in creating partnerships to
develop viable farm to institution markets. I investigate barriers to implementation, and
frame the potential trade-offs that need to be considered when stakeholders invest in
infrastructure needed to sustain the markets.
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The fourth chapter analyzes perceptions of costs of procuring local foods in
regards to school food authorities’ choice of procurement channel. We combine two
years’ of USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service national Farm to School Census data with
USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service Census of Agriculture and Local Food
Marketing Practices Survey data to test, among schools participating in farm to school
programs, whether procuring directly from producers is more likely to lower costs than
procuring through a distributor. Procuring local foods may add costs to school food
programs, since procuring local foods requires additional staff effort and local foods may
command a premium price. If the costs of locally procured foods are higher than those of
alternative products, we would expect to see constraints on local foods procurement in
the absence of continued policy interventions to mitigate costs. If, however, certain local
food procurement strategies are more effective at reducing school meal costs relative to
others, we might expect to see school food authorities (SFA) purchase local foods in
greater quantities. Procurement through intermediated channels, such as distributors, is
hypothesized by Farm to School advocates to provide economies of scale to the market to
reduce overall costs for SFAs, as well as to provide a supply chain capable of aggregating
product from small and medium sized farms that could not individually meet volume
requirements of institutional buyers. Alternatively, intermediated market channels may
provide the opportunity for relatively concentrated distributors to exercise market power,
limiting the ability of SFAs to negotiate prices and procurement terms, and resulting in
overall higher costs to procurement. We find that schools that exclusively buy from
intermediaries are five percentage points less likely to report lower costs from
undertaking Farm to School procurement initiatives. In contrast, schools that procure
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local foods from both producers and intermediaries are four percentage points more likely
to report lower costs. There are several possible mechanisms that can explain our finding.
One possible mechanism is that profit maximizing producers who market directly to
schools are offering a low price to cultivate a diverse marketing portfolio, or that utility
maximizing producers are offering a low price to supply product to schools to achieve
social objectives. Alternatively, intermediaries either may not be achieving cost savings
when aggregating from local producers or if they are, not passing the cost-savings along
to SFAs.
In the fifth chapter, “Producer Costs and Returns from New England Farm to
Institution Sales,” I present the results of field research that inform the development of
the theoretical model of utility maximizing producer choice of markets in Chapter 6 that
allows price and quantity to be endogenous when both firms and consumers choices are
influenced by social preferences. I interviewed producers in six New England states who
market at least some product to Farm to Institution markets about their costs and returns
in selling to farm to institution markets. Interviewees represented diversified fruit and
vegetable growers in each of the six New England states, and a broad range of farm
operations sizes and farm marketing strategies. Farm to Institution marketing ranged from
less than 1% of total sales to about 11% of total sales of the farm operations interviewed.
Notably, while very few farm operations specifically track costs and returns to farm to
institution marketing, only two producers target this market for future growth. The
barriers cited to increased participation include low prices, volume requirements, and
logistical challenges.
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The sixth chapter of my dissertation, “Equilibria and Welfare in Markets With
Social Preferences,” written with Nathalie Lavoie and Dan Lass, develops a behavioral
model of producer choice for high-quality local food markets in which marketing choices
may be influenced by social preferences, while allowing price and quantity to be
determined in the market. We draw upon theory from behavioral economics and
industrial organization, as well as field research results, to develop a theoretical model
that advances the existing literature on producer choice of market channels, in which
price is treated as exogenous. Non-pecuniary motivations in marketing choices are
increasingly identified in the literature as relevant to producer decision making. The
paper provides a theoretical framework to model the potential effects of policy
interventions when producers may be motivated by non-pecuniary factors and
downstream intermediaries may exercise oligopsony power. The model is informed by an
analysis of structured interview results from in-depth field interviews with agricultural
producers in six New England states and a literature review. We apply the model to
producer marketing choices in farm to school markets, which policy makers currently
provide demand-side support by subsidizing school food purchasers’ procurement of
local foods. We find that if policy makers wish to increase the quantity of local product
supplied to schools, supply-side subsidies are likely to more effective than demand-side
subsidies. Effective interventions could include mitigating producers’ transaction costs.
We also find that market power in the distribution sector may, in certain cases, serve to
counteract policy-makers’ goals to increase quantity of local foods supplied to schools. It
is also possible that distributors enjoy higher efficiency, perhaps as a result of economies
of scale, which can increase the quantity supplied to the market. Future work using this

8

framework will include evaluating interventions like promoting farm to school markets to
producers, or providing technical assistance to producers, to establish contracts with
intermediaries that support price pass-through and communicate information about
downstream market activity.
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CHAPTER 2
CONSUMERS’ HUMAN VALUES AND PREFERENCES FOR SOCIAL
OUTCOMES OF REGIONAL FOOD ATTRIBUTES
Authors: Jill Fitzsimmons and Gianni Cicia
2.1 Introduction

For decades, research has suggested that consumer decisions are not exclusively
rational and self-regarding (Camerer and Fehr, 2006), that consumers within
demographic classes have widely varying preferences that are not fully explained by
basic demographic profiles (Bruno et al., 1972; Worlsey and Lea, 2008), and that
preferences for product attributes measured in choice experiments may not be complete
and stable (Lusk and Briggeman, 2009). Consumer choices for credence process
attributes may be influenced by other-regarding preferences or bounded rationality, or
they may represent an intermediate stage of decision making. Credence process quality
attributes of products indicate “the characteristics of the processes used to produce them,”
for which consumers are unable to judge the quality of the product, even after they have
inspected, purchased, and used the product (Caswell, 1998). Consumers who purchase
products with credence process product attributes that signify social outcomes provide a
context to test the hypothesis that some consumer purchases are motivated by otherregarding preferences, given that the attributes expressly indicate that the purchase has an
impact on public goods.
Consumers might consider some process attributes to increase individual welfare
while simultaneously creating positive social outcomes (Hughner, et al., 2007; Lusk,
Norwood et al., 2006). For example, consumers might benefit individually from the
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characteristics of processes used to produce food products; Food produced organically or
locally might be perceived as fresher, more nutritious, or safer (Lusk, Brown et al., 2006).
At the same time, consumers might also believe that organic or local foods benefit others,
in addition to benefiting themselves, by reducing environmental impacts or making a
positive contribution to the consumer’s regional economy (Caswell, 1998). Other process
attributes, such as “fair trade” or “low carbon emissions” labeling, are less likely to have
a distinct and noticeable impact on a given individual’s welfare. Instead, these process
attributes are intended to promote social values of equitable treatment of labor, and
environmentalism. Individuals who make choices to promote social values are likely
motivated by something in addition to gains in individual welfare, and researchers may
be able to identify those motivations, beyond simply attributing the motivation to a
“warm glow” (Andreoni, 1990).
To help clarify the role that values have in influencing willingness to pay (WTP)
for specific credence process attributes that promote social outcomes, we use the
Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) to provide a conceptual and empirical
framework to measure human values, and relate consumers’ WTP for social outcome
attributes to their human values profile (Schwartz et al., 2001). Our results suggest that
there is an empirical relationship between Schwartz Human values and a stated
preference for credence process product attributes that promote values-related social
outcomes for a potato product. Consumers in both Italy and Germany who value the
environment and social equitability have a higher WTP for product attributes that
promote environmental benefits, labor, etc. and consumers who value self-gratification,
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personal success, and social power have a lower WTP for these product attributes, all else
equal.
Consumers’ affinities for products with credence process attributes that promote
social outcomes such as environmentalism, social equitability, or ethnocentrism, are more
likely to be based on consumers’ values than their demographic characteristics. An
emerging body of economic literature seeks to identify and measure the role that these
previously unobserved consumer values have on influencing consumers’ WTP for
product attributes, in general. In this paper, we use a robust cross-cultural survey tool, the
PVQ, to identify consumer heterogeneity in WTP for a potato product with attributes that
promote social outcomes based on human values. We apply the tool to consumers in
Germany and Italy and analyze the results using a mixed logit model to capture additional
heterogeneity by allowing coefficients to have a distribution. Instead of imposing the a
priori framework of Schwartz Human Values, we allow our econometric models to
identify significant relationships in the data, and find that these relationships confirm the
Schwartz Values framework, suggesting that the PVQ has promise as a tool for
identifying future relationships between consumers’ heterogeneous values and valuations
for credence process attributes.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the
relationship between human values and consumer decision-making; Section 3 describes
the data collection methodology; Section 4 describes the model applied to uncover the
effect of human values on consumer decision making in the two new potato markets;
Section 5 presents the results of our analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
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2.2 Human Values and Willingness to Pay for Food Attributes

Consumer demand analyses have focused on a wide range of credence attributes.
Food safety, nutrition information, and product traceability have been widely shown to be
important to consumers (Hobbs, 2003; Golan et al., 2004; Verbeke & Ward, 2006; Van
Rijswijk et al., 2008; Lusk & Briggeman, 2009; Ubilava & Foster, 2009; Louriero, et al.,
2007). Food safety, nutrition, and traceability attributes are primarily vertically
differentiated, but consumers have heterogeneous preferences for many process
attributes. Consumers may interpret process attributes as important signals of other types
of attributes that we would expect all consumers to value. For example, consumers may
perceive that products grown near to the point of purchase are fresher, more nutritious,
taste better, and are safer (Boyle, 2004; Scarpa and Del Giudice, 2004; Feldmann and
Hamm, 2015; Cavallo and Piqueras‐ Fiszman, 2017). On the other hand, the growth in
“conscious consumerism” suggests that consumers who value process attributes beyond
the utility given by consumption of the product may not be solely motivated by selfinterest (Manieri et al., 1997). Examples of credence process attributes that a “conscious
consumer” might purchase include credence process attributes like environmental
production and protection, sustainable development, assurances towards worker
protections, and equal labor remuneration.
In this paper, we suggest that the concept of food quality extends from food
characteristics that benefit the purchaser to social outcomes that result from purchase. We
identify and measure the relationship between human values and consumers’ choices for
products that claim a social outcome by labeling products as possessing credence process
attributes (Bond et al., 2007; Lusk and Briggeman, 2009). Therefore, we try to examine
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whether individuals’ values explain product choices with attribute claims for social
outcomes.
Economic studies that rely on demographic market segmentation alone are
inadequate to account for consumer decisions that are motivated by other-regarding
preferences (Bruno et al., 1972; Kamakura and Novak, 1992; Cicia, 1993; Camerer and
Fehr, 2006; Lusk and Briggeman, 2009; Cicia et al., 2010; Naspetti and Zanoli, 2011;
Cembalo et al., 2016; Caracciolo et al., 2016; Roselli et al., 2018). These studies tend to
predict consumers’ choices based on food attributes and consumers’ observable
demographic characteristics. Little research is available on the influence of personal
values on consumer’s purchasing decisions, though values and beliefs are likely pivotal
predictors of food consumption (Cicia, et a., 2002; Rigby and Burton 2003; Alfnes, 2004;
Scarpa and Del Giudice, 2004; Michaelidou and Hassan, 2008; Lusk, Norwood et al.,
2006; Ubilava and Foster, 2009).
To address this gap, an emerging body of economic and other social science
research investigates how values and beliefs likely affect consumers’ food choices for
vegetarian diets, organic production, environmental outcomes, food safety, country-oforigin labeling and preferences for domestic or local products (Allen and Baines, 2002;
Umberger et al., 2003; Lea and Worsley, 2005; Lusk, Brown et al., 2006; Spash and
Vatn, 2006). Many of the economic studies have used ad hoc mechanisms to identify the
values and beliefs that drive decision making, but there is progress in linking the
measurement tools economists use with more robust tools from other disciplines that
measure values and beliefs. Prominent social psychologists such as Rokeach (1973);
Azjen (1985); Inglehart et al. (1998); Schwartz (1994) have developed different
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conceptual frameworks to identify how individuals’ values and beliefs influence choices.
The conceptual frameworks include both theoretical mechanisms by which values are
filtered through intermediate stages of decision making, and decision-making contexts
and tools based on these frameworks to identify and measure stable values that persist in
individuals over time. These tools have been extended to apply to individuals’ economic
choices in different circumstances, and additional tools such Food Values (Lusk and
Briggeman, 2009) have further extended the application of social psychologists modeling
of values-based decision making to the sphere of food decisions. Behavioral economists
have also used experimental tools, for example, Ultimatum and Dictator Games and
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism to measure individual consumers’ preferences for
pro-social outcomes, like altruism and fairness.
The Food Values (FV) tool developed by Lusk and Briggeman (2009) eliminates
the malleability of stated and revealed preferences for food attributes by determining
consumers’ food values systems. Lusk and Briggeman point out that consumer choices
for unfamiliar food attributes may not be complete and stable representations of
preferences. Instead, choices reflect decisions made as trial and error, and within the
context of a decision task; the choices made, then, represent an intermediate stage of
decision making and not an absolute, time-invariant statement of preference. To address
this, Lusk and Briggeman designed the FV tool to identify and measure abstract
attributes, consequences, and end states (186) of food consumption that may be able to
explain consumers’ choices between food products, referred to as “food values”. Lusk
and Briggeman applied the FV tool to consumers’ preferences for organic food. They
found that, on average, consumers placed the most importance on price, food safety,
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nutrition, and taste, as expected, but also that there is significant heterogeneity across
consumers. Respondents who ranked naturalness, fairness, and the environment as very
important were more likely to have purchased organic food in the past, and stated higher
willingness to pay for organic food. Consumers for whom price was the highest ranked
food value were the least likely to have purchased organic food, and stated the lowest
willingness to pay. The authors also found interesting relationships between FV – for
example, people who placed high importance on fairness place lower importance on selfcentered values of price, taste, convenience and appearance. Results from additional
applications of the FV tool reinforce these findings (Lusk, 2011; Pappalardo and Lusk,
2016; Lee et al., 2014).
Finally, the Schwartz Human Values tool has been used to demonstrate how an
underlying set of stable human values influences individuals’ choices, primarily in the
public health and psychological literature. Schwartz (2007) proposed that humans across
cultures share a core set of relatively stable “value orientations”. Schwartz distinguishes
these underlying values from their expression as attitudes, norms, opinions, and actions
that are commonly measured in social sciences. The underlying values “guide the
selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people and events” (Schwartz, 2007, p. 297),
and remain stable for individuals throughout their lives.
Ten universal human values are identified by Schwartz: Self-Direction,
Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, Tradition,
Universalism and Benevolence. Descriptions of these values are provided in Table 1.
Each value relates to the others either appositionally or complementarily. For example, an
individual whose values are positively correlated with Tradition would express values
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that were negatively correlated with Hedonism, but positively correlated with
Conformity. As such, Schwartz grouped the ten human values into opposite meta-values,
organizing them in a circular-spatial manner. The meta-values and their respective
individual values are shown in Figure 1: Openness to change (stimulation, self-direction
and hedonism) versus Conservation (security, conformity and tradition); Selftranscendence (benevolence and universalism) versus Self-enhancement (hedonism,
achievement and power). In the theoretical Schwartz framework, hedonism can either
stand-alone or can be a part of Openness to change or Self-enhancement meta-values
(Caracciolo et al., 2016).
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Table 1 Schwartz Values and Defining Goals
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VALUES

DEFINING GOALS

SELF-DIRECTION

Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring (creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals, selfrespect, intelligent, privacy)

STIMULATION

Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life (a varied life, an exciting life, daring)

HEDONISM

Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent)

ACHIEVEMENT

Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential,
intelligent, self-respect, social recognition)

POWER

Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources (social power, authority, wealth, preserving my public
image, social recognition)

SECURITY

Safety, harmony and stability of society and of relationships (family security, national security, social order, clean, reciprocation of
favors, healthy, moderate, sense of belonging)

CONFORMITY

Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms (obedient, selfdiscipline, politeness, honoring parents and elders, loyal, responsible)

TRADITION

Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion provides (respect for tradition, humble,
devout, accepting my portion in life, moderate, spiritual life)

BENEVOLENCE

Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact [the ‘in-group’] (helpful, honest,
forgiving, responsible, loyal, true friendship, mature love, sense of belonging, meaning in life, a spiritual life)

UNIVERSALISM

Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (broadminded, social justice,
equality, world at peace, world of beauty, unity with nature, wisdom, protecting the environment, inner harmony, a spiritual life)

Source: Caracciolo et al., 2016

How consumers identify themselves in relation to these values is unveiled through
the Schwartz 21-item Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ). Each of the 21 items in the
PVQ addresses one of the ten human values. The survey provides respondents with
statements that describe an unknown person’s profile, such as “she thinks it is important
that every person in the world be treated equally. She believes everyone should have
equal opportunities in life”, and asks respondents to rank the extent to which they
identify with this person, using a six-point scale, where one indicates a low level of
identification (not like me at all) and 6 ranks a high level of identification (very much
like me).

Figure 1 Schwartz Human Values

The Schwartz human values (SHV) tool has been used in a handful of economic
studies on consumer food choices. Lombardi and colleagues (2015) use food related
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lifestyle (FRL) and SHV to identify consumer participation in a Solidarity Purchasing
Group (SPG) in Italy, which is a consumer cooperative that works directly with regional
farmers to source products for its members with the intention of supporting local
economies. Caracciolo et al. (2016) analyzed the relationship between consumers’
preferences for sustainable pig farming practices and SHV in five different European
countries. This study (n=2437) suggests a strong relationship between consumers who
value protection of welfare and nature, and an increased valuation of product attributes
that promote environmentally cleaner pork production systems; while consumers who
value self-gratification, personal success, and social power demonstrate a decreased
valuation for these product attributes.
Our paper extends this research by identifying and measuring human values to
explain willingness to pay for credence process attributes for early potatoes. We chose
the SHV framework to identify human values and the PVQ tool to measure these values
for a number of reasons. The SHV framework is well-established in the choice literature,
and has been shown to be valid across cultures, which is particularly valuable as we seek
to compare consumers in different countries. The PVQ tool, with only 21 scale questions,
places a low burden on respondents, which reduces fatigue and increases the reliability of
results. The simplicity of the PVQ also reduces the variability in researcher subjectivity
that burdens other approaches, such as means-end laddering. There are, of course,
critiques of the SHV framework and PVQ tool that we take into consideration in our
analyses. SHV do not include measures that might provide insight into consumers’
relative preferences for a credence attribute that signals both social outcomes and
fundamentally important product attributes, such as food safety, nutrition, convenience,
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or appearance (Lusk and Briggeman, 2009) and we are not able to separate consumers’
beliefs regarding the meanings of attributes claims and their preferences for those claims
(Costanigro and Lusk, 2014). Therefore, we are not able to empirically disaggregate
respondents’ preferences for social impacts versus their preferences for increased
individual welfare. However, we feel comfortable interpreting our results as upper bound
preferences for social impacts, as food safety in Italian and German produce markets is
likely considered to be adequately addressed by government regulation (Groulleau and
Caswell, 2006) and we believe that product nutrition, convenience, and appearance for a
potato product would be equivalent across the product attributes that we do vary in our
study. We also focus our interpretation on product attributes that are less likely to bundle
personal and social benefits.

2.3 Methods

2.3.1 Human Values and Product Attributes Measurement
Our analysis explicitly considers consumers’ human values using the framework
proposed by Shalom H. Schwartz (1992) and the 21-item Schwartz Portrait Values
Questionnaire (Schwartz, 2001). The early potato product was chosen because it
conforms with many of the relevant process attributes in which we were interested. The
early potato is differentiated, in Italy and Germany by regional and national origin,
environmental production, ethical certification, and carbon footprint. In Italy, early potato
cultivation is concentrated mainly in the southern regions, especially in pockets that have
evolved to resemble informal “territorial districts” that bind their agricultural economy to
this crop. Early potatoes grown in these regions are sold on the national market and are
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exported, mainly to Germany. Early potatoes from other Mediterranean countries are also
widely available in Italy and Germany. Unlike storage potatoes, early potatoes are not
stored prior to sale, and are considered to be a perishable product with a short window of
freshness. Italian producers use conventional, organic or low-input cultivation methods to
grow early potatoes. The product may be certified and branded as ethically produced in
accordance with the SA8000 certification 1, and it may be certified as being a part of a
low-carbon emissions supply chain, featuring a carbon logo. The characteristics of early
potato, like its production in specific territorial districts, freshness, the development of
more sustainable cultivation methods, the increasing competition with potatoes from
other countries, and its ethical and carbon-footprint certifications make it an interesting
case to test this relationship in modern markets.
The set of potato attributes and attribute levels we chose to study are specific to
the new potato product, and were selected as a result of a multi-step process. We began
with a literature review, based on which we conducted in-depth interviews with Italian
and German stakeholders in the early potato supply chain. Next, we narrowed down the
relative importance of different new potato attributes through focus groups held with
consumers, allowing us to identify the most relevant different quality dimensions of early
potatoes. This qualitative approach to content validity2 (Yaghmale, 2009), allowed us to
finalize the questionnaire and identify the attributes and levels used to analyze consumers
preferences. The attributes that emerged as most important to consumers included local
production in specific territorial districts, freshness, sustainable cultivation methods, the
1 SA8000 is an auditable certification standard that encourages organizations to develop, maintain, and
apply socially acceptable practices in the workplace (Henkle, 2005)
2 Content validity refers to the degree of coverage as regards the content, which the instrument is supposed
to measure (Yaghmale, 2009). Special attention was paid to identify first the attributes and than the levels
that define each attribute in order to define the specific quality dimension.
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perception of an increase in undocumented migrants among agricultural workers, and
competitive pressures from imported new potatoes. The credence attributes that we
ultimately selected to model were those that indicated territorial origin, ethical
certification, production method and carbon footprint certification.
We expect that consumers who exhibit meta-values that reflect outward looking,
pro-social human values will have a higher WTP for credence process attributes that
claim positive social impact, and consumers who exhibit meta-vales that reflect inward,
self-interested human values will have a lower WTP for these attributes. In particular, we
expect that consumers with “self-transcendent” Schwartz meta-values will be willing to
pay more for product attributes that indicate social outcomes like environmentalism and
equitability. We also expect that these consumers will be WTP more for environmental
production methods, but our survey design does not allow us to disaggregate what part of
this increased WTP is driven by self-interest for healthful, safe, fresh foods versus what
part is driven by preferences for pro-social outcomes. We would expect that consumers
who exhibit self-enhancement, conservative, or hedonistic meta-values will have lower
WTP for product attributes that indicate social outcomes. Finally, we would expect that
consumers who exhibit conservative meta-values would express higher WTP for
ethnocentric attributes, like own-country of origin labeling.

2.3.2 Study Participants
Our research compares heterogeneity in preferences and consumers’ human
values in Italy and Germany. We use a unique set of cross-sectional survey data from a
representative sample of 1,009 German and 1,004 Italian consumers, conducted by a
professional marketing company. People interviewed were responsible for household
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major food purchasing decisions. The sample has been selected and stratified by
geographical area, city size, gender and age (Table 2).
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Table 2 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
Germany

Italy

Male

45.5

13.3

Female

54.5

86.7

42.4 (13.1)

52.5 (14.4)

Yes

20.60

18.30

No

79.40

81.70

Poor

22.80

25.20

Moderate

39.30

36.90

Good

23.30

36.60

No answer

14.60

1.20

<High School

11.80

31.30

High School

22.50

40.40

University Degree

28.90

15.00

Sample Size

1,009

1,004

Gender (%)

Age (years): mean and (st.dev)
Children<10 years old (%)

Economic situation of the family (%)

Highest qualification completed (%)

The first section of the questionnaire assessed the perception of the quality of
fresh food products from consumers and their level of knowledge about product attributes
through a set of exploratory questions. The second section focused on the early potato.
Respondents were introduced to the main characteristics of the new potato, and then were
asked about past purchases of new potatoes, including frequency of consumption, the
country of origin (if known), and the importance attached to the various attributes of
early potatoes. In the third section, each respondent was asked to choose a preferred early
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potato product from a labeled hypothetical choice sets containing four different early
potato products, or to ‘opt-out’ and choose “none of these products”. Each early potato
product label featured a combination of five different extrinsic attributes and price. Each
extrinsic attribute was varied between two or three “levels” of attribute-specific options.
Attributes and levels included in the randomized questionnaire design are shown in Table
3. Each individual consumer faced five different choice sets, with four different products
and the opt-out alternative. Each of the four products offered featured a different label
showing one level of each of the product attributes. The order of choice sets offered was
varied between respondents in order to avoid order bias. Choice sets were the result of a
randomized CBC (Choice-Based Conjoint) advanced design with complete enumeration.
The D-optimal coefficient of the experimental design was equal to 0.99.
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Table 3 Choice Experiment Attributes and Levels
Attributes

Levels

Attributes

Production Method

Levels

Country of Origin
Organic

Italy/Germany

Environmental Friendly

Non-Domestic product
(but COOL known)
No information

No information
Carbon Footprint

Price (Euro/kg)
Carbon footprint logo

0.60

No information

0.80
1.00
1.40

Ethical certification
SA8000 certification
No information

2.4 Model and Analysis

We model previously unobserved heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences for
product attributes of new potatoes both by explicitly estimating consumers’ preferences
according to their SHV profiles, and by modeling the distribution of those consumers’
preference profiles using a mixed logit, or random parameters logit, model. We first
evaluate the reliability of the PVQ results. Upon satisfactory reliability, we conduct a
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation to reduce the number of
variables and identify human values principal component weights to create value profiles
for respondents. We then use the principal component weights for individual level human
values profiles and extrinsic product attributes in a mixed logit model (ML) to determine
preference heterogeneity within different Schwartz values profiles. The ML model also
allows us to avoid the assumption that observations from a given individual are
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independent of one another, which is a shortcoming of the standard logit model (Revelt
and Train, 1998; McFadden and Train, 2000).

2.4.1 Values Reliability
To determine reliability of the Schwartz Portrait Value results, we compute
Cronbach’s alpha scores for each of the 10 Schwartz Values. For nine out of the ten
Schwartz Values, reliability was a function of responses to two of the PVQ questions; for
the Schwartz Value “Universalism,” the reliability was calculated as a function of the
responses to three questions (Brunso et al., 2004; Schwatz, 2001).
Alpha scores for the Italian and German data sets are reported below in Table 4.
According to the literature, alpha scores of above 0.5 are generally considered to indicate
moderate/high reliability 3. All of the Values, except “tradition” in the Italian data set,
meet this standard. We retain this value, however, because retention of this variable had
negligible impact on subsequent analyses.

3

“There is much debate among researchers as to where the appropriate cut-off points are
for reliability. A good guide is: 0.9 and above shows excellent reliability; 0.7 to 0.9
shows high reliability; 0.5 to 0.7 shows moderate reliability; 0.5 and below shows low
reliability “ (Hinton et al., 2014, p. 364)
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Table 4 Reliability of the Portrait Values Questionnaire scores (Cronbach's
alpha)
German data

Italian Data

Values

C. alpha

C. alpha

Power

0.64

0.63

Achievement

0.76

0.81

Hedonism

0.66

0.61

Stimulation

0.57

0.71

Self-Direction

0.56

0.56

Universalism

0.59

0.68

Benevolence

0.72

0.62

Tradition

0.50

0.35

Conformity

0.59

0.54

Security

0.72

0.57

2.4.2 Principal Component Analysis
To reduce the number of variables and obtain principal components weights to be
used as regressors in our ML model, we conducted a PCA of the 21 PVQ scores, using
varimax rotation. These components represent the relative weight of each observation on
the composition of components. The orthogonality conditions of the varimax rotation are
critical in this analysis because of the oppositional tension inherent in the Schwartz value
design (Cembalo et al., 2016). Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin tests (KMO) verify the validity of the
initial data applied to the model. According to the Schwartz Human Values literature, we
would expect the ten human values to be reduced to five principal components
corresponding to the meta-values described above. Our analysis identified three
explained principal components for the Italian data and four explained components for
the German data, a significant reduction from the original 21 questions. The resulting
primary components align with the meta-value categories described above, and are
consistent with the SHV framework although they fall along slightly different boundaries
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due to the smaller number of components. We refer to these components as “values
profiles”.
The three values profiles identified from the Italian PCA and included as
regressors in the mixed logit model below are therefore: “Self-Transcendence/ Opennessto-Change,” “Self-Enhancement/ Openness-to- Change,” and “Conservation”. The
component analysis results for Italy are presented below in Tables 5. The four values
profiles resulting from the German PCA consist of four meta-values, including “SelfTranscendence / Openness-to-Change,” “Self-Enhancement,” Conservation,” and
“Hedonism.” The component analysis results for Germany are presented below in Table
6.
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Table 5 Italian Principle Component Analysis Result

Values

Self-Enhancement/
Openness-to -Change

Achievement

0.52

Hedonism

Meta-Values
SelfTranscendence/
Openness-toChange

Conservation

Unexplained

-0.08

0.03

0.23

0.44

0.05

0.05

0.33

Power

0.51

-0.15

0.11

0.27

Stimulation

0.45

0.17

-0.12

0.27

Benevolence
Selfdirection
Universalism

-0.09

0.55

0.11

0.23

0.25

0.49

-0.23

0.30

-0.09

0.61

0.05

0.19

Conformity

0.05

-0.01

0.60

0.30

Security

-0.01

0.17

0.45

0.37

Tradition

0.01

-0.03

0.59

0.38

Variance explained : 71.5%
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Table 6 German Principle Components Analysis Results

Values

Conservation

Meta-Values
SelfTranscendence/
Self
Openness-toEnhancement
Change
0.05
0.23

Hedonism

Unexplained

-0.14

0.30

Conformity

0.53

Security

0.53

-0.16

-0.13

0.40

0.19

Tradition

0.54

0.09

0.06

-0.14

0.30

Benevolence
Selfdirection
Stimulation

0.24

0.32

-0.26

0.23

0.25

-0.15

0.60

0.07

0.04

0.30

-0.19

0.33

0.20

0.32

0.28

Universalism

0.14

0.61

-0.09

-0.17

0.23

Achievement

-0.03

0.06

0.60

0.07

0.21

Power

0.08

-0.06

0.67

0.00

0.17

Hedonism

-0.02

-0.03

0.03

0.78

0.15

Variation explained: 76.47%
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2.4.3 Mixed Logit Analysis Results
2.4.3.1 Mixed Logit Model

The values profiles were included in our Mixed Logit model analysis as
observable consumer attributes. The mixed logit model is then used to estimate the
posterior probability of Italian and German consumers’ selection, and their WTP for
different credence process attributes of the new potato in both willingness to pay and
preference space. The mixed logit discrete choice model addresses two of the most
critical concerns associated with the traditional logit model. The model accounts for
additional unobserved consumer heterogeneity by allowing parameters to vary randomly
(Revelt and Train, 1998). As a result, our model does not suffer from the inappropriate
imposition of independence of irrelevant alternatives. In addition, the mixed logit model
allows unobserved utility to be correlated over individuals in our panel (Revelt and Train,
1998). The mixed logit model is widely used for food and consumer choice research.
In the discrete choice model, consumers n = 1,…,N maximize utility
=
U njt β n ' xnjt + ε njt

, where β n is a vector of individual-specific coefficients, xnjt is a vector of

observed attributes relating to individual n and alternative j on choice occasion t , and ε njt
is a random term that is assumed to be an independently and identically distributed
extreme value. The density for β is denoted as f ( β | θ ) , where θ are the parameters of the
distribution. Conditional on knowing β n , the probability of respondent n choosing
alternative i on choice occasion t is given by the conditional logit formula (McFadden,
1974)
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Lnjt ( β n ) =

exp( β 'n xnit )
J

∑ exp(β 'n xnjt )

(2.0)

j =1

Where j = 1,…, J denotes the product alternatives, and t = 1,…,T denotes the
choice sets. The vector of observed variables includes all of the product attributes for the
alternative offered to the consumer
T

S n ( β n ) = ∏ Lni ( n ,t )t ( β n )

(2.1)

t =1

Where i(n, t ) is the alternative chosen by individual n on choice occasion t . The
unconditional probability of the sequence of choices that are observed is the conditional
probability integrated over the distribution of β :
Pn (θ ) = ∫ S n ( β n ) f ( β | θ )d β

(2.2)

This is a weighted average of a product of logit formulas evaluated at different
values of β , with the weights provided by the density f .
The goal is to estimate the mean and covariance of β n , or the population
parameters θ . Since we suggest that there is consumer heterogeneity, the population
parameters provide us with the distribution of individual parameters. The probability
estimation must be approximated by simulation, as the integral 1.3 does not exist in
closed form and cannot be calculated analytically. Details on the simulation procedure
are provided by Hole (2007).
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2.4.3.2 Model Specifications

We include in the model five product attributes with two or three levels each to
represent extrinsic credence attributes for early potatoes. We interacted these attributes
variables with values profiles to create variables that capture heterogeneity in preferences
for attributes based on human values. The Italian model includes interactions between
Self-Transcendence/Openness-to-Change and attribute variables, and SelfEnhancement/Openness-to-Change and attribute variables; the base, or omitted, case is
Conservation. The German model includes interactions between Self-Transcendence/
Openness-to-Change and attribute variables, Self-Enhancement and attribute variables;
and Conservation and attribute variables; the base, or omitted, case is Hedonism 4.
Following Hole (2007) and Hole (2008) we tested a number of different model
specifications to identify which coefficients to vary or to leave as fixed, and which
distributions (normal or log normal) these coefficients should follow 5. As a result, the
models estimated for the Italian and German data sets vary slightly, in order to best fit the
respective data. In both cases, we find that allowing normal price variables to vary
improves model fit (Hole, 2008; Meijer and Rouwendal, 2006). In both data sets, we
tested whether coefficients were independently distributed, and finding that they were not
we followed Hole (2007) and Train (2003) to estimate the parameters in the covariance
matrices 6 and allow for correlated normal coefficients.

4

The models were tested with different base cases. These specifications fit the data best.
If we had found that the log-normal distribution fit best, it may not have been the case
that coefficients were correlated.
6 Not estimated directly, but through the lower-triangular matrix L, where covariance
matrix is LL’
5
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2.4.3.3 Mixed Logit Model Results

Given the results of the PCA, we expect that Italian and German consumers
whose values profiles align principally with Self-Transcendence/ Openness-to-Change
will demonstrate a coefficient with positive effects for process attributes that may
promote a social outcome, including potatoes that are labeled to indicate ethical labor
practices, and low carbon impact. We would also expect these coefficients to be positive
for sustainable production methods, such as Organic or Environmental Production, but
we are not able to disaggregate these effects from preferences for increased individual
welfare. We expect that Italian and German consumers who express the meta-value of
Self-Enhancement will demonstrate a decreased willingness to pay for potatoes that do
not confer an individual benefit, including ethical certification and carbon logo. Mean
coefficient estimates and standard deviations for the ML model are reported in Tables 7
and 8. We will focus our analysis on the statistically significant parameters. We do not
have strong priors about the effects of COOL. On one hand, we might expect that a
person who exhibits a Self-Enhancement values profile might indicate an ethnocentric
perspective, giving Own-Country origin labeling a positive effect, but Other-country
Origin labeling a negative effect. On the other hand, a truly self-regarding values profile
might indicate a disregard for anyone other than oneself, resulting in a negative effect.
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Table 7 Models Estimation (Italy)
Attributes

Values

Price

Italian Logit

Italian Mixed Logit

Coefficients

Coefficients

Standard
Deviations

Coef.

Std.
Err.

Coef.

Std.
Err.

Coef.

Std.
Err.

-1.05

0.06

-0.94

0.10

1.45

0.14

X

Self Enhancement

0.15

0.03

0.15

0.06

0.36

0.13

X

Self Transcendence

-0.10

0.03

0.06

0.08

0.47

0.16

Environmentally friendly

0.16

0.05

0.32

0.05

X

Self Enhancement

-0.03

0.03

-0.12

0.04

X

Self Transcendence

0.05

0.03

0.13

0.04

0.01

0.05

0.29

0.06

Production

Organic
X

Self Enhancement

0.00

0.03

-0.13

0.04

X

Self Transcendence

0.07

0.03

0.18

0.04

0.40

0.04

0.40

0.04

0.43

0.10

Carbon Logo
X

Self Enhancement

-0.03

0.02

-0.06

0.03

0.18

0.05

X

Self Transcendence

0.05

0.03

0.07

0.04

0.21

0.06

Origin
Labeled Italian

2.25

0.05

2.50

0.11

1.54

0.12

X

Self Enhancement

-0.18

0.03

-0.39

0.07

0.42

0.10

X

Self Transcendence

0.11

0.03

0.29

0.08

0.40

0.11

Labeled Not Italian

0.66

0.06

0.66

0.10

1.08

0.11

X

Self Enhancement

0.01

0.03

-0.11

0.06

X

Self Transcendence

-0.06

0.04

0.07

0.07

0.32

0.04

0.45

0.05

SA8000 Certification
X

Self Enhancement

-0.07

0.02

-0.16

0.04

0.24

0.06

X

Self Transcendence

0.05

0.03

0.13

0.04

0.21

0.07

-1.07

0.10

-4.74

0.59

4.26

0.41

Opt-Out

Constant

X

Self Enhancement

0.16

0.04

0.23

0.29

0.87

0.24

X

Self Transcendence

-0.20

0.04

0.94

0.31

1.77

0.30

-1.81

0.08
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Table 8 Models estimation (Germany)
Attributes

Values

German Logit

German Mixed Logit

Coefficients

Coefficients

-2.12

Std.
Err.
0.06

Coef.
Price

-3.07

Std.
Err.
0.17

Standard
Deviations
Std.
Coef.
Err.
0.21
2.77

Coef.

X

Self Enhancement

0.30

0.04

0.26

0.12

1.25

0.19

X

Self Transcendence

0.07

0.04

0.49

0.15

2.02

0.25

X

Conservation

-0.06

0.04

-0.15

0.13

0.77

0.17

Environmentally friendly

0.18

0.05

0.58

0.07

X

Self Enhancement

0.01

0.04

-0.26

0.06

0.62

0.09

X

Self Transcendence

-0.12

0.03

0.16

0.07

0.56

0.09

X

Conservation

0.06

0.04

0.09

0.06

Organic

0.25

0.05

0.73

0.07

X

Self Enhancement

-0.09

0.03

-0.27

0.06

0.60

0.09

X

Self Transcendence

0.03

0.04

0.20

0.07

0.54

0.08

X

Conservation

0.03

0.04

0.11

0.06

0.31

0.04

0.38

0.05

Production

Carbon Logo
X

Self Enhancement

-0.06

0.03

-0.13

0.04

0.29

0.07

X

Self Transcendence

0.02

0.03

0.11

0.05

0.51

0.08

X

Conservation

-0.02

0.03

-0.02

0.04

Labeled German

1.73

0.05

2.00

0.08

X

Self Enhancement

-0.17

0.03

-0.36

0.06

X

Self Transcendence

-0.14

0.04

0.07

0.09

1.44

0.11

X

Conservation

0.14

0.04

0.23

0.06
0.60

0.09

Origin

Labeled Not German

0.53

0.05

0.16

0.08

X

Self Enhancement

0.00

0.04

-0.17

0.07

X

Self Transcendence

-0.16

0.04

0.09

0.08

X

Conservation

-0.04

0.04

-0.11

0.07

0.49

0.04

0.81

0.06

0.49

0.09

SA8000 Certification
X

Self Enhancement

-0.17

0.03

-0.30

0.05

0.53

0.07

X

Self Transcendence

0.07

0.03

0.20

0.06

0.46

0.09

X

Conservation

0.01

0.03

0.08

0.05

0.18

0.08

-2.16

0.09

-6.40

0.60

5.20

0.38

Opt-Out

Constant

X

Self Enhancement

-0.10

0.05

-1.02

0.27

1.20

0.32

X

Self Transcendence

-0.07

0.05

0.90

0.31

2.47

0.35

X

Conservation

-0.15

0.05

-0.10

0.26

-0.63

0.07
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We created interaction variables between the values profiles discussed above and
product attributes. Several of these interactions were statistically significant, and,
additionally, conformed to the hypotheses regarding how human values affect consumer
preferences for extrinsic credence attributes. For the Italian model, the interactions
between Self-Transcendence / Openness to Change and the process attributes Organic
and Environmental Friendly production, Italian Origin, and Ethical Certification are
significant and positive. The interactions between Self-Enhancement and the process
attributes Organic and Environmental Friendly production, Italian Origin, and Ethical
Certification are significant and negative. The likelihood ratio for the model indicates a
good fit.
Italian and German consumers, as a whole, value process attributes as one would
expect, based on prior research. In the ML model, the random coefficients are expected to
vary across individuals; this variation is indicated by the estimated standard deviations of
the coefficients. The random coefficients in both Italian and German ML models include
Price, COOL (Country of Origin Labeling), Italian/ German Origin, Carbon Logo, and
Ethical Certification. Each of these is significant. The Organic and Environmentally
Friendly production methods attributes were also random, significant, and positive in the
German model; While they are not random in the Italian model, they are significant and
positive. Price effects and the “Opt-Out” are random, significant and negative for both
Italian and German consumers, as expected.
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Table 9 WTP Estimates for Mixed Logit Italy
Attributes

Values

Coefficients

Production

Coef.

Std. Err.

Environmentally friendly

0.36

0.04

X

Self Enhancement

-0.06

0.03

X

Self Transcendence

0.11

0.03

0.34

0.04
0.03

Organic
X

Self Enhancement

-0.03

X

Self Transcendence

0.13

0.03

Carbon Logo

Standard Deviations
Coef.

Std. Err.

0.31

0.03

X

Self Enhancement

-0.02

0.02

0.06

0.05

X

Self Transcendence

0.05

0.02

0.00

0.06

Labeled Italian

2.10

0.14

0.90

0.10

X

Self Enhancement

-0.23

0.05

0.23

0.05

X

Self Transcendence

0.22

0.06

0.29

0.06

Labeled Not Italian

0.71

0.08

-0.39

0.09

X

Self Enhancement

-0.05

0.04

X

Self Transcendence

0.07

0.05

0.35

0.04

0.29

0.10

Origin

SA8000 Certification
X

Self Enhancement

-0.08

0.03

-0.12

0.06

X

Self Transcendence

0.10

0.03

-0.14

0.05

-6.45

0.88

4.46

0.54

Opt-Out
X

Self Enhancement

0.07

0.09

0.62

0.12

X

Self Transcendence

0.15

0.11

1.99

0.26
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Table 10 WTP Estimate for Mixed Logit Germany
Attributes

Values

German Mixed Logit
Coefficients
Coef.
Std. Err.

Standard Deviations
Coef.
Std. Err.

Production
Environmentally friendly
X
Self Enhancement
X
Self Transcendence
X
Conservation
Organic
X
Self Enhancement
X
Self Transcendence
X
Conservation
Self Enhancement
Self Transcendence
Conservation

0.24
-0.07
0.06
0.03
0.25
-0.07
0.07
0.02
0.16
-0.01
0.01
-0.01

0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

Labeled German
X
Self Enhancement
X
Self Transcendence
X
Conservation
Labeled Not German
X
Self Enhancement
X
Self Transcendence
X
Conservation
SA8000 Certification
X
Self Enhancement
X
Self Transcendence
X
Conservation
Opt-Out
X
Self Enhancement
X
Self Transcendence
X
Conservation

0.66
-0.08
0.01
0.02
0.18
-0.04
0.01
-0.03
0.20
-0.06
0.05
0.01
-3.61
-0.27
-1.33
-0.13

0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.29
0.05
0.06
0.05

Carbon Logo
X
X
X

-0.06
0.00

0.01
0.02

0.04
0.00

0.01
0.01

0.05
-0.05

0.02
0.02

0.30

0.03

0.16

0.02

-0.03

0.02

-0.06
0.02
0.03
2.10
0.60
0.39

0.02
0.02
0.01
0.17
0.06
0.05

Origin
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To provide an intuitive interpretation of these coefficients, we calculate WTP
estimates in willingness to pay space (Train and Weeks, 2005; Hole, 2007; Hole, 2008),
reported in Tables 9 and 10. In contrast to specifying the distributions and then
estimating WTP in preference space as the ratio of two coefficients, we specify the
distributions for WTP at the estimation stage. We take this approach for three reasons.
First, our price attribute coefficients are random, and have a distribution. To estimate
WTP in preference space using the Delta Method, we would need to ignore the
information presented by the coefficients of the standard deviations estimated in our
mixed logit model and assume that our price coefficients are in fact scalar, since both
coefficients are normally distributed. Next, our Meta Values are constructed so that
individuals fall along a continuum such that the mean is about zero. While we could
perform a series of transformations to achieve a defined function, this seems unwieldy.
Finally, while there is some ambiguity about the proper approach to estimating WTP
from a Mixed Logit model, it appears that, compared to estimation in preference space,
coefficients estimated in WTP are less likely to be “inflated” and are therefore more
economically realistic than estimates arrived at through the preference space approach
Hole and Kolstad (2011). To calculate WTP in WTP space, we use the mixlogitwtp
procedure (Hole, 2007) in STATA (v.15). We assumed normal distributions and used 500
Halton draws. The mixlogitwtp procedure samples the independent Halton draws from the
mixing distributions of the coefficients βk and βp . In our sample we have
𝛽𝑘 ~𝑁(𝜇𝑘 , 𝜎𝑘2 ), 𝛽𝑝 ~𝑁(𝜇𝑝 , 𝜎𝑝2 ), where 𝜇𝑘 , 𝜎𝑘2 , 𝜇𝑝 , 𝜎𝑝2 are estimated in the previous

mixed logit model. For each draw, the WTP values are calculated according to the
𝛽

standard WTP formula, 𝑊𝑊𝑊 = − 𝛽𝑘 (Rischatsch, 2009).
𝑝
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In general, both Italian and German consumers’ mean WTP for product attributes
COOL (Country of Origin Labeling), Italian/ German Origin, Organic, Carbon Logo,
EC (Ethical Certification), and Environmentally Friendly (German) are positive and
significant (WTP estimates are statistically significant at 5% or better if the calculated
confidence intervals do not fall over zero).
However, we can see that these increased WTP vary importantly depending upon
the values profiles held by the individual consumers. As hypothesized, Italian consumers
with values profiles of Self-Transcendence / Openness to Change have a positive and
significant WTP for Organic (€/kg 0.13) and EC (€/kg 0.10) product attributes.
Consumers with value profiles of Self-Enhancement / Openness to change have
significant and negative WTP for Italian Origin (€/kg -0.23) and EC ( €/kg -0.08).
Similarly, German consumers with values profiles of Self-Transcendence /
Openness to Change have a positive and significant WTP for Organic (€/kg 0.07),
Environmentally Friendly (€/kg 0.06) and EC (€/kg 0.05) product attributes. Consumers
with values profiles of Self-Enhancement have significant and negative WTP for German
Origin (€/kg -0.08) and EC (€/kg -0.06).

2.5 Conclusion

This paper seeks to compare how the human values of consumers in Italy and
Germany impact a decision to purchase early potatoes that are differentiated by extrinsic
credence attributes. Two online surveys were conducted in the two countries to
investigate consumers’ human values, their preferences for early potatoes with different
extrinsic attributes, and basic demographic information. Several researches have focused
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in recent years their attention on the relationship between human values and food choice.
However, to the best of our knowledge this is one of the first to focus on the role human
values have in influencing the willingness to pay for specific extrinsic food attributes.
Results from this paper confirm not only the existence of a strong relationship between
consumers’ human values and food choices, but also show a clear influence of human
values on willingness to pay for extrinsic credence attributes.
According to our results, the Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire identifies the
heterogeneity in consumers’ Human Values and plausibly explains how pro-social values
relate to consumers’ preferences for pro-social credence process attributes. This
heterogeneity suggests that different consumers have different preferences for pro-social
attributes. On the face of it, this conclusion seems trite – but from a policy perspective the
implications are of considerable importance.
While other disciplines exhibit confidence in the external validity of the Schwartz
Values framework, there is room to compare the stated preference results with revealed
preferences, through scanner data or non-hypothetical experimental auctions. Our two
populations were both European, and more robust cross-cultural studies might help
interpret the role of equivalency bias.
Values appear to play an important role in consumers’ willingness to pay for
credence process attributes. Italian and German consumers who express the meta-value of
Self-Transcendence / Openness to Change have a higher WTP for product attributes such
as Organic and Ethical Certification, demonstrating concern for the wellbeing of others.
Consumers who express the meta-value of Conservation have an increased WTP for
product attributes such as Italian/ German Origin, and a decreased WTP for new concepts
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like Ethical Certification, demonstrating order, self-restriction, preservation of the past,
and resistance to change.
The results are encouraging, but they also are limited. We are not able to
disaggregate preferences for the individual welfare increasing aspects of double duty
attributes from the pro social aspects.
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CHAPTER 3
FOOD SERVICE AUTHORITIES’ MOTIVATIONS TO BUY REGIONAL
FOOD

3.1 Introduction

Like consumers in retail environments, food service authorities that purchase
foods for cafeterias in institutions like schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and prisons
have demonstrated an interest in buying local and regional foods. In this chapter, I
combine field research and empirical research to analyze the relationship between
institutions’ choices to purchase products with pro-social attributes and costs specific to
the market structure through which those products are delivered. The first section of this
chapter investigates the history of Farm to Institution (FTI) programs in Massachusetts
and the relationship between the pro-social motivations of FTI regional food purchasing
and market structure. In the second section of the chapter I present work conducted with a
co-author, Jeffery O’Hara, in which we use USDA Farm to School Census data to test,
among schools participating in farm to school programs, whether the market channel
portfolio used to procure local foods impacts school meal costs. We find that schools that
exclusively buy from intermediaries are five percentage points less likely to report lower
costs from undertaking Farm to School ( FTS) initiatives. In contrast, schools that
procure local foods from both producers and intermediaries are four percentage points
more likely to report lower costs.
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3.2 Massachusetts Farm to Institution Programs

3.2.1 Introduction
Farm to Institution programs seek to link institutional food service purchasers to
local farmers, and have grown considerably throughout the country and throughout the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the last decade. Programs are generally operated by
non-profits, institutions such as schools or hospitals, or local or regional governments or
departments. According to advocacy groups, the first documented “Farm to School”
program began in Santa Monica, California in 1996 (Community Food Security
Coalition, School Food FOCUS, & National Farm to School Network, 2010). By 2001,
there were 6 documented programs in the United States, 400 programs by 2004, and
2,350 programs by 2011 (Community Food Security Coalition, 2012). The National Farm
to School Network reports that in 2012 there were 2,571 programs in all 50 states,
involving 10,217 schools and 2,470 school districts (2012).
Farm to Institution (FTI) programs have been inspired by a range of motivations
including: to provide consumers of institutional meals nutrition education and access to
fresher, more appetizing, and more healthful meal options in order to combat nutritionrelated illness and disease; to provide a new market for farmers; to spur local economic
growth by increasing the scale of locally-grown sales; and to improve the environmental
sustainability of the food system (i.e., cutting down on “food miles” or limiting pesticide
use). FTI programs may provide support to any of the participants in the supply chain –
from the end consumer and the institution where they eat their meal, to the farmer.
Nationally, FTI programs began in public elementary and secondary schools, and have
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subsequently spread to private schools, colleges, universities, pre-schools, hospitals,
nursing homes, and group homes.
In 2002, the Massachusetts Department of Agricultural Resources (MDAR)
sponsored a farm-to-college event at Tu FTS University, which resulted in an
Institutional Sales Task Force under then-Commissioner of Agriculture Jay Healy. The
Task Force supported Massachusetts’ colleges and private schools to purchase locally
grown produce. By the fall of 2003 budget cuts at MDAR eliminated staffing for the Task
Force, but the Mass. School Food Service Association (now called Mass. School
Nutrition Association) had hired the former MDAR staff person to do a one year grantfunded farm to school pilot project with five public school districts. The former staff
person founded the Massachusetts Farm to School Project (M FTSP) in 2004.
M FTSP has been at the forefront of the national FTI trend, and has contributed to
a particularly robust landscape of programs in the Commonwealth. M FTSP was the first
entity in Massachusetts devoted exclusively to “connect[ing] farms and institutions to
improve access to locally grown foods and strengthen our local economy” (M FTSP,
2012). Over the course of the eight subsequent school years, Massachusetts Public School
Districts’ participation in Farm to School programs increased from 1% in 2004-2005, to
44% in 2011-2012 (Erwin, 2012). This increase in the percent of public school students
in Massachusetts who are served local food is shown in Figure 2, along with the
concurrent rise in the percent of schools that adopt preferential purchasing of local foods
in their school food service budgets (M FTSP, 2012). In 2013, M FTSP became a
subsidiary of Project Bread, a non-profit organization that assists those in need of food.
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M FTSP also reports increases in programs in hospitals, pre-schools, private
schools, colleges and universities in the Commonwealth (Leib, 2012). A list of the
entities that joined M FTSP to promote FTI programs in Massachusetts is listed in Figure
3. The list includes agricultural business associations, non-profit “Buy Local” advocacy
organizations, childhood health and nutrition organizations, municipal farm to institution
programs, economic development and government agencies, school food service staff and
farmers, as well as individuals in communities around the Commonwealth.
.

100%

80%

Farm to School
Participation in Mass.
Public Schools

60%
40%
20%

0%
Percent of School Districts

Percent of Public School Students

Figure 2 MA Public School District Farm to School Participation 2004-2012
(Erwin, 2012; DOE, 21012)

Despite the increase in number of FTI programs and the volume of product sold,
it is not yet clear how or whether these programs necessarily deliver all of the benefits
attributed to them. Massachusetts’ diverse and deep offering of FTI programs makes it an
ideal environment in which to study how different FTI programs may achieve these
benefits. In particular, this paper will provide the research foundation needed to analyze
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the market structures under which the claims that FTI contributes significantly to
increased revenues to regional farmers.
Massachusetts FTI Support Entities
Agricultural

Farm Bureau Agricultural Preservation Corporation

Business

Mass. Fruit Growers Association

Associations

National Association of College and University Food Services

Food Service
Associations

School Nutrition Association of MA
Berkshire Grown

"Buy Local"
Non-Profits

Northeast Harvest
Southeastern Mass. Agricultural Partnership (SEMAP)
Community Involved in Sustaining Agriculture (CISA)

Childhood

Mass. Public Health Association

Health &

Project Bread

Nutrition

Health Care Without Harm

Economic

MassDevelopment

Development

Franklin County Community Development Corporation (FCCDC)

Farm to
Institution

Project Bread
Mass. Farm to School Project
Springfield Farm to Preschool and Families Project
Mass. Dept. of Agricultural Resources

Government

Mass. Dept. of Public Health
USDA Rural Development

Figure 3 Massachusetts FTI Support Entities
This paper reviews the varied origins and goals of Massachusetts FTI programs,
describes the institutional wholesale markets for regionally grown differentiated products,
and summarizes the current market and suggests topics for future research, based on
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currently available data. In addition to the review of relevant published and publicly
available literature, the author conducted interviews and reviewed internal organizational
documents.
This paper is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of all Farm to Institution
programs in Massachusetts, but an outline of the markets that underlie these programs.

3.2.2 Origins and Goals
Farm to Institution programs have been inspired by a wide range of goals and
pursued by a variety of organizations. The major proponents of FTI programs in
Massachusetts have been:
•

Nutritionists, food access and public health advocates,

•

Organizations that advocate for regional economic development, and

•

Organizations that support farmers

Environmental sustainability does not appear to have been a primary driver of FTI
programs in Massachusetts, and this paper will not address environmental goals. This
section will offer a brief review of the origins and goals of FTI programs like those in
Massachusetts, and the state of current research that seeks to demonstrate the links
between them.

3.2.2.1 Nutrition and Access to Healthful Foods

Evidence that nutrition and health are closely linked has motivated nutritionists,
public health professionals, and other food access advocates to implement preventative
measures that combat nutrition and diet-related illnesses. It is not surprising that
institutional food service is seen as an ideal mechanism through which more healthful
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meals can be offered to at-risk populations in schools, hospitals, nursing homes and other
public or quasi- public settings (Briefel et al., 2009; Cohen, et al., 2012; Conner et. al,
2012). Institutional food service providers frequently supply basic sustenance to
consumers who are considered to be members of at-risk populations for nutrition-related
illness or disease, such as obesity or diabetes, and who may lack access to healthful foods
(Briefel et al. 2009, Cohen et al. 2012; Gordon, et al., 2009; Hawkes, 2009). This
subsection will outline the proposal that increased regional foods in institutional settings
can improve health outcomes.
FTI is not considered to be effective to reduce nutrition-related disease and illness
as a stand-alone program; FTI programs are pursued as one component of broad-based
health interventions for at-risk populations (Cohen, et al. 2012). Effective programs
comprehensively address a number of the economic, psychological and behavioral issues
that have been identified as barriers to healthful eating (Cohen, et al. 2012; Just, et al.
2008). For example, a comprehensive approach might offer a meal made with fresh
produce from a local farmer with a subsidy to incentivize the purchase of healthful foods,
a cooking class to promote the idea that healthful foods are satiating and taste good, a
visit to a local farm to teach students where food comes from, and the removal of snack
machines in cafeterias to help support new eating habits that include decreased
consumption of less healthful foods. The comprehensive approach sources and procures
healthful food; trains food service staff in nutrition and preparation of healthful foods;
provides consumers with information about health and nutrition; offers healthful foods in
a manner that encourages the selection of more healthful over less healthful foods;
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reduces the availability of less healthful foods; and tracks the actual consumption of
healthful foods (Just, et al. 2008; Briefel, et al., 2009).
The multi-faceted nature of the comprehensive approach, in addition to the recent
introduction of these programs, makes it difficult to isolate the importance of the role of
FTI, in and of itself, in achieving these health and nutrition related goals. Health and
nutrition-related studies that seek to verify the value of FTI programs in addressing these
issues appear to be focused on Farm to School programs, as opposed to Farm to Hospital,
or more general Farm to Cafeteria programs.
To demonstrate the value of FTI as a component of a comprehensive approach to
improve health outcomes, one would need to demonstrate that regional foods are
nutritionally superior or are more likely to be consumed than non-regional foods; that
education about and increased access to regional foods is directly linked to the increased
purchase and consumption of these foods; and that the increased consumption leads to a
decrease in nutrition related diseases. This is obviously a high bar, and these links have
not yet been conclusively demonstrated (Cohen, et al. 2012). The rest of the section will
focus on the pieces of evidence that FTI programs can impact health and nutrition
outcomes.
Farm to School programs operate under a specific set of constraints. These
constraints bind school food service providers to work within very tight budgets, and
adhere to an evolving landscape of nutritional requirements (Izumi, et al., 2010; Gordon,
et al., 2009). Public and non-profit private schools frequently participate in the National
School Lunch Program (NSLP) and School Breakfast Program (SBP), which subsidize
and provide USDA food for schools which offer free and reduced cost meals that meet
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the USDA’s dietary guidelines to eligible children (FNS, 2011). In addition, these
schools may have access to Department of Defense (DOD) commodity foods (FNS,
2011). Meals subsidized under NSLP and SBP are available to students whose families
are at or below 130 percent of the federal poverty level (free meals) and to students
whose families are between 130 and 185 percent of the federal poverty level (reducedprice meals) (Fox et al., 2012). Many schools supplement meals offered via USDA and
DOD programs with “competitive foods” - à la carte menu items, vending machines,
school stores, snack bars, and fundraisers, which students pay for in cash (Gordon et al.,
2009). These competitive foods are not required by the USDA to meet specific dietary
guidelines, although in 2010 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Legislature revised
Chapter 197 to regulate competitive foods (Erwin, 2012).
The USDA’s dietary guidelines for NSLP and SBP have changed over the years
as the understanding of the roles of different nutrients in a healthful childhood diet has
improved (Fox et al., 2012). The most recent guidelines limit the intake of total fats,
saturated fats, and sodium as well as recommended Dietary Allowances (RDA) or
Dietary Reference Intakes (DRI) for vitamins and minerals. Meals offered in schools
generally meet the dietary guidelines and NSLP nutritional requirements, but these
requirements have not historically limited or specified guidelines regarding sodium,
whole grains or fiber content, much less taste or palatability (Cho, et al., 2004; Clark, et
al., 2009). The USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) periodically conducts the
School Nutrition Dietary Assessment (SNDA) to determine student nutrient intake,
including both NSLP and SBP participants and non-participants. The most recent SNDA,
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which used a 24 hour student dietary recall along with 2004-2005 school menu reports,
found that while the number of schools that offer more healthful meals has increased,
“…Fewer than one-third of public schools offered and served school lunches that met the
USDA standards for total fat (no more than 30 percent of calories) or saturated fat (less
than 10 percent of calories)…” (Gordon et al., 2007). Because many of these food service
providers work on tight margins, often with significant public funding, school food
service providers have prioritized meeting the NSLP nutritional requirements, at times by
relying on low-cost inputs (Gordon, et al., 2009; Just, et al., 2008). The nutritional quality
and palatability of meals prepared with these low-cost inputs has been questioned, and
has fed the notion that more healthful meals would actually be consumed if better quality
products were offered (Cho, et al., 2004).
Research that validates the role of regionally sourced fresh fruits and vegetables
to achieve nutrition and public health goals is in its infancy, and reports that substantiate
this role often rely on program-level case studies and survey data (Graham, et al., 2004;
King, et al., 2010). Many non-peer reviewed studies indicate that consumption of fruits
and vegetables may increase when local or regional foods are offered through farmer’s
market salad bars or other farm to institution programs (Graham, et al., 2004). In 2007,
Faith, Monatine, Allison and Baskin reviewed different ways that institutions can address
the problems of food consumption and obesity by changing the food environment. Few of
the reviewed studies presented sound evidence that increased access to healthful food had
a direct impact on consumption or changes in consumption, though they found evidence
that indicated that subsidies for healthful food products did increase the purchase of more
healthful foods (Faith, et al. 2007). In some non-peer reviewed reports, the Faith et al.
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study is used to substantiate the link between increased access to -- and increased
consumption of -- more healthful foods. The validity of this link begs further analysis that
allows proper inference.
However, a recent study, published in 2012 in the Journal of the Academy of
Nutrition and Dietetics, analyzed the nutritional content of school meals offered through
the Boston Chef Initiative compared with the nutritional content of traditional meals in
control group schools that did not participate in the Chef Initiative program (Cohen, et
al.). The Chef Initiative program funded four trained professional chefs to work in two
public middle school cafeterias in Boston. The chefs worked with cafeteria staff to revise
the school lunch menu in selected schools to offer more flavorful lunches while
increasing whole grains, fruits and vegetables, and reducing sugar, salt, saturated fats,
and trans fats, and to plan and train kitchen staff to prepare more nutritionally healthful
meals. Meanwhile, two demographically comparable Boston public middle schools
continued to offer the “traditional” school lunches as a control. Pre- and postconsumption weights of plates from these schools were compared to determine whether
there was a difference in the quantity of the meal consumed. The results of this two-year
plate-weight pilot study indicated that, compared to the control group that offered less
healthful meals, when more healthful meals were offered to middle school students, a
similar percentage of school meals were consumed, which resulted in higher overall
consumption of more healthful foods (Cohen, et al. 2012). They hypothesizes that a
broad-based program designed to incorporate more healthful foods and improve
palatability of school meals would not negatively impact the amount of food consumed
was validated in this study. The study results supported this hypothesis, and Cohen et al.
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found no support for the contrary argument that students would eat less and waste more
when healthy foods were served to them via this program.
The Chef Initiative study did not use regionally grown food explicitly. No study
has demonstrated conclusively that regionally grown food is healthier. One frequently
cited and cautiously presented article, published in the Journal of the American College
of Nutrition in 2004, did conclude that there were real declines in certain nutrients
(protein, calcium, phosphorus, iron, riboflavin and ascorbic acid) in garden crops
between 1950 and 1999 (Davis, et al., 2004). The authors attribute these declines to the
increased cultivation of high-yield varieties (Davis, et al., 2004). To the author’s
knowledge, no comparable study of farm crops has been conducted, and no study has
demonstrated that “local” or “regional” foods have higher nutritional value than other
foods.
The Cohen et al. and Davis et al. studies are examples of the research currently
being undertaken to identify how to fit the causal links proposed by those who advocate
FTI programs to actual health outcomes. While these studies do not explicitly connect
regionally grown food with health outcomes, they offer pieces of the puzzle.
Understanding how, or whether, the pieces of a comprehensive campaign to prevent diet
and nutrition related illness fit together, and the role that FTI plays in that campaign, will
likely take many years. In the interim, public health professionals, nutritionists, and food
access advocates continue to incorporate FTI programs as components of campaigns that
introduce new, more healthful ways of eating to at-risk populations
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3.2.2.2 High Revenue Diversified Markets for Farmers

Supporters of local and regional agriculture, including regional interest groups,
non-profits and state departments of agriculture, advocate for FTI programs as a
consistent high-revenue market for nearby farmers (Anderson, 2007; Conner et. al. 2012;
Izumi et. al, 2010). Some supporters purport that the large scale of institutional food
service providers offers access to a large market for direct sales of locally or regionally based differentiated products with relatively small transaction costs, compared to direct
retail sales to consumers or smaller wholesale purchasers such as grocery stores and
restaurants (Conner et. al, 2012; King, et al., 2010; Izumi, et al., 2010). The economic
justification for the capacity of regional foods in the wholesale institutional market to
deliver higher revenues to farmers thus depends upon:
•

whether the “short” supply chain is able to minimize transaction costs and

deliver increased marginal revenues to farmers, similar to those resulting from
regional direct sales, and
•

whether the price premium for a regionally differentiated product is able

to capture a large enough premium over traditional wholesale products to
deliver a higher net revenue to farmers than other available markets (Brown et
al., 2012; Feenstra, et al., 2011; Low et al., 2010; Sexton, 2012).
This subsection will outline the proposal that farmers can increase revenues by
selling to the institutional market.
Early FTI sales linked farmers to occasional wholesale direct sales at schools,
often to prevent waste due to a bumper crop or a saturated market, or in a region where
an export crop was already in abundance (King, et al., 2010; Izumi, et al., 2010). More
consistent direct wholesale sales relationships followed, often coordinated by entities
“outside” of the supply chain, including non-profits or state departments of agriculture
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(King, et al., 2010). As volume and regularity of sales increased, operational
discrepancies between schools’ food procurement systems and farmers’ capacities
became more problematic (Brayley, et al., 2012; Conner, et al., 2011; Feenstra, et al.,
2011; Fitzsimmons, 2011; Leib 2012). Farmers do not always have the capacity to
produce large enough quantities of a particular product for delivery at a particular time,
the capacity to coordinate with other farmers to aggregate, the ability to lightly process or
wash produce to meet food service expectations, the ability to offer online purchasing or
become an approved vendor for school districts, or the ability to meet the rising bar for
on-farm food safety precautions, for example. For farmers who do have the capacity to
participate in direct sales to institutions, there is the potential to receive almost 100% of
the sale price. However, transaction costs absorbed by farmers associated with direct
sales are estimated in case studies to be between 13-62% (King, et. al, 2010). As a result,
FTI advocates have explored the addition of market intermediaries, such as wholesale
aggregators, broadline or regional food distribution companies, to the supply chain, as
these intermediaries’ capacities could fill the market gaps (Brayley, et al., 2012; Lieb,
2012).
Intermediaries can offer farmers and institutions with market services like orders,
purchases, packaging, sanitation guarantees, delivery, and billing, which are more in line
with a food service provider’s needs. The cost of these services must be absorbed by
farmers and institutions. In addition to an estimated 15-25% purchase price markup to
cover the transaction costs mentioned above, farmers can be required by intermediaries to
meet stringent and expensive food safety liability insurance (FSLI) and on-farm
sanitation guidelines like Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) that do not necessarily
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reflect the nature or scale of the farm (Feenstra, et al., 2011; King et.al. 2010; Erwin,
2012). In addition, the costs associated with transferring product information like the
characteristics of the differentiated product -- farm’s identity, growing conditions, and
sometimes the “local” quality of the product -- may be too high to be consistently
communicated to the purchaser, and thus to the consumer (Feenstra, et al., 2011; King et
al. 2010; Erwin, 2012). The exercise of market restraints, like FSLI, GAP, purchase
minimums, and the capture of margins associated with them, is common in agricultural
markets where downstream firms typically set contracts to protect food quality and safety
(Sexton, 2012).
In the recent paper, “Market Power, Misconceptions, And Modern Agricultural
Markets,” Richard Sexton writes that:
Market intermediaries, with even rather modest amounts of market power, can
capture large shares of the benefits from policies intended to benefit farmers
(2012).
While there is evidence that farmers who participate in direct-to-consumer sales are able
to capture a higher share of the food dollar, whether farmers who participate in
intermediated regional markets are able to capture a similarly high portion of the food
dollar is in question (Low & Vogel, et al., 2010). These realities challenge both the
notion that FTI programs necessarily generate net revenues to farmers comparable to
those seen in direct markets, as well as the idea that “regional” product differentiation
necessarily generates a price premium to farmers (Izumi, et al., 2010; King, et al., 2010).
These challenges, however, do not preclude the possibility that there are other
aspects to this market that do serve to increase revenues to farmers. To the extent that offgrade or surplus produce (smaller apples, peppers harvested at peak-season) are preferred
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by institutional buyers, these markets could be seen to offer farmers a premium price for
their marginal (but still regionally differentiated) products (Fitzsimmons, 2011; King, et
al., 2010). The willingness and capacity of institutional buyers to absorb transaction costs
or otherwise augment benefits to farmers (such as promoting the farmer through school
events) may bolster farmers’ revenues. In addition, participating in these markets clearly
is a way that farmers can diversify their businesses, and revenues are not thought to be
lower than in mainstream wholesale channels (King, et al., 2010). More relevant to an
analysis of market structure, some studies suggest that there is in fact a premium
available for regionally differentiated produce, and that some market structures are more
likely than others to preserve this premium for pass through to farmers (Brown, et al.,
2012; Feenstra, et al., 2011; King, et al., 2010). These concepts are explored in more
depth in the sections below.
There has been some indication that institutional sales in Massachusetts can be
profitable to farmers. The Massachusetts Farm to School Project commissioned telephone
surveys with farmers who sold institutions in 2008 and 2010 to inquire about the impact
of FTI sales on farmers’ profits (Adams, 2011). The survey results describe
Massachusetts farmers’ understanding of the profitability and role of FTI sales. The 2010
survey asked farmers who sold to institutions about:
•

Gross income from institutional sales

•

Whether the sales to institutions were profitable (Yes, No, Somewhat)

•

What percent of total annual product sales were institutional sales, if

known
•

Whether the farmer sold to a distributor that sells to institutions

The survey had a 68% response rate; 73 farmers completed the survey. Of these
73, 56% sold exclusively through direct sales to institutions, 14% sold both directly to
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institutions and through distributors to institutions, and 3% sold exclusively through
distributors to institutions. About 27% of the respondents did not sell to institutions in
2010.
Figure 4, Profitability of Actual Massachusetts FTI Sales, shows farmers’
perceptions of profitability from FTI sales. Of those farmers who sold directly to
institutions, 55% indicated that FTI sales were profitable, 27% indicated that FTI sales
were somewhat profitable, 14% indicated that FTI sales were not profitable, and 4% did
not know whether FTI sales were profitable. Profitability responses from farmers who
sold exclusively to distributors were not reported, and the profitability for farmers who
sold both through distributors and directly to institutions did not indicate whether one
supply chain contributed more or less to profitability than the other.

Profitability of Actual
Mass. FTI Sales, 2010
Profitable

Somewhat Profitable
Not Profitable
Don't know

Figure 3 Profitability of Actual MA FTI Sales, 2010 (Adams, 2011)
About 91% of respondents who sold to institutions estimated gross income and
the percentage of gross income from FTI sales. All of these respondents indicated that
less than 50% of gross sales were institutional sales, about 19% indicated that FTI sales
accounted for 10-50% of gross sales, and 81% indicated less than 10% of gross sales
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were FTI sales, as shown in Figure 5. Farmers’ Percent of Gross Income from FTI sales
in Massachusetts. Dollar amounts for income from sales to institutions were provided by
79% of respondents and totaled $1.32 million for the 2009-2010 school year. While the
average income from FTI sales, based on these results, is about $31,474 per farm, the
author of the report notes that correcting for a few outlying farms with large reported FTI
sales puts the per farm average sales at $5,753 per farm.

Farmers' Percent of Gross
Income from FTI Sales in Mass.,

10-50%

Less than 10 %

Figure 4 Farmer’s Percent of Gross Income from FTI Sales in MA, 2010
(Adams, 2011)

The report also noted some farmers’ comments. Farmers noted the trade-offs
between costs associated with FTI sales and the profitability of these sales, the noneconomic benefits of FTI sales such as community “exposure”, the role of FTI sales in
stabilizing seasonal income streams, the personal value of helping feed schoolchildren,
and the “premium” nature of the product sold.
In the language of economics and market structure, these comments and the
survey results identify a need to understand the relationships between profitability of
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direct sales and intermediated sales, the trade-offs associated with added transaction
costs, the market value of the differentiated product, and the motivations beyond profit
for farmers who sell to institutions.

3.2.2.3 Local Food as Economic Development

Recently, public officials and economic development organizations joined
regional and local FTI advocates, who emphasize the role of agriculture in local and
regional economic development (Izumi, et al., 2010). The idea that there are multiplier
effects created from the purchase of local products flows from the idea that money is kept
in circulation within a region, as opposed to flowing out of the region (King, et al., 2010).
This would occur, as O’Hara and Pirog point out, if farmers subsequently purchase
inputs, hire labor, and access capital within the region in question (Hilchey, 2013). This
subsection will outline the proposal that increased sales of regionally grown foods to
institutions can have a net positive effect on the regional economy.
Studies that attempt to quantify the general or broad “impact” of local and
regional agriculture on a regional economy generally estimate the potential economic
value of a large increase in fruit and vegetable production and purchasing in a given
region, often based on a “what-if” scenario. For example, “What if all of the end
consumers for institutional food in a region consumed the USDA recommended
quantities of fruits and vegetables, and these fruits and vegetables were all grown within
the region?” Input-output models and tools (e.g., IMPLAN) used to calculate the direct,
indirect, and induced effects of these “what-if” scenarios can be illuminating, but require
a series of assumptions that may or may not reflect the actual regional economy being
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modeled. Such assumptions include both the parameters that are assigned to different
events within the economy, as well as the nature of the regional economy itself.
A handful of recent studies that aim to quantify economic impact from regional or
local food modify the parameters in standard input-output models to obtain more accurate
results – these studies, along with the recent article “Economic Impacts of Local Food
Systems: Future Research Priorities” offer a review of the challenges associated with
conducting and drawing inferences from a rigorous input-output study (Gunter, 2011;
Hilchey, 2013; Otto et al., 2005; Swenson, 2011; Tuck, et al., 2010).
O’Hara and Pirog note four potential challenges associated with the parameters
values of input-output models. The values may:
•

Be out of date

•

Be “at a coarser resolution than the researcher’s specified area of study”

•

Represent “average conditions”, while the researchers may be attempting

to model specific conditions
•

May not be “based on statistical analysis”

They further recommend that researchers who use these models customize the
parameters in question, and document these modifications for future comparison
(Hilchey, 2013).
While regional economic “impact” studies of increased local production and
consumption can include institutional purchases, most studies do not specifically address
the role of FTI programs on economic development outcomes. An input-output study that
pursues this line of questioning for Massachusetts would likely need to ask “What if
Massachusetts producers grew enough fruit and vegetables to supply all of the wholesale
institutional purchasers in Massachusetts, and these purchasers restricted their purchases
of these products to only those products grown in Massachusetts?” Two studies, which
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use FTI programs in Colorado and Minnesota, have made some progress towards
answering similar questions on smaller scales.
The Minnesota study proposed to answer the question “what is the potential
economic impact of farm-to-school programs in Central Minnesota,” and to model impact
that explicitly “accounted for decreased expenditures in the current supply chain and the
potential for increased costs to the community in the form of higher lunch prices” (Tuck
et al., 2010). Tuck et al. both conducted interviews with food service providers and
farmers, and used pre-existing Minnesota food service survey demand data to frame
IMPLAN scenarios. The study created scenarios under which schools serve all meals,
some meals, or only special monthly meals, to model the “what if” shift in demand, and
used three different prices – one price that reflects a “farm price” near to the farmer’s
current market price, another “school price” that reflects the lower price that schools
currently pay for equivalent product, and a third “intermediate price” that is halfway
between the “farm price” and “school price.” The study finds that the largest multiplier
effects result from the scenarios under which all of the products that are available locally
are purchased, and where the farm price is used. However, the greatest positive regional
economic effect occurs when the “school price” is used, as any higher price increases the
costs to the public, which must pay for the increased cost of school meals. This result
suggests that there may be a tension between achieving all FTI goals – an increase in the
quantity of local foods served may not always be compatible with offering a price
premium to the farmer.
The Colorado study also uses IMPLAN to “quantify the direct impact of the Weld
6 [School District] Farm to School program on the local economy” (Gunter, 2011). The
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Colorado study, however, goes to greater lengths to customize IMPLAN to more
accurately represent the direct marketing sector (Gunter, 2011). Gunter relied more
heavily on survey and secondary data than did Tuck et al. to modify farmer decision
making parameter values and the relative importance of key economic decisions by all
supply chain actors. The study estimated demand for the school district in question as
10% of all direct sales in Colorado for both fruits and vegetables, calculated with 2007
Census data, and further assumes an allocation of sales between fruit and vegetables
based on the school district’s purchase data. Gunter models four scenarios, but suggests
that the most accurate scenario is that under which demand is not “new”, but shi FTS
from already existing wholesale demand, and the above mentioned modifications to
IMPLAN are incorporated. In this scenario, the increased local food purchases resulted in
a modest positive net effect on the regional economy.
An additional challenge for economic impact assessments is to appropriately
factor in the opportunity costs of transferring land, labor and technology from one area of
production to another (Swenson, 2010). Regions are distinct in both the existing areas of
production that would be reduced and the potential area that could be increased. Each
region is distinct in productivity of its farmland - the yields from an acre of land devoted
to carrot production in Iowa may not be comparable to that of an acre of land in
Massachusetts. Further, each region is distinct in the availability of productive farmland –
“what if” scenarios do not generally restrict the potential supply of production.
These caveats, along with others outlined in the reports mentioned in this section,
suggest that “economic impact” studies conducted with input-output models warrant a
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cautious reading, and that it is nearly impossible to extrapolate the findings of a particular
study to predict the nature of effects in other regions.
For example, Swenson’s 2010 report sought to quantify the economic value of
increasing fruit and vegetable production and consumption within each of the Upper
Midwest states, and again with selected sub-regions within that region. In this report, the
cost of taking agricultural land out of corn and soybean production, including subtracting
income from farm workers and revenues to local seed and supply firms, e.g., was
weighed against the increase in employment and revenues from new fruit and vegetable
production. Similar reports in other regions likewise used input-output models and found
potential positive economic effects to increased regional fruit and vegetable production
and consumption, but to date these studies appear to focus on regions that would swap
one agricultural use of land for another (Conner, et al., 2008; Otto & Varner, et al., 2005;
VSJF, 2011).
To date, no comparable study has been conducted for Massachusetts, and it is
therefore difficult to state with any confidence that increased production and
consumption of Massachusetts produced food could be a net driver of economic
development in the manner often suggested. In addition to the concerns above, a key
component of these studies – i.e., the switch between agricultural uses of land - does not
accurately represent the trade-offs that would need to be taken into consideration in
Massachusetts. The value of land in Massachusetts is relatively high and alternative uses
of land are likely to return higher economic values to non-agricultural uses, and perhaps
non-FTI agricultural uses. For example, Figure 6 shows the Farm Real Estate Value of
Land, which the USDA defines as an average of “the value at which all land and
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buildings used for agricultural production, including dwellings, could be sold under
current market conditions, if allowed to remain on the market for a reasonable amount of
time” for Massachusetts was $10,500 per acre in 2012 (USDA, Land Values, 2012). The
2012 farm real estate value per acre of land in Iowa, which had the highest average land
value of the states used in Swenson’s report, was $7,000. Average land value in Vermont,
which was studied in the Vermont Sustainable Jobs Fund report was $2,750 per acre, and
the value per acre in Michigan, which was studied in the Conner et al. report, was $4,250.
Swenson’s report used 2007 Agricultural Census and purchased IMPLAN data; the
difference between Iowa and Massachusetts farm land values in 2007 was even greater $3,958 per acre in Iowa versus $14,276 in Massachusetts (USDA, Agricultural Census,
2007).

2012 Farm Real Estate Value of
Land
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Figure 5 2012 Farm Real Estate Value of Land (USDA, 2013)
Another important difference between the scenarios offered above and the
intermediated market of interest in Massachusetts is the relationship between prices,
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transaction costs and the availability of supply chain infrastructure. While the Swenson
study assumes that the infrastructure required for “scaling up” is available, both the Tuck
and Gunter studies assume that FTI sales are direct sales, and that farmers in these
scenarios absorb the additional transaction costs associated with Farm to Institution sales
and earn any associated increase in the share of food dollars.
Finally, it is not entirely clear that agricultural markets for regionally
differentiated goods are perfectly competitive markets. Input-output models are based on
the economic assumption that the markets modeled are perfectly competitive and in
equilibrium. If these markets are not, in fact, perfectly competitive, then input-output
models may not have the power to illuminate economic effects of changes in the market
inputs or parameters.
The diversity of the origins and goals of these programs in Massachusetts has
resulted in a number of innovative FTI programs. While increasing the amount of locally
or regionally produced food in institutional settings is the common short-term strategy
among the programs, the end goals diverge and are often more in line with the
provenance of the group that has promoted or implemented the program. However, it is
generally agreed among these groups that each of the goals contribute to a larger shared
vision of a more equitable and just food system. Ultimately, health goals, economic
development goals, and environmental goals of FTI all depend on whether the farmer can
profitably sell to the institutional market.

3.2.3 Massachusetts Grown Wholesale FTI Market
Whether the farmer can profitably sell to the institutional market depends on
whether the product can command a price premium, or whether the costs associated with
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production and marketing preserve enough of the sale price for farmers. The structure of
the market influences these conditions. This section introduces the language and structure
of the microeconomic theories of industrial organization and information to the existing
market in Massachusetts, as described by market participants in interviews, and internal
organizational documents, such as annual surveys, intake sheets, and meeting notes.
This section first describes the differentiated local or regional product and how
the product attributes relate to unique characteristics of the market. The context and
institutions under which this market may exist are explored, including market channels,
supply and demand for these products, supply chain actors, and characteristics of the
supply chain with respect to contracts, information and regulation. This section will then
offer five different models of operational FTI supply chains within this market in
Massachusetts. Three recent USDA reports, the 2010 report “Local Food Systems:
Concepts, Impacts, and Issues” and “Comparing the Structure, Size, and Performance of
Local and Mainstream Food Supply Chains,” and the 2011 “Direct and Intermediated
Marketing of Local Foods in the United States,” offer helpful compilations of similar
regionally-grown market studies from around the country, as well as useful common sets
of terms, which we employ throughout this report (King, et al., 2010; Martinez, et.al.,
2010; Low & Vogel, 2011).
The scope of this section will be limited to fresh fruits and vegetables, as they
represent the most common products delivered through FTI supply chains, and existing
research and policy tends to be centered on these products. Massachusetts FTI programs
also encompass beef, poultry, fish, and dairy supply chains (Erwin, 2012).
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3.2.3.1 “Locally” or “Regionally” Differentiated Product

There is currently no concise, universal definition for what constitutes a “local” or
“regional” product. The most widely referred-to guidelines are defined by Martinez et al.,
and rely on a spatial definition that links the products’ origins to their points of
consumption, usually in terms of miles, but also in terms of the state or region (2010).
Reports and studies that use USDA data tend to employ the NASS Census agricultural
product designation “Direct Sales for Human Consumption” as the best proxy for
“Local”, but acknowledge that this category is imperfect, as it omits products that are
sold through intermediated channels, such as wholesale institutional sales through
regional distributors.
However, case studies and experiments indicate that the terms “local” and
“regional” may imply more than the distance between producer and consumer (Conner et
al., 2012; Darby et al., 2008; Dentoni, et al., 2009; Feenstra, et al., 2011; Thilmany, et al.,
2008). For consumers, these terms may carry connotations of quality and freshness, the
impact that the growing practices may have on the consumers’ community and
environment, and an idea that their purchase has a positive net effect on the local or
regional economy (Cembalo, et al., 2012; Darby, et al., 2008; Dentoni, et al., 2012;
Wirth, et al., 2012; Lusk, et al., 2006; Thilmany, et al., 2008).
These connotations are quality attributes, or characteristics of the product which
indicate that consumers may be willing to pay a premium for the product, compared to a
similar product without the “local” or “regional” designation. In this sense, these products
are differentiated from other available products, which may look and taste the same, but
do not carry additional information about the perceived impact of the consumers
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purchase. These quality attributes are “credence attributes,” or attributes that some
consumers may believe to be true, but do not have means to verify (Dentoni, et al., 2009;
Sexton, 2012). Such information about specific qualities of regionally differentiated
products – and therefore traceability and food safety attributes – is considered to be more
accessible in shorter supply chains.
This implicit product differentiation is thought to create market value (Feenstra, et
al., 2011, Izumi, et al., 2010; King et al., 2010; Thilmany, et al., 2008). In the case of
regionally differentiated products in institutional wholesale markets, it can be difficult for
an end consumer to know with certainty whether the product available for purchase meets
the standards that the individual consumer has in mind. This certainty should arise from
the consumers’ belief that each of the intermediaries, who prepared, purchased, sourced,
transported, and grew the product, both shared these standards and verified the standards
at each step along the way.
For this reason, the institutional market for regionally differentiated products is
unique from both the traditional wholesale institutional market and the direct to consumer
market for regionally differentiated products. Market interactions carry an additional
burden of information verification. This burden can be interpreted as one of traceability
and labeling, which begs the question of enforceability, or as a burden of trust and
relationships, which similarly begs the question of the dependence of the market on the
non-market entities that foster and monitor these relationships (Feenstra, et al., 2011).
For the purposes of this paper, we will simply allow that participants in these
markets share mutually agreeable definitions of “regional” or “local”. We will use the
terms “local” and “regional” interchangeably. Further discussion of the role these product
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attributes play in the FTI market will be addressed in the Information, Regulation, and
Contracts section below.

3.2.3.2 Value Added vs. Not Value Added Product

A raw product that has undergone some physical change of state prior to its
purchase by the food service institution, such as primary and secondary processing, is
considered a value-added product. Some examples include coined carrots or washed salad
greens.
The USDA’s definition of “value added” calls for the incremental market value
added to the product by its change of state to accrue to the farmer, which can occur only
if the product underwent this change of state prior to its purchase by the food service
providers (USDA, Value Added Producer Grant, 2012). Primary Processing in these
market channels is conducted on-farm. If the same kind of processing, for example, coincutting carrots, is conducted in the food service kitchen by the food service management
company, it is referred to as On-Site Processing, and the product is not considered to be
value-added. Secondary Processing in this supply chain is assumed to be value-added
because the secondary processor in Massachusetts is a non-profit organization that passes
the added value on to the farmer.

3.2.3.3 Fresh vs. Frozen or Canned Product

Fresh marketing channels, as opposed to extended-season marketing channels,
appear to account for the highest volume of “regional” sales in the country, and can be
divided into intermediated supply chains and fresh direct-to-consumer supply chains
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(Low & Vogel, 2011). Fresh marketing channels are characterized by their short supply
chains, which allow farmers to capture a larger percentage of the sales price (Low &
Vogel, 2011). Farms must perform additional tasks in this supply chain, such as
marketing, storage, distribution, pricing, and sales that may increase farmers’ transaction
costs. Generally, small and mid-sized farms selling fresh direct (“annual sales of
agricultural products are less than $250,000 for small farms and $500,000 for mid-size
farms - hereafter referred to as small farms”) can absorb these additional tasks given their
smaller volumes (USDA, Small and Mid- Sized Farms, 2012; Martinez, et al., 2010).
However, larger farms (over $500,000 in annual sales) either need to invest in onfarm capacity, or participate in an intermediated marketing channel (Martinez, et al,
2010; Low & Vogel, 2011). FTI advocates maintain that a consistent fresh wholesale
sales relationship with an end purchaser in the form of a large institution allows farmers
to minimize transaction costs, while capturing a high percentage of the sales price. Sales
to a fresh wholesale distributor or aggregator transfer these transaction costs to the
intermediaries, but reduce the percentage of the sales price that flows directly to the
farmer.
The fresh marketing channel in New England is restricted by seasonality. In
response, a small “extended season” intermediated wholesale marketing channel has
developed in Massachusetts. This intermediated marketing channel resembles the fresh
intermediated marketing channel, with the addition of a secondary processor which
purchases fresh product directly from the farmer, and freezes or cans the product for sale
to institutions during the winter season. Frozen or canned products undergo a series of
physical changes in state that allows the product to be consumed in the off—season.
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Some examples include frozen broccoli or canned tomatoes. Extended-season marketing
channels are those channels in which Secondary Processing has occurred.
This addition incurs additional transaction costs, and likely reduces the net
income to the farmer. However, in this case the processor is also non-profit market
support entity with capital costs that are already invested, and the processor uses the
regional produce market wholesale price index as a benchmark price. Thus, the processor
does not extract economic profits and farmers receive prices for their products that
represent their best alternative prices, which are current wholesale prices.

3.2.3.4 Supply and Demand

It is a challenge to estimate the supply and demand for local or regional fruits and
vegetables, particularly with respect to intermediated markets (King, et al., 2010; Low &
Vogel, 2011; Timmons, 2008). While publicly available data can describe who grew
what, nationally gathered data has not historically identified product channels – it is
difficult to say to whom products were sold. In addition, aggregated consumer purchases
of fruits and vegetables are not publicly available, so it is difficult to describe the actual
demand for fruits and vegetables in general, much less for fruits and vegetables that come
from a specified area and are sold to consumers within that area. Practitioners and
researchers do not generally have access to food distributors’ private data, which can
track where product is purchased and where it is sold. It is a challenge to track sales of a
product grown in a specified area, particularly in New England, with relatively small
states and distribution networks centered in multi-state regions.
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It is clearly a challenge, then, to further isolate the relationship between
Massachusetts farmers and Massachusetts institutions using publicly available data. The
supply of, and demand for, fruit and vegetable products for FTI programs in
Massachusetts overlaps with FTI programs in other New England states. This paper will
not attempt to quantify either supply or demand in this market. Instead, this section will
mention some of the methods used to estimate supply and demand of local or regional
products, and offer data that describes the overall agricultural trends in Massachusetts.
Placed alongside national characteristics of direct-to-consumer and the intermediated
markets described in the Massachusetts Grown Wholesale Market section above, this
section sketches the supply and demand in the FTI intermediated wholesale market in the
state.
The USDA’s National Agriculture Statistical Service (NASS) takes a census of
agriculture every five years, and conducts annual surveys. However, past data collection
has primarily emphasized producer and product characteristics, and has not requested
detailed information about the various supply chains through which agricultural products
flow. Data that track the number of farms participating in direct-to-consumer supply
chains (a farmer who sells directly to the end consumer, e.g., at a farmers’ market,
roadside stand, or through a CSA) and the value of these sales has been collected since
1978. However, survey questions that elicit information about intermediated supply
chains were introduced in the 2008 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS)
survey conducted by the Economic Research Service (ERS), and only the 2011 ARMS
separated questions on direct-to-consumer sales from intermediated sales and requested
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information that could allow researchers to quantify the role of institutional markets in
intermediated marketing channels (Low & Vogel, 2011).
National 2008 ARMS data suggests that including locally marketed food that
flows through intermediated market channels (farmers’ sales to local retail, restaurants,
and regional distributors) increases the estimated volume of “local food” about four-fold,
compared to the volume suggested by the NASS census that tracks direct-to-consumer
sales (Low & Vogel, 2011). The value of the food that flows through intermediated
channels is three times that marketed through direct-to-consumer channels. While farms
of all sizes sell through each of these marketing channels, more large farms sell through
intermediated market channels with more supply chain steps, and more small farms sell
through market channels with fewer supply chain steps (Low & Vogel, 2011). Nationally,
USDA researchers estimate that for farms of all sizes who market local foods, 61% of
gross farm sales are local foods (Low & Vogel, 2011). Low and Vogel further suggest
that the high share of local food sales demonstrates integration of these farms into
existing direct-to-consumer and intermediated supply chains (2011).
While the number of farms in Massachusetts has increased in the last 5 years,
these farms decreased in size (USDA, 2012). At the same time, the number of farms
engaged in direct-to-consumer sales has increased, as has the per farm sales of direct-toconsumer marketed products (USDA, 2012). “The value of sales directly to consumers on
a per farm basis” in 2007 was $25,356 in Massachusetts, which places the
Commonwealth at the second highest per farm value of direct to consumer sales in the
nation (USDA, 2011).
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Studies do quantify the existing overall production of fresh fruits and vegetables
in Massachusetts, and attempt to quantify the amount of production consumed locally,
with varying degrees of success. Fruit and nut tree farms and vegetable and melon farms
in Massachusetts reported the market value of products grown in Massachusetts in 2007
at $58,995,669, or about 32% of the total market value of all farm products grown in the
state; however, it is unclear what proportion of these sales were in-state, much less
whether they were sold directly or through distributors to institutions, restaurants,
processors, or retail operations (USDA, 2012). Timmons et al. used 2002 NASS data to
estimate that a maximum of 5.6% of all foods grown in Massachusetts were sold as
direct-to- consumer “local” foods (2008). For this to increase, some combination of
increased farm productivity and the amount of land in production would need to increase.
Increasing these factors may be a challenge in Massachusetts: “While Massachusetts has
519,000 acres of land in farms, only 119,000 acres of that land is cropland with prime
agricultural soils—the best land for food production” (Bowell, et al., 2008).
It is not known how the increase in the percentage of Massachusetts schools that
participate in FTI, described in the introduction above, translates into the dollar value or
quantity of product sold. While some schools are committed to increasing the volume of
product they purchase, others only buy occasionally. The University of Massachusetts
Amherst, for example, now purchases about 25% of its produce regionally, while some
schools purchase one delivery of apples each year (Toong, 2010). The consensus at this
time seems to be that there are very few scenarios under which the supply of
Massachusetts grown products could keep up with the institutional demand for these
regionally grown products (Erwin, 2012). In 2013, the USDA’s Food and Nutrition
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Service conducted the first-ever National Farm to School Census, which asked public
school districts about their participation in Farm to School programs. The results, when
available, may be able to help quantify the current dollar value of demand for Farm to
School purchases in public school districts.

3.2.3.5 Market Channels

The wholesale farm to institution market in Massachusetts is an intermediated
market for locally-based differentiated products, comprised of five different marketing
channels that are characterized by:
•

How many times the product changes hands, or the potential “degree of

markup”, explained in detail below.
•

Whether the product has “undergone a change in physical state” –referred

to as value-added or not value-added (i.e., washed, peeled, or chopped), and
•

Whether the product is fresh, or frozen / canned (USDA Value-Added

Producer Grant, 2012; Low & Vogel, 2011).
The use of the term “direct sales” poses a challenge in this scheme. According to
Low and Vogel, literature on FTI frequently describes sales between a farm and an
institution as “direct”, although it is understood that there is an additional sale from the
institution to the end consumer – the student, patient, etc. “Generally, marketing channels
are classified as intermediated when local food products pass through one or more
intermediate steps in the local food supply chain before reaching the consumer” (King, et
al., 2010). The rest of this document will abandon the term “direct,” and instead refer to
the degree of markup.
The market channels, in turn, are comprised of supply chains. The supply chains
are models of relationships between different “supply chain actors” -- the farm
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businesses, aggregators, processors, distributors, food service providers, and other
organizational entities that support markets. In this paper, end consumers, such as
students and patients, are also referred to as supply chain actors. The life-cycle of the
supply chain is modeled linearly, and actors are defined relative to other actors.
“Upstream actors” refers to those firms whose actions are nearer the beginning of the
chain, and “downstream actors” refers to those firms and consumers whose actions are
nearer the end of the chain (Waldmen et al., 2007). For example, a food service provider
is upstream of the consumer, but downstream of the farmer.

3.2.3.6 Markup

Potential “degrees of mark-up” refers to the minimum numbers of transactions
through which the product has changed hands. Each time the product changes hands, a
transaction cost is incurred, and there is potential to add a “markup.” The concept of
markup arises from the ability of the supply chain actor to add an economic profit margin
to a product, above the transaction cost to perform the supply chain step (Carlton &
Perloff, 2005). Economic profit refers to profit that is extracted above and beyond the
transaction costs incurred, including the cost of foregoing all other opportunities. Markup
occurs when the supply chain actor possesses some degree of market power. In a
perfectly competitive economy, like those modeled in the “Local Foods as Economic
Development” section above, it is assumed that sellers do not make an economic profit
from sales. It is difficult to say, at this stage, whether or how much market power any of
the supply chain actors in the FTI supply chain actually have, and therefore whether any
markup charged by a supply chain actor accrues as profit to that actor or is simply a
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reflection of the transaction costs incurred by that actor. However, this concept is
included because it provides terminology to differentiate between gradations of long or
short supply chains and highlights a major question that must be asked in future research
in order to determine the long term viability of FTI supply chains.
It is also important to note that in FTI supply chains, market power could be
exercised to achieve non-economic, values-based outcomes (Izumi, et al., 2010).
A low degree of markup, or “3rd degree marginalization”, indicates that the
product has changed hands at least twice – once from the farmer to the food service
provider, and once from the food service provider to the final consumer (what is referred
to as “direct sales” in much of the literature). A medium degree of markup, or “4th degree
marginalization”, indicates that the product has changed hands three times – from the
farmer to a distributor, and from the distributor to the food service provider, and then
from the food service provider to the consumer. A high degree of markup, or “5th degree
marginalization” indicates that the product has changed hands at least four times – from
the farmer to a processor, from the processor to a distributor, from the distributor to the
food service provider, and then from the food service provider to the consumer. Note that
in each of these cases, an additional transaction may occur when an upstream farmeraggregator aggregates product from a number of different farmers prior to selling it
downstream. This happens more frequently as the volume of product required by a
downstream purchaser increases.
The products that move through the 3rd and 4th degree marginalization marketing
channels may either be completely unprocessed, fresh produce when they are delivered to
the food service provider, or they may be products that undergo some primary

82

processing. For example, whole, unpeeled carrots without the greens are considered nonvalue added products, while peeled, coin-cut carrots are considered to have gone through
some primary processing. In Massachusetts, some farms have primary processing
equipment on site; often these farmers will act as aggregators and purchase unprocessed
produce from other farmers, perform some primary processing on the product, and then
sell the product to the downstream actor.
Unique to Massachusetts, at the time of this writing, is an operational extendedseason processing facility that has the capacity to freeze or can large quantities of product
for sales in the off-season. This marketing channel is 5th degree marginalized.
Direct-to-consumer sales referred to in much of the literature would be
characterized as 2nd degree marginalization, from the farmer directly to the consumer.
This is clearly not likely in the institutional wholesale supply chain.

3.2.3.7 Supply Chain Actors

This section defines and describes the people, businesses, and organizations that
move food between farmers and institutions in Massachusetts.
Farms that participate in FTI are generally small to mid - sized farms, with
revenues between $50,000 and $250,000 (Low & Vogel, 2011). Some of these farmers
play the role of aggregator. They aggregate product from other farmers to sell
downstream (Diamond & Barham, 2012). Some of these farmers conduct Primary
Processing.
Aggregators need not be farmers – they can also be private firms or co-operatives
of farmers who operate an aggregation business collectively. Aggregators source product
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from a number of different farmers for sale downstream, often in order to meet the
volume required by the downstream producer. Farmers may aggregate and then conduct
Primary Processing.
Secondary Processors, as described in this supply chain, transform freshly
harvested product from a farmer or aggregator into a value-added product by changing its
physical state (USDA, Value Added Producer Grant, 2012). Processors may include farm
operations, aggregators, and processing facilities. Primary processing refers to the first
(and often only) round of processing, peeling or chopping freshly harvested vegetables,
for example. In some supply chains, primary processing is performed by food service
providers, which we will refer to as on-site processing. Depending on the supply chain
actor and their institutional capacities, this processing may be performed manually or by
large, specialized machinery. Secondary processing preserves the product and allows it to
be served in institutions out of season – for example, freezing or canning. Specialized
facilities with large capacities are generally required to perform secondary processing
efficiently and according to food safety requirements. These products are referred to as
extended season products.
Broadline Distribution Companies source and stock a wide range of food and
food service products, and offer these products to institutional purchasers. Distributors
purchase product from the farmer or processor, at times process the product, and then sell
the product to institutions. Distributors source and provide access to a wide variety of
perishable and non-perishable goods, and perform a number of services in institutional
food service markets (Izumi, et al., 2006). Broadline distribution companies may require
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food businesses to meet packaging and labeling requirements, which provide important
information for tracking and rotating stock (Audile et al., 2012).
Regional Produce Distribution companies source, store, and deliver usually fresh
produce to institutional purchasers. These companies may offer a more limited range of
specialized products. Some regional distributors adopt a “we don’t own it” policy, where
the services contracted may include brokerage and transportation, but the distributor
never takes ownership over the product, even when the product is in physical possession
of the distributor.
Food Service Providers may receive freshly harvested product (not value-added),
value-added product, or extended season product. If they receive non-value added
products they may need to process the product in some way (peel or chop carrots, e.g.).
Food service providers prepare meals and sell these meals to consumers, which in this
example are students. To sell the product to students, food service providers engage in a
number of supply chain activities. They also plan meals, source product, meet federal and
state nutrition guidelines, hire and train food service staff, receive, bill and invoice
suppliers, etc.
Institutions such as schools, hospitals, group homes, and nursing homes either
have in-house food service staff, or contract with a food service management company.
Many of these institutions are funded from government sources, operate as bidders on
publicly funded contracts, or receive remittances from government sources. This funding
goes hand in hand with requirements to provide meals that meet nutritional standards. In
addition, certain kinds of funds (notably for schools with students who qualify for free
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and reduced meals) correspond with the availability of very low cost food from the
USDA.
Food service companies that pursue procurement of locally grown foods will
likely have more market power than individual in-house food service operations, because
they may be able to aggregate demand from many different institutions. A very large
institution, such as a university or urban school district that operates without a food
service management company may also wield market power because of the ability to
aggregate demand. The mix of public funds and à la carte payments for meals can impact
an institution’s ability to purchase specialty items, such as regionally or locally produced
food. Paradoxically, schools with lower à la carte sales and higher free and reduced lunch
percentages receive larger and more regular quantities of USDA foods, which allow them
more flexibility in their procurement budgets. This counterintuitive result arises because
the comparatively low cost of USDA foods frees up purchasing dollars in the food budget
for other purchases.
Smaller institutions, institutions in agricultural regions and/or in communities that
advocate for regional procurement, may have additional flexibility in their procurement
options (King, et al., 2010). Some states or localities have passed ordinances that allow
schools to bypass low-bid offers for a certain percentage of regional purchases. In some
cases, the proximity of regional farms and community-based relationships pave the way
for regional procurement (King, et al., 2010). Some of the incompatibilities between a
farm operation and an institution can be mitigated by institutional infrastructure that has
not been “updated” and therefore de-equipped, i.e., for institutional kitchens that still
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have ovens, stovetops, blenders and choppers, instead of only microwaves and steam heat
trays.
Support Entities include a wide range of organizations that provide some level of
market support to any of the supply chain actors in FTI programs. Often these entities are
considered to be outside of the market, and are not modeled as supply chain actors, but as
they have historically served and continue to serve certain key market roles, we include
them in the model. The Massachusetts Department of Agricultural Resources funds
assistance to introduce the market to both farmers and institutions. Non-profit
organizations such as M FTSP and SEMAP act as modified brokers, in the sense that they
collect information regarding different supply chain actors’ preferences and capacities,
and link and encourage relationships between these actors. These organizations, along
with others such as Community Involved in Sustaining Agriculture (CISA) and national
organizations like the National Farm to School Network offer tools for both farmers and
institutions to use as they navigate these new markets, including how-to’s, sample
procurement forms, best practices, and workshops. In the extended season supply chain,
the Franklin County Community Development Corporation (FCCDC) has a pure market
role as processor, including negotiating prices and contracts and taking ownership of
product. Non-profits also provide marketing services, and develop marketing tools to
communicate the value of the differentiated product (i.e., “local food”) – some examples
include posters, calendars, trading cards, and events, such as the Massachusetts Harvest
for Schools Week, which takes place each September. These entities have worked to
change the political and regulatory landscape regarding local, state, and federal levels
with successes that range from new nutrition guidelines to new preferential purchasing

87

agreements. Finally, the continued involvement of these entities has served the critical
role of verifying the characteristics of the regionally differentiated product, and
communicating that the product meets the requirement of credibility to both upstream and
downstream actors.
Consumers in the supply chain examples are students who purchase meals from
food service providers and, in some cases, their parents.

3.2.3.8 Information, Regulation, and Contracts

End consumers and institutional purchasers may find it challenging to confirm
information about a “local” product. As discussed above, a “local” product implies a
number of product attributes. Some of these attributes relate to the product itself – it is
presumed to be fresher, and therefore have better taste and texture, and perhaps an
improved nutrient profile. Some of the attributes relate to the process that has produced
the product; for example, consumers presume that the product was grown with fewer
chemical inputs, it traveled fewer food miles than comparable products, it was grown
within a certain distance from its purchase, or farmers and farm workers earned a living
wage in its production. Process attributes may also relate to the food safety associated
with the product – because it is grown locally, farmers may be compelled to ensure that
the product is not spoiled or contaminated. Finally, some of these attributes relate to the
presumed implications of purchasing the product: that purchasing the product keeps
productive farmland in use; that money earned is used in the community and has a
multiplier effect that benefits the entire community and that is greater than the multiplier
for non-“local” food. Some of the attempts to verify whether these presumed attributes
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are accurate are addressed above. To reiterate, there is no industry-accepted standard to
date that offers, labels, or enforces whether the “local” product does exhibit any of these
product attributes.
The supply chain modeled in Figure 5 shows where the ownership of the product
and/or the physical possession of the product are transferred. But each of these points
also shows where product information is transferred, as well as where market supports
may be offered, transaction costs may be incurred, or economic profits may be captured.
Product attribute information may be explicitly communicated – a farmer may tell an
institutional buyer that the product was grown without pesticides and harvested that
morning, or a farmer may label a box of peppers with the farm name and address. The
product attribute information may also be implicitly communicated – the product is
labeled as “local” on a distributor’s price list, or a market support entity has
recommended a farmer to a purchaser, but they do not exchange specific product
information outside of price and quantity ordered.
Contracts in this market can range from a “handshake” agreement, to standard
arms-length contracts, to extensive site visits and requirements to become an “approved
vendor,” to contract farming. The nature of specific contracts and the transfer of product
information will be described below for each supply chain example.
While the contractual arrangements vary, food service management companies
that pursue local food increasingly require certification that the food purchased meets
stringent food safety requirements. Farmers can be required to obtain Good Agricultural
Practices (GAP) certification and purchase additional Food Safety Liability Insurance
(FSLI). Processors are required to create and follow Hazard and Critical Control Point
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(HACCP) plans and Good Manufacturing Plans (GMP), as well as meet local, state, and
federal requirements for sanitation of processing equipment and facilities, and train
employees in food safety. Each of these food safety regulations, while indispensable for
ensuring the safety of the food supply, can add considerable fixed costs to a farm
operation that sells to institutions.
In addition to regulating food safety, some laws serve to advance the purchase of
local foods, under the same presumptions about the social and economic impacts of
product attributes mentioned above. Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 7, Sections
23B contains a preferential purchasing policy for state agencies to “give preference to
food products grown or produced in Massachusetts” (Leib, 2012). This law “requires
state agencies to purchase food products grown in Massachusetts, unless the price is more
than 10% higher than the price of out-of-state products” (Leib, 2012). While the
regulations are “required,” they do not appear to be legally binding (Leib, 2012). An
additional regulation, Chapter 30B, Section 20, however, does allow state agencies some
latitude to justify and make individual in-state purchases up to $25,000 without seeking
quotes (Leib, 2012). This regulation applies to all public schools.
The roles of information, contracts, and regulations carry a heavier burden, and
are significantly less codified in the regional wholesale FTI market than in other
wholesale markets. Because the product does not pass directly from farmer to consumer,
the “relationship-based” verification of product information relies upon not one, but a
series of relationships. Individual consumers prefer certain “local” product attributes over
others, and without either a total convergence of every intermediary buyer and sellers’
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preferences for “local” or a clear line of explicit information, it is unlikely that each
consumers’ presumed menu of “local” product attributes is achieved in this market.

3.2.9 Supply Chain Examples

Figure 5 models five different supply chain examples for Massachusetts FTI
markets. These five chains illustrate the variety of supply chains within the marketing
channels observed in Massachusetts. This section describes each individual supply chain,
and identifies which supply chain actors absorb transaction costs, which supply chain
actors make transaction costs explicit, how information flows, and what kinds of
contracts are common.
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Figure 6 Wholesale Regionally-Grown Intermediated FTS Market
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3.2.3.9.1 Supply Chain #1
Support entities introduce the market relationship concept of FTI to both farmers
and schools. The support entities may assist or provide tools for farmers and schools to
use to begin a market relationship, including sets of questions and expectations for each
supply chain actor to consider. Questions and expectations might address choice of crops,
seasonality, price, quantity, quality and specifications, ordering, packaging, delivery,
billing, and marketing (M FTSP, 2012). Some support entities work with farmers to
determine how entering this market might impact their farm business, and some entities
work with institutions to determine how to best incorporate FTI purchases into their
menus and school wellness plans, including how to train food service staff. This work is
sometimes referred to as “building relationships.” Relationships or networks resulting
from relationships can also be framed in terms of market interactions: providing
assistance in market development and establishing the veracity of information and
product attributes. Despite this initial assistance, after a market relationship between
farmers and purchasers is established, contracts are generally standard arms – length
transactions.
The farmer plans the crop, purchases inputs such as seed and fertilizer, grows and
harvests the product. The farmer contacts the food service provider to schedule delivery,
delivers the product, usually along with a hand-written invoice. The food service
company receives and inspects the product, and upon approval submits the invoice to the
billing department for payment. The food service provider plans meals and menus that
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include the product. The food service company performs any needed on-site processing,
prepares the meal, sells, and serves the product to the consumer.
In this supply chain, the institution conducts the On-Site primary processing. The
institution absorbs nearly all of the transaction costs associated with this market – from
the added cost of time spent planning with the farmer, to developing and implementing
non-standard food procurement and payment protocols, to cleaning and chopping
produce that staff would not otherwise need to process, and to marketing and selling the
product to the end consumer.
The farmer also absorbs transaction costs, but these are few compared to other
FTI supply chains. This supply chain offers the fewest supply chain steps and the fewest
intermediaries, and as a result should come the nearest to generating a relatively high
margin for the farmer with relatively few external transaction costs.
Over time, the food service provider’s role may evolve to help the farmer plan
which and how many crops to plant, quality control, food safety, marketing, and
additional value-added activities such as farm tours, or including farmers in institutional
activities. These overlaps have some characteristics that are similar to vertically restricted
supply chains present in contract farming, where the downstream purchaser begins to
have more control over upstream activities (Carmeli, et.al, 2007).

3.2.3.9.2 Supply Chain #2
This supply chain is nearly identical to Supply Chain #1 described in detail above.
Information transfer, contracting, and most transaction cost responsibility remain the
same.
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The distinction between Supply Chains #1 and #2 is that the Primary Processing
supply chain step is moved from the food service company’s role to the farmer’s role.
The farmer has primary processing capacities on-farm, and creates a value-added product
to sell to the institution. The food service providers no longer need to perform primary
processing on-site.
While some institutions may be willing and able to pay a premium for this
product, as intended by the characterization of “value-added,” this product will generally
transfer some, if not most, of the transaction costs described above as accruing to the
institution, to the farmer, instead.

3.2.3.9.3 Supply Chain #3
This supply chain builds on Supply Chain #1, and adds the supply chain steps of
Distribution and Storage, undertaken by a broadline or regional distributor downstream of
the farmer or aggregator. The distributor picks up fresh produce that is not value-added
from the farmer. In some cases, a distributor may deliver the product directly to the
institution, but usually the product is brought to a centralized storage facility and either
aggregated or divided for delivery to an institution.
As FTI programs have become more prevalent, the lack of operational
compatibility between farmers and institutions has increasingly become a barrier to the
success of many programs, particularly when the institutions are relatively large, or are
far away from the farmers. Supply chains that include distributors which aggregate
product and provide delivery and billing services removes these barriers by transferring
the transaction costs to the intermediary, but may correspondingly lower the price paid to
the farmer.
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Most distributors take ownership of the product when they pick it up from a
farmer. Distributors, therefore, are cautious about the quality and safety of the product
that they distribute. Distributors can require farmers to purchase FSLI, get GAP
certification, to use particular kinds of containers or on-farm storage facilities to control
for heat and humidity. Farmers who work with a distributor may have to make up-front
investments (and incur explicit transaction costs) in order to be in compliance with
distributors’ requirements.
Contracts in these supply chains can vary, but many of these transactions are
conducted as arms-length transactions. The transfer of farm- and product-specific
information can vary widely with the distribution company.

3.2.3.9.4 Supply Chain #4
This supply chain is like Supply Chain #2 in that the farmer conducts primary
processing. It is like Supply Chain #3 in that it includes distribution. In this supply chain,
the farmer adds value to the product, but then relies on distribution. Like Supply Chain
#3, distribution can resolve operational incompatibilities between farmers and institutions
through aggregation, billing services and distribution, but can add up front transaction
costs for farmers and can compromise the transfer of farm- and product-specific
information.

3.2.3.9.5 Supply Chain #5
This supply chain builds upon #4 above, but adds a supply chain step downstream
of the farmer and upstream of the distributor. This step, Secondary Processing, creates
another change in physical state, where the product is frozen or canned for sale in the off
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season. This extended season product is then picked up by a distributor and delivered to a
storage facility before it is delivered to the food service provider. Secondary Processing
allows Massachusetts farm products that are locally grown to satisfy markets that were
previously inaccessible due to seasonality. In this value chain, the processing facility
conducts primary processing.
Transactions costs in this supply chain are primarily absorbed by the processor.
Federal, state and local regulations require the processor to maintain strict facility and
employee food safety certifications and protocols. In some cases, distributors or large
food service management companies may impose additional food safety requirements,
and contracts between food service companies, distributors, and processors will provide
for these requirements. Transaction costs for the farmer in this supply chain can vary. For
the most part, these costs are similar to those in Supply Chain #4, although the
processor’s need for a large delivery at a particular time and day adds labor,
transportation, and storage costs.

3.2.4 Summary and Future Research
Massachusetts’ farm to institution programs have steadily increased in number
and volume of product bought and sold over the last fifteen years. There are many
inherently attractive aspects to Farm to Institution projects – it is uncommon that a
relatively simple idea has the power to link such a wide variety of social problems with
an enterprise-based and culturally inspiring solution. Can this simple idea actually deliver
the hoped-for benefits to all actors in a way that satisfies all of the constraints? Can the
large scale of institutional purchasing of Massachusetts grown food by Massachusetts
institutions improve health outcomes, provide farmers with improved farm viability and
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contribute to economic development? If FTI sales do not contribute to farm viability, is it
possible to achieve the nutrition, environmental, and economic development related
goals?
The answers to these questions are unclear. While a significant amount of work
and thought has been devoted to the promotion and assessment of individual programs,
there is very little evidence available to show whether or not these goals are being, or can
be, met on a regional scale. This paper has offered a framework by which farmer viability
in FTI markets can be analyzed.
The FTI market is an interesting subset of the “local foods” trend. The product
itself is differentiated by process and product attributes, most of which are credence
attributes. Some of these attributes relate to the product itself, but some relate to the
perceived impact of the product. Additionally, product attributes are impacted by process
attributes that depend on the marketing channel and supply chains through which the
product flows. Because of this, the market for regionally produced goods and its ability to
preserve a premium price that passes through to a farmer may depend on market
structure, the market power of the supply chain actors, and by whom the transaction costs
are absorbed.
The market for the differentiated product may flow through different market
channels. These market channels can have different opportunities for markup.
The supply of and demand for these products is difficult to quantify, other than to
say that both appear to be growing. That supply and demand are growing implies that the
market will continue to grow, though it will have boundaries in the natural capacity of
productive farmland in the area.
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The role of information in much of this market is currently very informal, and this
lack of formality is reflected in the preponderance of arms—length contracts between
supply chain actors. Regulation in this market is generally pursued by private companies
which aim to ensure food safety in supply chains with higher degrees of marginalization.
These companies do not emphasize the role of explicit product information; larger
distribution and food service companies appear to be slow to decide that detailed product
information beyond the label “local” may be valuable.
If demand for this product continues to grow, there are a number of factors that
will need to be considered to determine whether the purported goals are being, or can be,
achieved. These considerations are offered as possible future research areas.
The first consideration, particularly given the relative scarcity and high
opportunity cost of productive farmland in the Commonwealth, is whether FTI programs
should focus on state-specific procurement or on regional procurement. Massachusetts
has the highest population density in New England. New England, as a relatively small
region, shares existing food system infrastructure between Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont and Rhode Island. The New England states’
productive farmland is much greater than Massachusetts’ alone. To connect potential
supply to potential demand, many FTI programs in New England, including
Massachusetts, are pursuing regional markets. The second consideration is whether the
end consumers of institutional food prefer “local” enough to pay a premium price for it. If
so, will that premium be enough to cover the additional transaction costs associated with
the relative supply chain? Will that premium price generate a return to the farmer
comparable to that returned through direct marketing, or through wholesale marketing?
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Finally, is this market perfectly competitive or do some supply chain actors exert market
power? Are all of the supply chain actors price-takers, or do some supply chain actors, in
particular distribution and food service companies, have enough market power to extract
economic profit, in addition to covering their transaction costs?
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CHAPTER 4
MARKET CHANNEL AND SCHOOL MEAL COSTS IN FARM TO
SCHOOL PROGRAMS
Authors: Jill Fitzsimmons and Jeffrey O’Hara
4.1 Introduction

Schools in the United States participate in “farm to school” ( FTS) programs to
promote the health and well-being of students by engaging them in a variety of food and
nutrition related activities. One important component of many FTS programs is to teach
students about agriculture by procuring and serving locally produced foods in school
meals and snacks. Local food procurement may add costs to school food programs since
buying local may require additional staff effort and command a premium price (Boys and
Fraser 2017). Among the subset of schools that buy local foods, if the costs of locally
procured foods are higher than those of alternative products, we would expect to see
constraints on local foods procurement in the absence of continued policy interventions to
mitigate costs. If, however, certain local food procurement strategies are more effective at
reducing school meal costs relative to others, we might expect to see school food
authorities (SFA) purchase local foods in greater quantities.
In this paper we supplement school-level data from the 2013 and 2015 USDA
Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) Farm to School Censuses with data from the Census of
Agriculture and Food Environment Atlas to investigate, among schools with FTS
programs, whether the market channels from which they procure local foods reduces
perceived school meal costs. Specifically, the procurement strategies that we use as
independent variables include whether an SFA purchases local foods directly from
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producers exclusively, from intermediaries exclusively, or from both producers and
intermediaries. We control for observable factors that may impact school meal costs,
including SFA characteristics, regional characteristics, and transaction characteristics.
We use lagged values of these variables to control for the types of local food products
purchased and educational motivations behind local procurement to mitigate the
possibility of simultaneity. Regional characteristics include dummy variables for regions
of the country and whether the SFA is located in or adjacent to a metropolitan county.
We test whether our results are sensitive to specific types of transaction characteristics
that may influence local food procurement costs, identified by responses to questions
regarding procurement challenges that SFAs experience when they source local products.
The marginal effects of our probit regressions indicate that SFAs that buy local
foods exclusively from intermediaries (relative to SFAs that procure at least some local
foods directly from producers) are five percentage points less likely to report lower
school meal costs from FTS. SFAs that procure local foods from both producers and
intermediaries are four percentage points more likely to report lower school meal costs.
We did not find a relationship between SFAs that procure local foods exclusively from
producers and school meal costs, likely because this procurement method was
uncommon. These results contradict the hypothesis that intermediated FTS market
channels, in contrast to direct market channels, are more likely to support the long term
viability of FTS procurement as a result of efficiencies and economies of scale. While
our data don’t reveal the specific mechanism(s) by which SFAs experienced reduced
costs due to local purchases from producers, we document that our results may occur for
any combination of the following reasons: producers may supply foods to fulfill social
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goals while intermediaries may supply foods to maximize profits; intermediaries may not
efficiently source local foods; and intermediaries may efficiently source local foods, but
do not pass savings that result from these efficiencies along to SFAs.
To address concerns that reduced school meal costs and the choice of market
channel are determined simultaneously, we test whether market channel choice is
endogenous. We consider two instruments that characterize local food activity proximate
to SFAs: county-level farmers markets per capita and county-level number of direct-toconsumer farmers that sell to retail outlets per capita. We show that proximate local food
market activity is correlated with market channel choice, since the market channels SFAs
use are influenced by the types of suppliers available. We argue that these variables are
otherwise uncorrelated with SFA decisions to reduce school meal costs through FTS
program participation.
Prior to the development of the FTS Census, research into the economic
motivations of actors who participate in FTS programming consisted of case-studies of a
small number of producers in a narrow geographic region, like a state (Izumi, Wright,
Hamm, 2010). For instance, Conner et al. (2014) found that producers sell to schools at
lower price points (provided their costs are covered) for non-pecuniary objectives, such
as portfolio diversification and social preferences, and that broadline distributors that
supply local foods for profitability objectives may not have the same motivations to
supply foods to schools at lower prices. Our results provide the first national-level
empirical findings into factors that influence how market channel choice of local food
procurement impacts perceived school meal costs.
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While the FTS Census has increased the rigor of research on FTS
implementation, most of the applications of this dataset to-date have examined which
socio-demographic factors predict the adoption of FTS programming, such as Botkins
and Roe (2018). One exception is Christensen, Jablonski, and O’Hara (2017), who use
FTS Census data to find a negative correlation between per-student local food
expenditures and purchases of local foods directly from producers and from other nontraditional suppliers. We introduce a structural model and test for a causal relationship
between market channel portfolio choice and costs. This advances the literature on FTS
procurement programs and provides new insight that informs the financial sustainability
of local foods procurement from the perspective of SFAs and policy intended to support
FTS programming.

4.2 Background

4.2.1 School Meal Costs
Schools are a strategic venue to promote healthier food consumption due to the
long duration of time that most children in the United States (U.S.) are at school (CDC
2018). However, SFAs must keep meal costs low without compromising participation
rates among students and the nutritional content of the food. While SFAs that provide
government-funded school meals are intended to operate on a cost-recovery basis to
maintain a balanced budget, some programs operate at a loss in practice (Ralston and
Newman 2015).
Standard school food program costs include the cost of food purchasing,
preparation, and program management. Food service operations can be self-operated or
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contracted out to a food service management company, but regardless are nested within a
SFA’s administrative management structure, which is ultimately responsible for food
services. An average SFA reports that food purchases account for 46% of reported meal
costs, while labor for food preparation and food service portion of management comprise
45% of reported costs (Bartlett, Glantz, and Logan 2008). Program management costs at
the administrative level are generally unreported, as they are incurred by the SFA’s
administrative offices, not the food service operation. However, Bartlett, Glantz, and
Logan (2008) estimate that on average, unreported costs account for 19% total costs,
about 61% of which is labor. Average school per-meal costs vary depending on the
region of the country; whether the school is in an urban, suburban, or rural area; and
school size (Ollinger, Ralston, and Guthrie 2011, Ollinger and Guthrie 2015).
In addition to the standard costs of school food programs, FTS programs are
associated with increased transaction costs resulting from the additional effort needed to
gather information, negotiate costs, and monitor costs (Motts and Sharma, 2016). The
effort required to deal with additional transaction costs generally enters as labor costs,
and might manifest as additional staff hours dedicated to FTS procurement (Fitzsimmons
and Lass, 2015). Other FTS specific costs may arise from the additional effort associated
with training food service staff how to cook with local foods (labor costs), or purchasing
new kitchen equipment to more effectively cook local foods (capital expenses)
(Colasanti, Matts, and Hamm, 2012). Finally, an obvious source of increased costs from
local may be a price premium associated with purchasing the higher-quality local product
(Sharma, 2012; Ortiz, 2010).
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The transaction costs associated with FTS program adoption are welldocumented 7. For instance, the 2013-2014 Farm to School Census asked SFAs what
kinds of problems they experienced when they procure local foods (Appendix A).
Product availability was the most widely reported problem (57%). High prices were a
problem for 38% of respondents, and procurement coordination problems, alongside
regular procurement were a problem for 26% of respondents. Overall, 25% of SFAs
reported no problems with procurement.

4.2.1.1 Farm to School Programs

FAs that implement FTS programs in the United States undertake at least one of
following three activities: locally sourced food products, establish school gardens, or
implement nutritional educational curriculum. Schools undertake FTS programs to
improve the nutritional content of school foods, support local farmers, and/or create
interactive educational opportunities about culinary and agricultural topics (Benson
2014). In 1997, just six FTS programs were reported in the United States, but by 2014
5,254 school districts reported FTS programs (NFSN 2016, USDA FNS 2017).
FTS Census data reveal that SFAs procure local foods from a wide variety of
sources (Appendix B). SFAs undertake direct purchases from individual producers (40%)
more frequently than direct purchases from producer cooperatives (17%), farmers
markets (8%), or CSAs (3%). SFAs source local foods most frequently from distributors
(63%). SFAs also commonly make local food purchases from food

7

For instance, see Izumi, Wright, and Hamm (2010); Colasanti, Matts, and Hamm
(2012); Bateman, Engel, and Meinen (2014); Fitzsimmons and Lass (2015); Motta and
Sharma (2016); and O’Hara and Benson (2017).
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processors/manufacturers (38%), USDA Food Distribution Programs (31%), Department
of Defense Fresh Program vendors (29%), and food buying cooperatives (14%).
Numerous studies examine which factors are important in predicting institutional
purchases of local foods. Prior to the FTS Census, state-level FTS studies were
undertaken by Vo and Holcomb (2011) and Dimitri, Hanson, and Oberholtzer (2012) in
Oklahoma and Maryland, respectively. Similar studies examining institutional purchases
of local foods in non-school contexts include Smith, Kaiser, and Gomez (2013) and
Oberholtzer, Dimitri, and Jaenicke (2014) with regard to hospitals and retailers,
respectively. National-level studies of the determinants of FTS programs using 2013
FTS Census data include Lyson (2016); Ralston et al. (2017); McCarthy, Steiner, and
Houser (2017); and Botkins and Roe (2018), whereas O’Hara and Benson (2017) use
2015 FTS Census data. While the specifications, and in some instances datasets, have
varied between the FTS studies, collectively they have found that school characteristics,
state FTS policies, local agricultural conditions, and spillover effects are all important in
predicting the FTS engagement levels of SFAs. Examining whether the market channels
used by SFAs impacted the cost-effectiveness of school meal programs has not been
closely scrutinized in these studies.
Using 2015 FTS Census data, Christensen, Jablonski, and O’Hara (2017) found a
negative correlation between a SFAs per-student non-milk local food expenditures and
whether they purchased local foods directly from either producers or from other nontraditional suppliers (food hubs, cooperatives, and state FTS program offices). However,
their findings represent correlations since they did not develop a causal model. While
Christensen, Jablonski, and O’Hara (2017) examine the relationship between market
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channel and food expenditures, they do not focus on outcome changes that schools may
have experienced from FTS participation. Our results suggest that SFAs may reduce
costs by taking a portfolio approach to local foods procurement, rather than relying
exclusively on intermediated procurement.
While farmers selling directly to local schools seek to receive a price that
compensates them for their costs, receiving a high price may not be the primary factor
motivating their participation in the transaction (Conner et al. 2014, Fitzsimmons and
Lass 2015, Barrowclaw et al. 2017, Lehnerd et al. 2018). Thus, they may be willing to
sell to schools at a relatively low price point in order to achieve other objectives. First,
farmers may sell to local schools in order to satisfy their own social values, such as
supplying healthy food locally (Batemen, Engel, and Meinen 2014, Conner et al. 2014,
Matts et al. 2016, Lehnerd et al. 2018). Farmers with such motivations may sell food to
schools in such small volumes that it does not affect farm profitability, and they are more
likely to donate food, visit a classroom, and/or host a field trip (Conner et al. 2012). If
there is a high degree of trust in the relationship between the farmer and SFA, nontraditional procurement methods may be undertaken (like delivering the food in a
personal vehicle) in order to keep costs low (Izumi, Wright, Hamm 2010). A second
motivation is that selling to schools offers farmers a form of market diversification and/or
an opportunity to sell surplus produce (Izumi, Wright, Hamm 2010, Batement, Engel, and
Meinen 2014). School sales for farmers motivated by this objective are larger, account
for a relatively larger percentage of total sales, and are undertaken to increase their
profitability (Conner et al. 2012).
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There is similarly variation in the motivations of distributors in participating in
farm to institution programs. Larger-scale distributors principally engage in farm-toinstitution markets for profitability considerations, while distributors that may be a nonprofit or have a regional focus may be more motivated by social considerations
(Cleveland et al. 2014, Conner et al. 2014). This suggests that there may be a relationship
between the scale and priorities of distributors and whether they pass cost savings from
economies of scale through to SFAs.

4.2.3 Market Channel Structure and Costs
It is suggested that intermediaries may reduce supply costs for local food products
relative to producers through economies of scale. Supply costs that may be reduced
include those incurred both by farmers and by SFAs in the form of additional transaction
costs (gathering information, negotiating terms, and enforcing terms) and marketing costs
(packaging and distribution). If intermediaries reduce these costs and pass the cost
savings on to SFAs, then school meal costs of local procurement should be lower when
procured through intermediated markets than procured directly from producers. On the
other hand, procurement from intermediaries might increase costs to SFAs. This might be
the case if intermediaries do not pass cost savings through to SFAs, if the economies of
scale are not significant enough, or if there are fixed adjustments costs that confront
intermediaries in procuring local products.
SFAs may bear additional costs from procuring local foods from two sources: the
additional effort that schools must engage in to source, purchase, and prepare local foods,
as well as the price of the food itself (Boys and Fraser 2015). SFAs have limited budgets
and ability to cover additional costs associated with procuring local foods, so local food
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procurement must be cost-effective for SFAs to commit to buying local foods in
significant quantities in the long-term. In the last decade there has been significant
investment in developing intermediated channels through which schools can access local
foods (Low, et al., 2015). Such intermediated channels are hypothesized to provide
economies of scale to the market to reduce overall costs for SFAs, as well as to provide a
supply chain capable of aggregating product from small and medium sized farms that
could not individually meet volume requirements of institutional buyers (Low et al.
2015).
Intermediaries may be able to exercise market power, limiting the ability of SFAs
to negotiate prices and procurement terms, and resulting in overall higher costs of
procurement (Nocke and White 2007). Economic theories rooted in industrial
organization suggest that there is considerable ambiguity in the predicted outcome from
market consolidation, such as from vertical integration and mergers (Ashenfelter et al.
2015) 8. In the case of vertical integration of markets, where upstream and downstream
supply chain actors are combined, there may be efficiencies of scale that lower overall
costs along the supply chain (Hortascu and Syverson, 2007). Similarly, mergers may
create efficiencies by eliminating redundancies and accessing efficiencies of scale
(Ashenfelter et al. 2015). However, both theoretical and empirical research suggests that
cost reductions realized from these efficiencies must be measured against the effects of
increased market concentration (Ashenfelter et al. 2015, Belleflame and Peitz 2010,

8

It is unusual in the literature for consumers to advocate for a consolidation of suppliers
in a market, as is the case where SFAs advocate for more opportunities to buy from
intermediated sources instead of individually from farmers. The relevant theory comes
from the perspective of suppliers that are interested in consolidation and the subsequent
conversation about the potential welfare effects of consolidation.
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Hortascu and Syverson 2007). Both vertical integration and mergers result in fewer firms
in the market, which might provide remaining firms with the ability to exercise market
power and charge the end consumer higher prices (Belleflame and Peitz 2010).
Market concentration upstream of SFAs validates the possibility that market
power may be a factor. School food authorities may contract with food service
management companies, who hire management staff and arrange procurement, or they
may be self-operated by the authority. School food service management companies
comprise about 25% of the food service contracting industry, in which 66% of revenues
are accrued by the top four companies in the industry nationwide, indicating the potential
for upstream market power (Hyland 2018). While the national concentration of wholesale
food distribution companies is lower in general, the broadline food distribution
companies that often supply school food services are also concentrated, with the top three
companies earning 60% of revenues, suggesting that even self-operated food service
management may be subject to upstream market power (Technomics 2017). We do not
have data that indicate whether SFAs in our sample are self-operated or are operated
through contracted food service management companies. Regardless, upstream market
concentration is a reasonable proposition in either case.

4.3 Data and Methods

4.3.1 Farm to School Census
The USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) developed a national-level FTS
Census to comply with a directive in the Healthy Hunger Free Kids Act of 2010 to
“disseminate research and data on existing farm to school programs”. The first FTS
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Census solicited data in 2013 about FTS activities during the 2011-12 academic year
from U.S. public school districts participating in the National School Lunch Program.
USDA FNS revised questions in the 2015 FTS Census and administered it to private
schools and charter schools as well. In the 2015 FTS Census, 12,585 SFAs completed
the survey, a response rate of 70%. The FTS Census did not impose a definition of
“local” foods for SFAs. Instead, it instructed SFAs to self-define local from among
several common options. Of SFAs that provided a definition in the 2015 FTS Census,
45% considered local to be within the same city/county, within 50 miles, or within 100
miles (O’Hara and Benson 2017).
Whereas previous studies using the FTS Census only used variables from
one of the surveys, we use variables from both datasets. To merge the 2013 and 2015
FTS Census datasets, we first eliminate SFAs in the 2015 Census that did not have a
Common Core of Data (CCD) identification number, since these numbers served as the
basis for linking FTS responses with school district data from other sources. Because in
some instances the CCD number was not uniquely assigned in the 2015 Census, we
merge respondents in the two datasets by matching on CCD number, SFA zip code, and
the first eight letters of the school name 9. The resulting dataset includes 2,373 observed
SFAs that participated in both the 2013 and 2015 Census. Of these observations,
however, 161 did not specify which market channel they used to source local food

9

Before doing this, we deleted ten observations from the 2015 Census in which two
schools had the same CCD number, zipcode, and first eight letters of the school name in
common.
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products. Our resulting dataset thus has 2,122 observations 10. We merge these FTS data
with county-level rural-urban continuum codes in order to control for the metropolitan
status of the county (USDA ERS 2013). We merge in county-level data from the Census
of Agriculture (USDA 2017) and Food Environment Atlas (USDA ERS 2017).
Twenty-two percent of SFAs reported lower school meal costs from participating
in FTS programs (Table 1). Ten percent of SFAs purchased local food exclusively from
a producer, while 47% made such purchases both directly from producers and
intermediaries. Fruits and vegetables were the most frequently purchased local food
products. The average student size of an SFA was 5,600, and an average 48% of students
were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. The corresponding median values for these
two variables are 2,247 students and 47%, respectively. SFAs were distributed evenly
among the six geographical regions established by FNS, and 86% of the SFAs were
either located in a metropolitan county or adjacent to a metropolitan county. While the
FTS Census was administered to all SFAs, it is possible that SFAs undertaking FTS
programming are more likely to respond to the survey than non- FTS SFAs. However,
this is not a concern for our study since we are exclusively examining SFAs with FTS
programs, and of this subset it isn’t clear that there would be different response rates
among SFAs conditional on the market channels that they use for local procurement

10

A select number observations had either negative or zero values recorded for the
number of students in the school district and/or the number of schools in the school
district. In such instances, we changed the value to missing.
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Table 11 Descriptive Statistics for Market Channel and School Meal Costs
Variable

N

Mean

Lower Cost from FTS Programming

2,212

0.22

Std.
Dev.
0.42

Purchased Direct Exclusive

2,212

0.10

Purchased Intermediate Exclusive

2,212

Min.

Max.

0

1

0.31

0

1

0.42

0.49

0

1

Purchased Both Direct and Intermediate

2,212

0.47

0.50

0

1

County-level Farmers Markets Per 10,000

2,194

0.50

0.59

0

6.36

County-level Direct Retail Producers Per 10,000

2,167

3.89

5.17

0

75.52

Student size of SFA / 10,000

2,195

0.56

1.37

0.0007

32.0532

% of Students Free/Reduced Price Lunch

2,187

0.48

0.22

0.00

1.00

SFA in Metropolitan County

2,212

0.61

0.49

0

1

SFA in Non-Metro Adjacent County

2,212

0.25

0.43

0

1

Fruits / Veg. Local (2011-12)

2,212

0.62

0.49

0

1

Fluid Milk Local (2011-12)

2,212

0.28

0.45

0

1

Meat / Eggs Local (2011-12)

2,212

0.15

0.36

0

1

Farm Visit / Trip (2011-12)

2,212

0.26

0.44

0

1

Transaction Procurement Problem

2,212

0.53

0.50

0

1

Product Procurement Problem

2,212

0.74

0.44

0

1

Distribution Procurement Problem

2,212

0.29

0.45

0

1

On-Site Procurement Problem

2,212

0.29

0.45

0

1

Pricing Procurement Problem

2,212

0.48

0.50

0

1

Northeast

2,212

0.16

0.37

0

1

Midatlantic

2,212

0.10

0.30

0

1

Southeast

2,212

0.13

0.34

0

1

Midwest

2,212

0.23

0.42

0

1

Mountain

2,212

0.13

0.33

0

1

Southwest

2,212

0.08

0.27

0

1

4.3.2 Empirical Model
We estimate equation (1) using a probit model.
𝑃(𝑦 = 0|𝒙) = 1 − Φ(𝒙𝛾)

(4.0)

The independent variable, 𝑦, is a binary indicator that equals one if an SFA reported

lower school meal costs from FTS participation in 2013-14 and zero otherwise. In (1), Φ
is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and 𝒙 is a matrix of explanatory
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variables. Since the parameter estimates of probit regressions are challenging to interpret,
we report the marginal effects of each coefficient in which the other covariates are
evaluated at their sample means.
The main independent variable of interest is the market channels that SFAs use to
procure local products. We estimate three separate regressions in which the main
independent variable is, respectively, whether the SFA procured local foods exclusively
directly from producers; whether the SFA procured local foods exclusively from
intermediaries; and whether the SFA procured local foods from both producers and
intermediaries. We estimate the regressions including just one of these independent
variables so that we can implement the endogeneity tests discussed below. In addition,
we report regression results in which we include two binary variables indicating if the
SFA purchased directly from producers exclusively and directly from intermediaries
exclusively, which we report as specification “D” in the results. The results from
specification D inform whether omitting one of the market channel classifications from
the results would bias the results.
We define SFAs that purchased directly from producers as those that answered
affirmatively to any of the following four market channel classifications regarding where
they obtained local foods: directly from an individual food producer
(farmer/fisher/rancher), at a farmers market, via a community supported agriculture
(CSA) program, or from a producer cooperative 11. We define SFAs that purchased local
foods from intermediaries as those making such purchases from food
11

While purchases from a producer cooperative can be considered “direct” from a
producer, they could exert market power. Nonetheless, our main results are robust to
whether we classify producer cooperatives as “direct” purchases or purchases that occur
from an “intermediary”.
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processors/manufacturers, distributors, food buying cooperatives, food hubs, food service
management companies, Department of Defense Fresh Program vendors, USDA Foods,
or state FTS program offices.
To mitigate the possibility of omitted variable bias, we control for region-specific
and SFA-specific characteristics. Regional variations influence the adoption of FTS
programs and the ways they are implemented (Lyson 2016, McCarthy, Steiner, and
Houser 2017), so we include indicator variables to control for the region in which the
SFA resides. We use rural-urban continuum codes to control for whether the SFA resides
in a metropolitan county or non-metropolitan county that is adjacent to a metropolitan
county (USDA ERS 2013). We control for the number of students in the SFA since there
could be economies of scale that could influence the use of particular market channels.
We control for the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price meals since
the socioeconomic status of the school may influence which market channels they use.
For instance, schools in less affluent districts may be more motivated to participate in
FTS programs for cost saving purposes than wealthier schools.
The type of local food products that SFAs purchase might influence the market
channels that SFAs use to procure these products. To control for this variation, we use
three food product classifications for whether the SFA purchased a) fruits or vegetables
locally, b) fluid milk locally, and c) meat or eggs locally. For example, it may be easier to
procure fruits and vegetables directly from a farmer than fluid milk. We control for
educational motives that SFAs may have for purchasing directly from a producer by
constructing a binary variable equal to one if the SFA conducted a student field trip to a
farm or had a farmer visit a classroom. Including this control is important if such
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educational activities result in reduced school meal costs. We use responses from the
2013 Census to construct the food product and educational variables as otherwise these
control variables could be endogenous due to simultaneity.
We examine whether particular problems with procuring local food are correlated
with market channel choice. To do so, we combine FTS Census responses in which
SFAs are asked to indicate procurement challenges because responses to these questions
are highly correlated with each other. The five variables that we create are whether the
SFA experienced local food procurement challenges pertaining to executing the
transaction, the product, distribution, on-site preparation, or product prices (Appendix A).
Even though our new categories reduce the redundancy of some of the problem
categories, the new procurement variables that we create are nonetheless positively
correlated with each other (Table 2). SFAs that experience challenges with procuring
particular types of products are less likely to buy local foods exclusively from
intermediaries, and more likely to make local purchases both directly and intermediaries.
However, other types of procurement challenges are uncorrelated with whether a SFA
purchased exclusively from an intermediary. Instead, SFAs with transaction, distribution,
on-site, and pricing procurement problems are less likely to purchase local foods directly
from producers exclusively, and have a greater probability of purchasing local foods from
both producers and intermediaries. The procurement problem variables are negative
correlated with SFAs that experienced lower school meal costs, as expected. Thus, the
correlations between procurement challenges that SFAs confront and market channel
choice provide justification in testing whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of
the procurement problem variables in our regressions.
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Table 12 Market Channel Choice and Procurement Variables Correlations

Lower Cost
from FTS
Direct
Excl.
Interm.
Excl.
Both Direct
& Interm.
Transaction
Prob.
Product
Prob.
Distribution
Prob.
On-Site
Prob.
Pricing
Prob.

Lower
Cost
from
FTS

Direct
Excl.

Interm.
Excl.

Both Direct
& Interm.

Trans.
Prob.

Product
Prob.

Distr. Prob.

1.00

0.01

-0.05**

0.05**

-0.05**

-0.01

-0.07***

1.00

-0.29***

-0.32***

-0.04*

1.00

-0.81***

-0.02

0.01
0.08***

1.00

0.04*
1.00

On-Site
Prob.

Pricing
Prob.

-0.04*

0.08***
0.08***

0.19***
0.07***

-0.03

0.00

-0.04*

0.07***

0.06***

0.05**

0.08***

0.42***

0.33***

0.29***

0.30***

1.00

0.28***

0.22***

0.37***

1.00

0.25***

0.30***

1.00

0.27***
1.00

*** -- Significant at 0.01 level. ** -- Significant at 0.05 level. * -- Significant at 0.1 level.
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4.3.3 Instrumental Variable Regressions
An SFA may make the decision of which market channels to use and school meal
costs simultaneously. We use two instruments to test for the possibility that market
channel choice is endogenous: the county-level number of farmers markets in 2016 per
10,000 residents and the county-level number of farmers selling directly to retail outlets
in 2012 per 10,000 residents (USDA ERS 2017, USDA 2017). Both measures are
indicative of the opportunities available to SFA to procure foods directly from producers.
We use two variables because while the number of producers selling directly to retailers
in a county is a more accurate representation of producers within close proximity, some
of those producers may not be marketing products within the county in which they reside.
Alternatively, the number of farmers markets is more representative of the vibrancy of
local food markets within closer proximity to the school, which could include the
participation of producers from outside of the county. The county-level density of
farmers markets is a variable that has been used in other FTS studies, although in
different contexts (Ralston et al. 2017, Botkins and Roe 2018).
We hypothesize that both of these instruments are positively correlated with the
probability that a SFA within that county has procured local foods directly from a
producer. This is because a greater number of DTC markets and/or farmers selling to
retail outlets within close proximity to the school could increase the probability that
schools can identify producers from which to procure food products directly. We claim
that these variables are exogenous with regard to whether a FTS program reduced school
meal costs at the school district level in 2013-14 outside of its influence on market
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channel choice. This is because these variables represent average county-level conditions,
which we claim are exogenous with regard to decisions made at the SFA-level.
Since both the dependent variable and independent variable of interest are binary,
we estimate a linear probability model (LPM) using instrumental variables following the
rationale in Angrist and Pischke (2009). We estimate the coefficients from which derive
the Hausman p-values that we present for the linear probability model according to the
methodology in Wooldridge (2002). For robustness, we estimate instrumental variable
probit regressions by maximizing the likelihood function of the joint density of lower
school meal costs and market channel choice following Wooldridge (2002). We estimate
both types of instrumental variable regressions to assess whether the distributional and
functional forms associated with either of these regressions influences the results.
However, for brevity, we only present the LPM instrumental variable regression results.

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Probit Regressions
We present the probit regression results in Table 3 12. In model A, there is no
statistically significant association between SFAs that purchase local foods directly from
producers exclusively and lower school meal costs. SFAs that purchase local foods
exclusively from intermediaries (relative to those that do not) are less likely to have
reduced school meal costs in model B (P<0.05). SFAs that purchase local foods from
both producers and intermediaries have a greater probability of reducing school meal

12

We find similar results when we estimate linear probability models or logit models
instead of probit specifications.
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costs in model C relative to those that do not (P<0.05). In model D, the coefficient on
whether a SFA purchases exclusively from intermediaries is statistically significant with
a similar coefficient magnitude as in model B. Thus, our results are robust to whether we
include more than one market channel designation as an independent variable.
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Table 13 Probit Regression Result
Intercept
Purchased Direct Exclusive

A

B

C

D

-0.44***
(0.15)
0.02
(0.10)

-0.38**
(0.15)

-0.51***
(0.15)

-0.37**
(0.15)
-0.05
(0.10)
-0.17**
(0.07)

Purchased Intermediate Exclusive

-0.16**
(0.07)

Purchased Both Direct and Intermediate
Student size of SFA / 10,000
% of Students Free/Reduced Price Lunch
Fruits / Veg. Local (2011-12)
Fluid Milk Local (2011-12)
Meat / Eggs Local (2011-12)
Farm Visit / Trip (2011-12)
SFA in Metropolitan County
SFA in Non-Metro Adjacent County
Northeast
Midatlantic
Southeast
Midwest
Mountain
Southwest
Observations
-2 * Log Likelihood
Percent Correctly Predicted

-0.03
(0.02)
-0.09
(0.16)
0.06
(0.08)
0.03
(0.08)
-0.07
(0.09)
0.006
(0.074)
-0.33***
(0.09)
-0.15
(0.10)
-0.08
(0.11)
0.02
(0.12)
-0.15
(0.11)
-0.22**
(0.10)
-0.18
(0.12)
0.34***
(0.12)
2,186
2,276
78%

-0.03
(0.02)
-0.09
(0.16)
0.03
(0.07)
0.04
(0.08)
-0.08
(0.09)
0.002
(0.074)
-0.30***
(0.09)
-0.14
(0.10)
-0.08
(0.11)
0.01
(0.12)
-0.13
(0.11)
-0.21**
(0.10)
-0.19
(0.12)
0.39***
(0.13)
2,186
2,270
78%

0.14**
(0.06)
-0.03
(0.02)
-0.09
(0.16)
0.04
(0.07)
0.03
(0.08)
-0.07
(0.09)
0.001
(0.074)
-0.31***
(0.09)
-0.15
(0.10)
-0.08
(0.11)
0.02
(0.12)
-0.13
(0.11)
-0.21**
(0.10)
-0.17
(0.12)
0.38***
(0.12)
2,186
2,271
78%

Parameter estimate (standard error)
*** -- Significant at 0.01 level. ** -- Significant at 0.05 level. * -- Significant at 0.1 level.
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-0.03
(0.02)
-0.09
(0.16)
0.03
(0.07)
0.03
(0.08)
-0.08
(0.09)
0.002
(0.074)
-0.30***
(0.09)
-0.14
(0.10)
-0.08
(0.11)
0.02
(0.12)
-0.13
(0.11)
-0.21**
(0.10)
-0.18
(0.12)
0.39***
(0.13)
2,186
2,269
78%

In models A, B, C, and D, SFAs in metropolitan counties and in the Midwest have
a lower probability of reduced school meal costs, while SFAs in the Southwest are more
likely to have reduced them. None of the other control variables influence the probability
of whether a SFA reduced school meal costs via FTS program participation.
In model B, the marginal effect of a coefficient magnitude of -0.16 implies that
purchasing from intermediaries exclusively decreases the predicted probability that a
SFA reduces school meal costs from FTS participation by 0.05 (Table 4). The marginal
effect for this coefficient in model D is similarly equal to -0.05. In model C, the marginal
effect of a coefficient magnitude of 0.14 implies that purchasing local food from both
producers and intermediaries increases the probability that the SFA reduces school meal
costs by 0.04. The marginal effect of a SFA residing in a metropolitan county reduces the
predicted probability of a SFA reducing school meal costs by 0.09. SFAs residing in the
Midwest decrease the probability of reducing school meal costs by 0.06, while SFAs in
the Southwest increase the probability by 0.1.
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Table 14 Marginal Effects
Specification

A

B

Purchased Direct Exclusive

0.006

-0.015

(0.029)

(0.030)

Purchased Intermediate Exclusive

C

D

-0.048**

-0.050**

(0.019)

(0.020)

Purchased Both Direct and Intermediate

0.042**
(0.018)

Student size of SFA / 10,000
% of Students Free/Reduced Price Lunch
Fruits / Veg. Local (2011-12)
Fluid Milk Local (2011-12)
Meat / Eggs Local (2011-12)
Farm Visit / Trip (2011-12)
SFA in Metropolitan County
SFA in Non-Metro Adjacent County
Northeast
Midatlantic
Southeast
Midwest
Mountain
Southwest

-0.010

-0.009

-0.010

-0.009

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

-0.026

-0.028

-0.027

-0.027

(0.048)

(0.048)

(0.048)

(0.048)

0.017

0.009

0.011

0.009

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.022)

0.008

0.011

0.008

0.010

(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.024)

-0.019

-0.022

-0.021

-0.022

(0.027)

(0.027)

(0.027)

(0.027)

0.002

0.001

0.000

0.000

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.022)

-0.097***

-0.088***

-0.092***

-0.089***

(0.027)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

-0.045

-0.042

-0.043

-0.042

(0.029)

(0.029)

(0.029)

(0.029)

-0.022

-0.024

-0.024

-0.024

(0.033)

(0.033)

(0.033)

(0.033)

0.005

0.004

0.007

0.005

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.036)

-0.044

-0.038

-0.038

-0.038

(0.034)

(0.034)

(0.034)

(0.034)

-0.064**

-0.062**

-0.062**

-0.062**

(0.030)

(0.030)

(0.030)

(0.030)

-0.054

-0.055

-0.050

-0.054

(0.034)

(0.034)

(0.034)

(0.034)

0.100***

0.114***

0.111***

0.114***

(0.036)

(0.037)

(0.037)

(0.037)

Parameter estimate (standard error)
*** -- Significant at 0.01 level. ** -- Significant at 0.05 level. * -- Significant at 0.1 level.
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Our results are robust to the inclusion of control variables that represent
challenges that schools experience with procuring local products (Table 5). The
coefficient magnitudes on the independent variables that do not represent procurement
problems are of a similar magnitude to the parameter estimates of the regressions in
which the procurement problem variables are not included. SFAs that experience pricing
challenges with procuring local foods are less likely to experience reduced school meal
costs from implementing FTS programs, while SFAs with product challenges are more
likely to do so. The other procurement problem parameter estimates are statistically
insignificant.
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Table 15 Probit Regressions with Controls for Procurement Challenges
Specification

A

Purchased Direct Exclusive

-0.05

-0.13

(0.10)

(0.11)

Purchased Intermediate Exclusive

B

C

D

-0.17**

-0.19***

(0.07)

(0.07)

Purchased Both Direct and Intermediate

0.18***
(0.06)

Transaction Procurement Problem

-0.05

-0.05

-0.05

-0.05

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.07)

0.25***

0.23***

0.24***

0.24***

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

-0.06

-0.06

-0.06

-0.06

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

-0.09

-0.08

-0.09

-0.08

-0.08

-0.08

-0.08

(0.08)

-0.56***

-0.56***

-0.57***

-0.56***

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.07)

OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
INCLUDED

YES

YES

YES

YES

Observations

2,186

2,186

2,186

2,186

-2 * Log Likelihood

2,192

2,185

2,184

2,184

Percent Correctly Predicted

78%

78%

78%

78%

Product Procurement Problem
Distribution Procurement Problem
On-Site Procurement Problem
Pricing Procurement Problem

Parameter estimate (standard error).
*** -- Significant at 0.01 level. ** -- Significant at 0.05 level. * -- Significant at 0.1 level.
Notes: We do not report the coefficients from the other independent variables for brevity.
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4.4.2 Endogeneity Diagnostics
We present endogeneity diagnostics in Table 6. For the linear probability model,
both the county-level density of farmers markets and number of producers selling to retail
institutions have positive and statistically significant coefficients on whether a SFA
purchases local foods both directly from producers and intermediaries, and a negative and
statistically coefficients on whether a SFA purchases local foods exclusively from
intermediaries. These coefficients are statistically significant irrespective of whether we
estimate the regressions with just one of the instruments or if both instruments are
included. The F statistics from the first-stage regression are greater than ten in magnitude.
The statistically insignificant F value from the over-identification test results provide
evidence of the validity of using two instruments. Collectively, the first-stage regression
results and over-identification test results imply that we do not have weak instruments.
The market channel choice variable has a statistically insignificant impact
on reduced school meal costs in each of the second-stage regressions. However, we find
in our Hausman tests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that market channel choice
is exogenous. Thus, due the robustness of the finding across different instruments and
market channel combinations, we believe it is reasonable to conclude that market channel
choice is exogenous with regard to reducing school meal costs.

127

Table 16 Endogeneity Diagnostics
Potentially Endogenous
Market Channel Variable:

Interm.
Excl.

Interm.
Excl.

Interm.
Excl.

Both Direct
& Interm.

Both Direct
& Interm.

Both Direct
& Interm.

First Stage Regression Results (Linear Probability Model)
Density of Farmers Markets

-0.04*

-0.06***

-

0.05**

0.06***

-

Density of Direct Retail
Producers

-0.01***

-

-0.01***

0.01**

-

0.01***

Regression F Statistic

17.05***

17.18***

17.91***

10.66***

10.88***

10.93***

0.19

0.49

0.25

0.22

0.50

0.29

0.02

-

-

0.01

-

-

0.88

-

-

0.91

-

-

Pertinent IV Statistics (Linear Probability Model)
Hausman Exogeneity P-Value
Overidentifying Restrictions
F-Value
Overidentifying Restrictions
P-Value

IV Regression Results (Linear Probability Model)
2nd Stage Market Channel
Coefficient

0.17

0.15

0.16

-0.22

-0.14

-0.23

Regression F Statistic

2.31***

2.63***

2.30***

2.25***

2.63***

2.20***

*** -- Significant at 0.01 level. ** -- Significant at 0.05 level. * -- Significant at 0.1 level.
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In the instrumental variable probit regressions (which we do not present in
Table 6), the instruments are statistically significant when both instruments are used.
However, the statistical significance is attenuated when only one instrument is used.
While the market channel choice variable is statistically insignificant in the second-stage
regressions when we use both instruments, it is statistically significant in three of the four
second-stage regressions when we use one instrument.

4.5 Discussion

We find that exclusively purchasing local foods from intermediaries reduces the
probability that an SFA perceives reduced school meal costs, and that purchasing from
both intermediaries and producers increases the probability that an SFA perceives
reduced school meal costs. While we are not able to identify the mechanism underlying
these results with these data, there are a number of possible explanations for why this
may be the case. One explanation for these results is that producers may have nonpecuniary objectives for selling directly to schools, and they may be more willing to sell
foods at affordable prices in order to facilitate the transaction (Conner et al. 2014).
Intermediaries either may not achieve cost savings when aggregating from local
producers, or if they do achieve cost savings, they do not pass those cost-savings along to
SFAs.
We do not find that purchasing local foods directly from producers exclusively
has a statistically significant impact on reducing school meal costs. One reason why this
effect is statistically insignificant is because a proportionally small number of SFAs
procure local foods in this way, so we may not have a large enough sample to estimate an
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effect. Another explanation is that SFAs that procure local foods from a variety of market
channels may be able to negotiate or identify the most cost-effective locally priced foods.
For example, a farmer may sell food at a lower price to a SFA that is also procuring local
foods from intermediaries vis-a-vis those that are not.
Our results are consistent with other case studies that found that non-pecuniary
factors can be important in a farmer’s decision to sell to schools. While previous studies
occurred with a small number of farmers within a narrow geographic region, we establish
that this result holds at a national-level. Our results are also consistent with Christensen,
Jablonski, and O’Hara (2017), who found that per-capita local expenditures were
negatively correlated with SFAs that procured local foods directly from producers. The
new insight that our model provides is establishing a causal relationship between market
channel choice and school meal costs. We demonstrate that market channel choice by
SFAs is highly influenced by characteristics of the surrounding food distribution system,
and the results from our instrumental variable regressions indicate that market channel
choice is exogenous. Nonetheless, we did not obtain consistent results on the secondstage market channel choice coefficients, since they were statistically insignificant in the
LPM IV regressions but significant in some of the IV probit regressions. So, our
conclusions would be attenuated if market channel choice was endogenous.
The negative coefficient on metropolitan counties in reducing school meal costs
could arise if input costs for local farmers (irrespective of the market channels that they
use) selling to SFAs in metropolitan counties is high, such as land prices or transaction
costs. These higher input costs could raise their production costs, and reduce potential
cost-savings to SFAs from local procurement. Or, these farmers may have greater
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opportunity costs, such as other local marketing opportunities (like selling at farmers
markets and/or to restaurants, for example) that may reduce their incentives to market
products to schools (Fitzsimmons and Lass, 2015).
The procurement problem variables were positively correlated with sourcing from
both producers and intermediaries, which suggests SFAs may adapt to procurement
challenges by sourcing from multiple types of suppliers. Of the five distinct procurement
problems, lower school meal costs has highest negative correlation with pricing
challenges (Table 2). This correlation may explain why pricing procurement challenges is
statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the probit regressions (Table 5). While product
procurement challenges have a positive coefficient in the regressions, it is statistically
insignificant when we estimate the regression without including pricing challenges as an
independent variable. On-site procurement problems and distribution procurement
problems are statistically insignificant in Table 4, but are both negative with statistical
significance when pricing challenges is not included as an independent variable. We
caution against drawing definitive conclusions about how particular procurement
challenges impact school meal costs because the procurement challenges are highly
correlated with each other (Table 2). Our principle purpose in including these controls is
to test whether procurement challenges that could influence school meal costs were
correlated with market channel choice, and we find that the statistical significance our
market channel coefficients are robust to the inclusion of these variables.
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4.6 Conclusion

Whether and by what means SFAs may be reducing school meal costs via
participation in FTS programs has not received extensive attention. Transactions costs
and impediments to local food procurement by SFAs is well-documented, and our results
suggest that market channel portfolio choice can contribute to reduced school meal costs.
These findings suggest the conditions under which FTS program implementation may be
more self-sustaining in the long-run, perhaps in the absence of policy support. Our results
contradict the hypothesis that intermediated channels both realize cost reductions and
pass those savings long the supply chain. However, since we do not observe actual costs,
we are not able to determine the relevant mechanism. In particular, do intermediated
channels not create significant efficiencies, or do they create efficiencies but do not pass
them through the supply chain?
One limitation of the dataset is that the question about school meal costs reflects
the perception of SFAs regarding whether their school meal costs were reduced through
participation in FTS programs. They were not asked to undertake any calculations to
arrive at their conclusion or to elaborate on how their school meal costs declined. The
FTS Census does not ask FTS SFAs if their school meal costs increased, and does not
ask non- FTS SFAs questions about trends in school meal costs. More detailed data
collection efforts into the components of school meal budgets would be valuable in being
able to identify how school procurement strategies can be most effectively deployed
given budgetary constraints.
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CHAPTER 5
PRODUCER COSTS AND RETURNS FROM NEW ENGLAND FARM
TO INSTITUTION SALES

5.1 Introduction

Diversified specialty crop producers take into consideration a number of factors
when they choose how to market their products. In this chapter, I present the result of
field research that informs the development of a theoretical model of utility maximizing
producer choice of markets. We interviewed producers in six New England states who
market at least some product to Farm to Institution markets. The field research results
from a small scale study (N=11) of costs and returns to producer sales to local foods
markets in New England, with particular focus on how sales to institutions fit into
producers' overall marketing plans.
We conducted in-depth interviews with eleven producers about their costs and
returns in selling to farm to institution markets and two interviews with producers about
their farm to institution markets more generally. Interviewees represented diversified fruit
and vegetable growers in each of the six New England states, and a broad range of farm
operations sizes and farm marketing strategies. Farm to Institution marketing ranged from
less than 1% of total sales to about 11% of total sales of the farm operations interviewed.
Notably, while very few farm operations specifically track costs and returns to farm to
institution marketing, only two producers target this market for future growth. The
barriers cited to increased participation include low prices, volume requirements, and
logistical challenges.
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We asked New England producers to identify the transaction characteristics
associated with sales to the institutional market in direct and traditional-intermediated
supply chain structures. Research results contribute to a growing body of literature on
costs and returns to local foods markets and FTI specific transaction costs. This research
further contributes to a new theoretical model of producer market channel choice that
explicitly accounts for transaction characteristics that impact producers' decision to
supply to FTI markets in the Chapter 6.
In addition, we identify three important emerging topics that impact producers'
profitability in the farm to institution market and conduct additional research to develop
materials to inform producers about these topics. These topics include the emergence of
online brokerage platforms to reduce transaction costs, the increased risk of violating
Federal Department of Labor Wages and Hours violations as a result of engaging in some
farm to institution activities, and the role of a value-added product in farm to institution
sales.

5.2 Background

There are many ways for researchers to model producer marketing choices like
what to produce and where to sell the products, but each model of producer choice comes
with a trade-off. Extension economists, for example, might be interested in the practical
choice that producers face on a regular basis: "This is what I can grow, where do I sell
it?" To help producers answer this question, researchers can model costs and returns in
different markets (Hardesty and Leff, 2010; LeRoux, 2010). It is often expensive and
difficult to obtain this kind of information for diversified specialty crop producers. It is
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not usually possible, for this population, to obtain cost and returns data in the volume that
would allow statistical inference, so results are often of limited applicability.
National data sets might allow researchers to observe which markets producers
have sold to in the past, but do not usually provide both cost and returns information,
such as sales prices, costs of production, marketing costs, transaction costs, and the costs
and returns of the alternative markets to which the producers may have otherwise sold
product. Producer choices are explained by producer demographic information, regional
consumer demographic information, county, region, or state level market information that
can be merged with other national level data (Park, Mishra, and Wozniak, 2011). While
this research can provide a national view with broad applicability, it models producer
choice as utility maximizing where equilibrium prices and quantities are exogenous, if
they enter the model at all. This limitation prevents researchers from performing welfare
analysis and inhibits the ability to model the potential effects of policy changes on market
equilibria.
Another approach is to model producer choice to differentiate product as local,
instead of the choice of how to market the product. Producer product differentiation
models are based on a well-developed literature (Muss and Rosen, 1978) with application
across agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. This approach has the strength of
allowing endogenously determined equilibria but does not account for the practical menu
of choices that producers face regarding where to market their product. Two recent
applications of this mode l use simulation methods (Winfree and Watson, 2017) and
regional proprietary data from retailers (Richards et al., 20I 8) to identify equilibria and
conduct welfare analysis.
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As Farm to Institution (FTI) programs in New England expand, new supply
chains are being developed to handle the increased flow of regionally-produced goods to
regional institutions (Ralston, et al., 2017). While some supply chains deliver product
directly to institutions, using no aggregators, distributors, or processors, other supply
chains rely upon these additional supply chain actors. These are referred to as "direct"
and "intermediated" supply chains, respectively. Each time an additional supply chain
actor is added, the costs incurred to perform the supply chain task for which the actor is
responsible must be covered. The actor may also charge an additional fee. On the other
hand, in the absence of these additional supply chain actors, producers must absorb the
costs associated with performing the supply chain tasks.
It is not clear whether FTI markets are profitable to producers, and if not, what
motivates producers to sell to FTI markets. Adams (2010) found evidence that
institutional sales in New England may be profitable to producers. The Massachusetts
Farm to School Project commissioned telephone surveys with producers to identify the
impact of FTI sales on producers' profits. Results provide a description of Massachusetts
producers' understanding of the profitability/ role of FTI sales. In written comments,
producers noted trade-offs between costs associated with FTI sales and the profitability of
these sales, non-economic benefits of FTI sales such as community "exposure", role of
FTI sales in stabilizing seasonal income streams, personal value of helping feed
schoolchildren, and the "premium" nature of the product sold. Sitaker et al. (2014)
conducted a comprehensive literature review to determine whether different local food
marketing options:
•

enable producers to make a living;
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•

improve local economies;

•

provide local residents with greater access to affordable, healthy food; and

•

contribute to greater consumption of healthy food among local residents.

They found positive support to claim that producers marketing to farmers
markets, retailers, CSAs, and food hubs may contribute to achieving these goals. In the
case of FTI, however, the available research was insufficient to determine whether or not
FTI is profitable, provides community economic benefit, or improves access and diet
quality.
Conner et al.'s (2012) work "Sustainable School Food Procurement in Large K-12
Districts" offers a qualitative value-chain analysis of two pilot Farm to School projects.
This study interviews producers, schools, and mid-chain vendors and uses Stevenson and
Pirog (2008) definition of value-chains to further define the specific attributes of value
chains as related to Farm to Institution programs. According to Stevenson and Pirog,
value chains are characterized by:
•

product differentiation and value-added products

•

strategic partnerships across supply chain actors

•

information-sharing

•

trust

•

commitment to welfare of all participants through

•

fair pricing

•

fair governance.

Conner et al. find that actors in the farm to school supply chain in their study
display evidence of cultivating value-chains, particularly with regards to Business
Relationships and Values, Information and Learning, and Equity and Pricing. Actors'
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business interests and decisions are informed by the potential contribution they could
make to the school districts' goals to improve local producer viability and child nutrition.
Actors exchange information and develop opportunities to learn from one another to
improve supply chain responsiveness. Finally, actors recognize that support for their
shared goals of supporting local producers and child nutrition are constrained by tight
price margins and economic bottom lines, and made efforts to offer products at
"competitive prices," although the practice is dominated at times by the "desire to extract
maximum economic surplus from upstream or downstream supply chain links" (2012).
Low and Vogel (2012) use national data to determine how "local" foods are
marketed, finding that "a large portion" of local foods move through intermediated
markets, although small and medium sized farm sales in the northeast are dominated by
direct markets. They also find that while there is evidence that producers participating in
direct to consumer sales are able to capture a higher share of the food dollar, whether
producers who participate in intermediated markets are able to capture a similarly high
portion of the food dollar is in question.
King et al. (2010) conducted case studies to compare "structure, size, and
performance of local food supply chains with those of mainstream supply chains,"
including a FTI supply chain. The case studies focused on descriptions of structure, size,
and performance of local food supply chains. Five key findings emerged from their
research. First, they found that while local foods can move through different types of
supply chains, intermediated supply chains make it difficult to establish and maintain
consumers' connection to the "local" attributes of the product. Second, they found that
local food supply chains account for a very small percentage of overall consumer demand
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for the five products and places studied. Third, they found that there is no single "cookie
cutter" business model for a successful local food business enterprise. Fourth, they found
that farmers that market directly generally count direct marketing as one component of a
diversified marketing portfolio. Finally, they found that product aggregation to reduce per
unit costs can be more important than how nearby the producer is to the consumer.
Sexton (2012) suggests that “Market intermediaries, with even rather modest
amounts of market power, can capture large shares of the benefits from policies intended
to benefit producers." The exercise of market restraints, like liability insurance, sanitation
guidelines, purchase minimums in FTI markets, and the capture of associated margins is
common in intermediated agricultural markets where downstream firms typically set
contracts to protect food quality and safety.

5.3 Methods and Participants

The goal of the research was to identify producers' costs and returns from broad
range of FTI sales experiences. In coordination with Farm to Institution New England
(FINE), we worked with farm to institution practitioners in New England to identify a
judgement sample (Marshall 1996) of producers in six New England states who had
experience selling to institutional buyers either directly or through intermediated
channels. The criteria for inclusion on the list were broad: we requested that practitioners
identify producers that were representative of their states' farm size, product offerings,
access to marketing infrastructure, and marketing channels used. From this list, we
prioritized interviewees that provided geographical, farm size, and market channel
diversity. Fourteen producers agreed to be interviewed, although not all were willing to
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provide the full range of data requested. The sample size is appropriate for in depth
qualitative research on FTI market costs and returns (Sandelowksi, 1995) for the purpose
of informing future research, but not large enough to be used to draw inferences.

5.4 Survey Instrument

We developed a survey tool and used the tool to conduct semi structured, in
person interviews. We designed the survey to meet many goals. The survey instrument is
intended to be compatible with existing USDA surveys and reports (King et a., 2012;
USDA NASS 2012 Census of Agriculture; USDA ERS 2011 Agricultural Resource
Management Survey), and IRS forms (1040 Schedule F), and additionally include
questions that address costs and returns not currently gathered in these instruments (Lass,
2012). There were multiple purposes for this intention. Primarily, we hoped to make
straightforward comparisons to existing data for those fields that are included in both
existing instruments and our instrument. Producers were able to refer to forms that they
have already completed in order to answer many of our questions, which streamlined the
process and helped the interviews go more quickly. Finally, the questions are designed to
complement the existing instruments so that they may be easily inserted into future
federal instruments and/ or may serve as a pilot for potential questions, should USDA
decide to begin soliciting farm to institution data in future surveys. The list of documents
prducers were requested to have on hand during interviews is provided in Figure 5.1, List
of Farm Operation Documents.
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2014 IRS Schedule F
2014 Harvest data
Documentation of any grants received (contracts, etc.)
Payroll
Insurance paperwork
Federal Crop Insurance
Food Safety Liability Insurance
Farm Property Insurance
Employee Liability Insurance
Mortgage statement/ Leases
Town tax documents
A copy of your 2012 USDA Farm Census form

Figure 7 List of Farm Operation Documents

The survey was also designed to be compatible with existing measures of social
preferences. We designed the social preferences section with the intent of using the
results to inform a future field experiment design. To achieve this, we reviewed the
literature on field experiments, and developed a survey intended to identify a robust
Dictator Game to identify producer social preferences for three social outcomes. As
identified in the literature. In the process of making this design decision, we reviewed and
rejected a number of other social preference frameworks.
The final instrument design was built on the literature review and previous
producer costs and returns surveys, including federal farm financial reporting and survey
instruments, and questions intended to elicit producers' preferences for the social
outcomes attributed to Farm to Institution programs (King et al., 2014; Lass, 2012).
Section I, Social Preferences, included a section eliciting producers' agreement with
common beliefs about the impact of FTI programs and the effectiveness of organizations
with goals and principles that align with those impacts, using 5 point Likert scales
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ranging from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree, with a "Can't Choose" option. Identify
other causal factors that relate to supply chain transactions, including producer
preferences, producer socio-demographic characteristics and farm characteristics.
Sections 2 through 6 requested farm operation and financial information for the
2014 growing year. Section 2 asked producers which market channels they sold to and
whether and how they contracted with buyers in these market channels. In Section 3 we
requested farm operation information regarding total acreage, production and marketing
income from specific crops. In Section 4 we asked the producer about any other farm
related income, and in Section 5 we asked detailed information about farm labor and
wages. In Section 6 we solicited detailed information regarding farm operating expenses.
Finally, Section 7 requested demographic information from the interviewee. A sample of
interview questions is provided in Figure 5.2. The full instrument is attached in Appendix
C.
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Section 1. Social Preferences
Beliefs
Do you Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree or Disagree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree or Can’t Choose
with the following statements:
•
Increasing the sales of New England food to New England consumers benefits the
environment.
•
Increasing the sales of New England food to New England consumers helps preserve the
region's working landscape.
•
Increasing the sales of New England food to New England consumers decreases the
environmental impact of large-scale agriculture.
•
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a driver of local economic
development.
•
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a driver of regional economic
development.
•
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods to consumers in New England could
improve health and nutrition outcomes.
•
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could improve health and nutrition
outcomes for students k-12.
•
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could improve health and nutrition
outcomes for the elderly.
•
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could improve health and nutrition
outcomes for incarcerated individuals.
•
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could improve health and nutrition
outcomes for hospital patients.
•
Small and medium sized farms are important drivers of rural economies.
Section 2. Markets and Marketing Contracts
Direct to consumer (fresh or processed)
•
Farm stand
•
CSA
•
Farmers' market
•
PYO

Intermediated (fresh or processed)
•
Direct to restaurant
•
Direct to retail
•
Direct to buying club
•
Direct to aggregator

Wholesaler
End buyer known? Y N
if "yes":
•
institution
•
retail
•
restaurant
•
buying club
•
processor
•
other

Direct to processor
Direct to institution
•
public k-12
•
pre-school private k-12
•
private college
•
public college/univ
•
hospital
•
other

Figure 8 Selected Interview Questions
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5.5 Procedures

We identified and interviewed 11 producers who shared extensive financial
information about their farm operations, and two additional producers who were
interested in discussing their experiences with costs and returns in farm to institution
markets but were not willing to share financial information. The FINE practitioners
identified potential producers to interview and the appropriate means of conducting those
interviews. Several unanticipated questions came up during the process of identifying
potential producer interviewees; particularly the issue of how FINE could be included in
collecting producer information in a way that satisfies University Internal Review Board
(IRB) requirements for confidentiality.
The interviews were conducted on site, as producers were asked to share financial
documents that would be difficult to transport. We requested in depth farm financial
information, and a brief survey of producers pro-social motivations. We provided
producers with hard copies of the interview instrument three weeks prior to the scheduled
interview, along with a list of Farm Operation Documents that could furnish the
information requested in the interview, provided in Table XX, and a guide to indicate
which Farm Operation Documents were needed to respond to each interview question.
Interviews times were targeted to be about two hours, and actual interview time
ranged between two and four hours, with interviews taking over two hours being
extended with the continuing consent of the respondent. Surveyed producers were
compensated $100 each.
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Respondents were informed that their responses were voluntary and that they
could withdraw from the interview process at any time without forgoing compensation.
Respondents were further informed that information received would only be reported in
aggregate and that they would not be identifiable, and that they would remain
anonymous. After each interview, the interview notes were typed and emailed to
producers. Producers were given a (flexible) deadline, and asked to review the notes for
accuracy, and to edit or redact any information that they consider to be identifying or
proprietary.

5.6 Results

We use USDA's classification of farms according to gross income. 45.45% of
interviewed farm operations were "small family farms" with less than $350,000 in gross
cash farm income (GCFI) (USDA, 2013). Four of these farms are considered "low-sales
small family farms" with GCFI of less than $150,000, and one is considered "moderate
sales small family farms" with CGFI between $150,000 and $349,999. Interestingly, only
one interviewed farm (9.09%) is classified as a "mid-sized farm," or a family farm with a
gross income between $350,000 and $499,999 a year. The remaining 45.45% of farms all
are considered "large-scale family farms" with CGFI of between $1,000,000 and
$4,999,999.

5.6.1 Social Preferences
We asked eleven questions intended to elicit whether interviewed producers
believed that farm to school programs contributed to the achievement of pro-social goals.
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Producers ranked their responses on a Likert scale from 1 to 5, where" 1" indicated strong
agreement and "5" indicated strong disagreement. The producers were also allowed to opt
out of stating a level of agreement, although none did for any question. In the case where
a farm operation had more than one primary farm operator, we asked each farm operator
with equal decision-making roles to fill out this portion of the survey; however, responses
are not weighted to reflect the number of responses per farm operation.
All producers interviewed "Strongly Agreed" or "Agreed" with the statements
that: Small and medium sized farms are important drivers of rural economies; Increasing
the sales of New England food to New England consumers helps preserve the region’s
working landscape; Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a driver of regional
economic development.
Almost 92% of producers "Strongly Agreed" or "Agreed" with the following
statements: Increasing the sales of New England food to New England consumers
benefits the environment; Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a driver of
local economic development; Increasing the sales of local and regional foods to
consumers in New England could improve health and nutrition outcomes; Increasing the
sales of local and regional foods could improve health and nutrition outcomes for hospital
patients.
Over 81% of producers "Strongly Agreed" or "Agreed" that: Increasing the sales
of New England food to New England consumers decreases the environmental impact of
large-scale agriculture; Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could improve
health and nutrition outcomes for the elderly; Increasing the sales of local and regional
foods could improve health and nutrition outcomes for incarcerated individuals. And 75%
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of producers of producers "Strongly Agreed" or "Agreed" that increasing the sales of
local and regional foods could improve health and nutrition outcomes for k-12 students.
Table 17 Producer Social Preference
Strongly
Agree/
Agree

Neither

Strongly
Disagree/
Disagree

Can't
Choose

91.7%

8.3%

0.0%

0.0%

100.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

83.3%

16.7%

0.0%

0.0%

local economic development

91.7%

0.0%

8.3%

0.0%

regional economic development

100.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

91.7%

8.3%

0.0%

0.0%

for students k-12

75.0%

16.7%

0.0%

0.0%

the elderly

83.3%

8.3%

8.3%

0.0%

incarcerated individuals

83.3%

16.7%

0.0%

0.0%

hospital patients

91.7%

8.3%

0.0%

0.0%

100.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Increasing the sales of New England food to New
England consumers …
benefits the environment
helps preserve the region's working
landscape
decreases the environmental impact of
large-scale agriculture
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a
driver of …

Increasing the sales of local and regional foods to
consumers in New England could improve health
and nutrition outcomes.
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods
could improve health and nutrition outcomes for
…

Small and medium sized farms are important
drivers of rural economies.
N=12

5.6.2 Supply Chain Structure
We asked producers to identify how they marketed all products sold by the farm
operation, and in particular, to identify the structure of the supply chains through which
products flowed to end consumers in institutions. We provided producers with the
following definition:
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"Direct Marketing" is defined as sales from the producer directly to the
end consumer of the product.
"Intermediated Marketing” is defined as any sales where an additional
business or organization owns the product before it reaches the end consumer.

5.6.2.1 Direct Sales

Seventy three percent of producers interviewed sold directly through a farm stand
or farmers market, while 82% sold directly through a CSA, and 45% sold directly
through pick-your-own. This suggests that our producer sample is not solely comprised
of large producers that exclusively market to large wholesale buyers.

5.6.2.2 Intermediated Sales

We look at intermediated sales, in which producers sold product to outlets that
prepared or sold product in turn to end consumers. Given our research goal to identify the
costs and returns in the FTI market, we distinguish between intermediated sales to
institutions versus those outlets that are not institutions. For Non-Institution
Intermediated Sales, we find that 100% of producers interviewed sold product to a retail
outlet, like a grocery store or co-op; 91% of producers interviewed sold to restaurants;
55% sold to processors, 36% sold to aggregators, and 27% sold to buying clubs. This
indicates that our sample was "wholesale ready", meaning that while producers in our
sample may include sales directly to consumers in their portfolio of marketing options,
they have the capacity to work with wholesale buyers. If our sample was comprised of
producers that were not already "wholesale ready," we would be concerned that FTI
specific costs could not be separated from the costs of learning or from up front fixed
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costs associated with entering a new wholesale market, rather than the costs that are
specific to the FTI market itself.
Next we asked about FTI Intermediated Sales. Since our sample was selected
from producers that were known to have sold to the FTI market in 2014, we asked
producers to identify which FTI markets they sold to without using a wholesaler, such as
an aggregator, processor, or distributor. Fifty four percent of producers interviewed sold
to a public pre-k through 12th grade institution; 36% sold to private pre-k through 12th
grade private schools or hospitals; 28% sold to a public college, or a private college, or a
jail; and 9% sold to a pre-school.
When producers sell products to a wholesaler, they do not always know who buys
their product from the wholesaler. On the other hand, there are occasions where
producers negotiate sales with a buyer and then contract a wholesaler to deliver the
product. One important contribution of this study is that we ask producers who sell to
wholesalers whether they have information about buyers further down the supply chain.
This information is important because it provides insight into whether the intermediated
supply chain is a "value-chain", in the sense that information flows "backwards" to the
producer, whose marketing decision may be influenced by knowledge that the end
consumer; are students, for example. To obtain this information, we asked producers
about Intermediated Sales, when producers sell to wholesalers where the end buyer is
known. Of the producers interviewed, 64% sold to a wholesaler. Of the producers
interviewed, 27% (three total producers) sold to a wholesaler and know who buys their
product from the wholesaler. All of these three producers know that the buyer who
bought their product from the wholesaler was an institution. Of the producers
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interviewed, 36% used a non-profit online broker as a wholesale distributor to
institutions. Additional Market results are presented in Table Markets and Marketing
Contracts.
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Table 18 Producer Choice of Market Channel
Markets
No
Direct to consumer
Farm stand

Yes

No

Yes

9%

91%

27%

73%

Intermediated
Direct to restaurant

CSA

18%

82%

Direct to retail

0%

100%

Farmers' market

27%

73%

Direct to buying club

73%

27%

PYO

55%

45%

Direct to aggregator

64%

36%

Direct to processor

45%

55%

Intermediated
Wholesaler

36%

64%

Direct to institution

End buyer known?

73%

27%

Public k-12

45%

55%

Institution

73%

27%

Pre-school

91%

9%

Retail

82%

18%

64%

36%

Restaurant

82%

18%

73%

27%

Buying club

91%

9%

Private k-12
Private Higher
Ed
Public Higher
Ed

73%

27%

Processor

100%

0%

Hospital

64%

36%

Other

82%

18%

Other

73%

27%

Institution

0%

100%

Retail

33%

67%

Restaurant

33%

67%

Buying club

67%

33%

Processor

100%

0%

Other

33%

67%

If End Buyer Known

N=11

5.6.3 Transaction Costs - the Costs of Gathering Information, Negotiation, and
Monitoring.
We asked a number of questions intended to uncover the transaction costs
associated with farm to institution sales, but only one producer kept records that allowed
us to calculate a dollar value of those costs as distinct from costs associated with other
marketing. In this particular case, the dollar value is estimated as a portion of the salary
of an employee whose job includes wholesale marketing, plus additional labor costs
required for packing product for sales to these markets. This farm operation's business
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planning is perhaps the most sophisticated of all farms interviewed, and may offer a
window into how other farms will approach farm to institution marketing in the future, so
we will share as much as we can about the costs without providing identifying
information about the farm operation.
This farm operation only used a non-profit online farm brokerage platform to
coordinate and deliver farm to institution sales. Like many farms interviewed, the farm
does not distribute to institutional buyers because the uncertainty associated with these
deliveries is too high, and the revenue too low. The broker adds a 20% charge above what
farm price. The 20% shi FTS the cost of the non-profits brokerage services and delivery
to the buyer, so that the producer is not bearing these costs. In terms of transaction costs,
the brokerage service is bearing the costs of gathering information about potential buyers
and making a match among buyers and sellers; negotiating terms, including contracts,
product quality and packaging, prices and quantities; and monitoring the value and
quality of the sale. The farm does not process the product beyond what they would for
any other wholesale buyer, but the FTI product needs to be packed differently than
product for other wholesale buyers. The employee spends about 2% of their paid time on
FTI sales, which constitute about 0.004% of the farm's total sales, and has volunteered
about 200 hours of additional unpaid time to developing the farm to institution market for
the farm.
While other farm operations do not track information about transaction costs in a
way that allows for this comparison, it is perhaps not difficult to see why 81% of the
experienced farm business decision makers interviewed do not see Farm to Institution
marketing as a growth area for the farm business operation. When we asked these
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producers why they did not see this market as an area for growth, the answers all alluded
to the transaction costs in the market.
We provide a number of producer comments from our semi-structured interviews
that indicate that transaction costs are a barrier to increased sales to institutions:
-The wholesale learning curve is way more transparent than the FTI learning
curve. Also, the rules for FTI are evolving more quickly, so it isn't like you invest
in learning something and then you've invested that time and you move on instead the needs and rules change as you go. Not sure if it will each some kind of
stasis.

-In wholesale marketing, the organizational relationship is much stronger than
the institutional relationship, but in the institutional market, the relationship with
the individual is paramount to getting anything done, even though it is dynamic if a person [who you are working with at an institution] moves jobs, that may be
the end. With institutions, you have to actually go and meet with them.

-Won't do [delivery to institutions], or will avoid it if at all possible. Probably less
than 1% was direct. For example, one local school wanted deliveries, but we said
they need to go through the distributor because it just isn't worth all of the
coordination for the volume that they want.

-Quantities are too small to make it worth running a truck. Makes no economic
sense.

-Sold through [online broker to schools] for about 4-5 years, But 2014 was the
last year  then they didn't want to work with us because we were too small.
[online broker] has decided to focus on working with larger scale wholesale
farms.
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-We could have sold through [national distributor who works with food service
companies in institutions] but we would have had to increase our Food Safety
Liability Insurance to $10 million umbrella. That would have cost $3000 a year,
so we avoided it.

-[To increase sales to institutions] you need to incentivize the people who buy.
Buyers at schools need to get some kind of incentive - maybe 1% of local foods or
something, as a bonus at the end of the year.

-For us to move more of our sales from wholesale to institutions, they would need
to increase their prices.

-People who do food service are not accustomed to using whole vegetables, and
they have to be willing to deal with the product we sell, to cook it, etc. We haven't
made efforts to lightly process product in the way that institutions would need. At
the moment we wouldn't take on that kind of processing. It is conceivable that we
could sell to a middle man who would then process and move the product to
schools. But they would have to make a commitment to organic, or the investment
we've made in that wouldn't earn the returns to make it worthwhile.

-What we need is a processor that can make the product into the kind of thing that
cafeteria workers like.

In addition, these farms may have better options for growth areas for their
businesses. Farms that are near metropolitan areas are investing in farm stands and other
direct marketing, like CSAs. Farms farther away from metropolitan areas are interested in
moving into wholesale restaurant and retail markets, particularly those that have access to
online brokerage platforms. These marketing options have much more clearly defined
transaction costs.
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With these comments however, it is important to distinguish the uncertainty about
the transaction costs in the FTI market and the actual costs themselves. Perhaps with the
emergence of online non-profit and for profit brokerages, the uncertainty will be
gradually eliminated, and producers will sort themselves into markets with clearly
defined costs, including farm to institution markets.
Only two of the thirteen producers interviewed see farm to institution marketing
as a growing market for their farm operation. These farm operations had a few
characteristics in common - they did not perceive direct marketing as a growing market
for their operations, either because they were geographically isolated from densely
populated areas or because they felt that the direct to consumer market was saturated
where they were located. Unlike most of the producers interviewed, who identified as
diversified farm operations, each of these two operations focused on growing a smaller
number of crops. Both operations had made large investments in on-farm processing
facilities in the last two years, and both farms aggregate and process products from
nearby growers to sell to institutions. While the other eleven interviewed producers
engaged in on-farm processing, only these two farms served as aggregators, suggesting
that the growth opportunity may be in aggregation, rather than a reallocation of product
grown on-site from more general wholesale sales or direct sales to farm to institution
sales.
These producers, however, had far more differences than similarities. The
operation sizes in terms of total dollars sales were on the opposite ends of the ranges of
those interviewed. Farm labor expenditures were relatively low for one producer, and
relatively high for the other. The farms' locations were very different in terms of access to
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markets and infrastructure. One farm had significant on-farm infrastructure and the other
did not. The producers had very different ratios of expenditures for distribution costs,
utilities, insurance costs and other standard farm operation costs.

5.7 Emerging Issues

In addition to addressing social preferences and costs and returns in the FTI
market, our semi-structured interviews uncovered some important emerging topics in FTI
markets. The first topic is the development of a number of non-profit and for-profit
organizations that have developed online ordering platforms that minimize many of the
transaction costs associated with producers and buyers interacting in this market. The
second topic is the increased chance that producers will be in violation of Federal
Department of Labor Wages and Hours regulations as a direct result of new farm
activities that producers may engage in to sell to institutional markets, including
aggregating product from other producers and processing product. The final topic is the
role of engaging in value-added processing for the farm to institution market. Appendices
include extension and outreach materials developed as a result of this research to guide
producers in their choices regarding two of these issues, and a Case Study to explore the
third. To provide useful information to producers and practitioners about the emerging
issues uncovered in the interviews with producers, we extended our research.

5.7.1 Online Brokerages
We determined the important characteristics of online brokerage platforms,
identified the nonprofits that offer these services to producers, constructed an online
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survey using SurveyMonkey to elicit the relevant information and asked non-profits to
fill out the survey. We identified five non -profits in New England that operate as
brokers. The role that the brokers played varied. Most brokers required that producers
deliver their product to a centralized location, although some would pick product up if the
farm was on an established delivery route. Farmers usually set the price they charged
brokers for each delivery of product, although it was often noted that the process was
generally give and take, and at times prices were set for a portion of a season. The cost
structure varied among brokers, with some brokers passing transaction, storage, and
delivery costs directly on to buyers, and others charging a flat rate of 10-18%. Notably,
most brokers paid producers in full within two weeks, which is an important
improvement over the payment terms offered when by institutional purchasers, which can
take months to fulfill payment. Finally, the brokers often provided a range of additional
services, including:
•

Process raw product;

•

Refrigerated & Frozen storage;

•

Refrigerated trucks;

•

Legally own product once it is in possession;

•

Label, or require farmers to label, product origin;

•

Require farmers to participate in or carry any additional food safety

certification s or processes
•

Online platform for sales.
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5.7.2 Labor Laws and Farm to Institution Innovations
In recent years, a number of producers in New England have been the subjects of
Department of Labor Wages and Hours violation investigations for activities like
aggregation and on farm processing that are encouraged by FTI advocates, but that result
in farm workers’ exemption from Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). We interviewed
three farmers who had been found in violation of labor law, reviewed FLSA and relevant
case law, and interviewed a number of labor lawyers with expertise in agricultural labor
law. We found that FTI sales may be different than other wholesale sales because
institutions may want product that is lightly processed, they may need a volume delivered
that is too large for any one farm to fill so that producers work together to aggregate
deliveries, or they may be interested in buying from a farm in a neighboring state.
Producers that are relatively large and are engaged in any of those activities to satisfy
orders from institutional buyers may not be employing workers in "agricultural work" as
defined by labor law. If workers are not engaged in agricultural work according to this
definition in any given week, then they are not exempt from overtime pay for that week,
and failure to pay overtime could result in expensive fines, in addition to providing the
affected workers back pay.
More research is needed to understand the scope of impact of labor regulations on
the agricultural activities that producers engage in to meet the demands of institutional
buyers, as well as on the activities that producers in New England engage in for other
markets. A number of producers in New England have been found in violation of labor
laws in the last few years, and engaging these producers to research this issue in depth
and develop materials to prevent non-compliance is a growing need. Online brokerage
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platforms, both those run by non-profits and those run by for profit companies, are a
growing trend across the country. In what circumstances might these platforms support
producer profitability and in what circumstances they may contribute to a downward
pressure on the prices charged by producers who use the platforms? More research is
needed into the prices and quantities of products sold by producers and costs and returns
to different farm to institution food processing options. Without this information, it will
continue to be difficult to determine the profitability of this market for producers.

5.7.3 Value-Added Product Line
We conducted an in-depth interview with a farm that developed a value-added
product line for institutional consumers. Reviewing internal production, processing, and
sales documents detailing the costs and returns for that product and its role in the farm
operation's long term viability, we investigated the convergence of stakeholders and
resources that allowed the producer to explore a value-added soup product line. Despite
significant community support for the value-added venture, the pilot value -added soup
project was not cost-effective, and was not likely to be without significant changes in
production costs.

5.8 Conclusions

The project identified a number of critical potential costs and returns for
producers in farm to institution marketing in New England, and important new
approaches to mitigate those costs. One approach is to leverage new technological
resources like online brokerage systems to reduce transaction costs.
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Results are also important for practitioners and researchers who have struggled to
clearly understand the roll of farm to institution marketing in a sustainable farm business
plan. In addition to the valuable responses to questions we asked about marketing, we
have identified a number of questions that must be asked in the future, including the role
of different market intermediaries and market structures, the role of labor and farm to
institution activities, the role of processing, and the role of social preferences in
producers choices to sell to these markets.
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CHAPTER 6
EQUILIBRIA AND WELFARE IN MARKETS WITH SOCIAL
PREFERENCES

Authors: Jill Fitzsimmons, Dr. Nathalie Lavoie, Dr. Daniel Lass

6.1 Introduction

In this paper we introduce a theoretical model of markets for local foods that
demonstrates how microeconomic theory can support sound policy decisions when both
firm and consumer choices are determined by social preferences, and we apply the model
to examine the effectiveness of different policy tools to enhance local food markets in
which there may be a trade-off between achieving different local foods systems goals.
Supply chains in markets for local foods are commonly referred to as “value chains”
(Stevenson and Pirog, 2008). Value chains, in this definition, are supply chains in which
both the product and information regarding the product’s pro-social attributes are
communicated upstream and downstream along the supply chain, and supply chain
actors’ choices in the market are influenced by preferences for pro-social attributes.
There are three major challenges to modeling equilibria and welfare in markets
comprised of value chains, like local foods: 1) The classical approach to modeling
agricultural producer choice in markets for local foods is to treat the producer’s choice as
a profit maximizing decision to differentiate product to meet consumer demand for local
product attributes, but this objective function ignores the literature on producer profit
maximizing market channel choice in local food markets, as well as the literature on
161

producer utility maximizing market channel choice; 2) Either firm or consumer choices
can independently be explained by incorporating determinants of social preferences into
the relevant objective functions, but prices and quantities are treated as exogenous, so
that aggregate supply and demand cannot be derived and used to determine the market
price and quantity; 3) Markets for local foods have, until recently, been characterized as
“direct” markets in which there are no market intermediaries, but as the market matures,
the effect of intermediary supply chain actors that may not be motivated by social
preferences must be taken into account.
This paper makes two types of contributions. First, we demonstrate the impact of
modeling assumptions on welfare measures in markets that include value chains. To do
this, we develop a partial equilibrium model that allows endogenous price and quantity in
markets for local foods and that unifies the different perspectives of firms and consumers
in markets for local foods. Our model allows identical producers to choose markets while
heterogeneous consumers choose products. We then develop a model in which both firm
and consumer are heterogeneous in their preferences for pro-social value chain outcomes,
expanding the application of social preferences in decision making to firm decision
making. Finally, we include the potential for intermediary market power to conduct
welfare analysis. The second contribution is to apply this model to test the effectiveness
of different policy measures in the specific case of farm to school markets, though the
approaches we suggest can be used to model other agricultural markets, as well as nonagricultural markets.
Farm to School ( FTS) markets are particularly interesting because both case
studies and empirical evidence raise questions regarding the long term viability of the
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markets, but policy makers continue to support them to achieve childhood health and
nutrition objectives. While demand in these markets is growing, it is price constrained
(Ralston et al., 2017; Technomics, 2017), and supply to this market is relatively low
compared to that of other markets for local food products (NASS, 2016). It is not clear
that marketing to FTS channels is a profitable strategy for producers who market local
food (Boys and Fraser, 2018; Fitzsimmons and Lass, 2015; Sitaker, et al., 2011), yet
empirical evidence suggests that physical proximity to producers who market directly is
both statistically and economically important to FTS program implementation (Botkins
and Roe, 2018). Finally, while the local foods in general and the FTS market in
particular are moving toward more intermediated sales (Richards, et al., 2017; Bloom and
Hinrichs, 2011) producer motivation to supply to the market may be driven by nonpecuniary factors (Lehnerd, et al., 2018; Matts et al., 2011) that may not be discoverable
or supported in intermediated markets where intermediaries do not transmit market
information upstream.
Policy makers have invested in creating demand for Farm to School Programs in
which schools purchase “local” foods from producers, but have not made similar
investments to ensure producer supply to these programs. This is understandable,
considering that previous research does not provide a clear explanation for how producers
choose marketing channels for locally differentiated products in intermediated markets. If
policy makers want to support FTS programs but do not understand how producers make
the choice to sell to this market, it is difficult to design policy intended to encourage
participation.
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The FTS market for locally differentiated products to schools highlights a
number of potential trade-offs that often go unexplored in local foods research but that
can be addressed through our approach. In FTS markets, there may be economic tradeoffs between increasing the quantity of local foods supplied to schools and total welfare
in the partial equilibrium model. As the quantity supplied to the FTS market increases as
a result of policy intervention, total economic welfare can decrease due to welfare
decreases in the non FTS market. As the FTS market grows, producers and schools
increasingly rely on market intermediaries to distribute product. The role of
intermediaries in the market, however, is generally overlooked, resulting in the potential
to under-estimate the price paid by schools for local product and over-estimate the
equilibrium quantity allocated to the market. In addition, subsidies intended to increase
the quantity of local foods in FTS programs may improve success if used to support
producer supply rather than school demand. The Farm to School case highlights that
policy interventions to support social outcomes of local foods systems are sensitive to
market factors that are not currently considered by policy makers and FTS advocates,
and highlights the need for more rigorous economic theories that can incorporate
different dimensions of local foods systems.

6.2 Economic Analysis of Local Food

Economic analysis of “local” food systems has been challenging, in part, because
the market definition differs between the demand side and the supply side. While
consumers purchase “locally differentiated” products, producers sell “through direct
markets”. To the extent that local foods markets have been defined by the direct
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marketing channel through which they were bought and sold, and the product attributes
have been considered verifiable as a result of “knowing” the producer, the modeling
distinction has been insignificant. As markets for local food grow, however, and diversify
beyond direct-to-consumer channels to include marketing locally differentiated foods
through intermediated market channels, the distinction becomes relevant and necessary to
effectively analyze market equilibria, policy impacts, and economic welfare.

6.2.1 Consumer Demand for Local Food
The idea that consumers can make purchasing choices to support social causes is
not new, and has been applied to consumer choices for food and agricultural products for
many decades. Examples include Victory Gardens, health foods, sustainable foods,
organic foods, and most recently, local foods (Brown & Jameton, 2000; Pothukuchi &
Kaufman, 1999). Economic analysis of consumer demand in markets for these foods
generally focuses on understanding the specific food product attributes that consumers
bundle into their definitions of these foods (Connolly & Klaiber, 2014; Darby et al.,
2008; Lusk and Briggeman, 2009). Economists ask what product attributes, such as food
quality, environmental outcomes, health, et cetera, motivate consumers to choose and
pay a premium for these products over otherwise indistinguishable commodity
alternatives. Consumers consistently demonstrate an increased willingness-to-pay for
products that are labeled as “local” or are labeled with a specific local or regional brand
(“Colorado Grown”) and the attributes that are bundled into the implicit concept of local
(Darby et al., 2008; Feldmann & Hamm 2015; Fitzsimmons and Cicia, 2018; Loureiro et
al., 2002; Martinez, 2010). More recently, economic models of consumer demand have
included other-regarding consumer preferences to support local producers (Toler et al.,
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2009) or to value local economic impacts and other potential externalities (Winfree and
Watson, 2017). The presumption is that producers may then use this information to
differentiate their product to meet consumer demand, and capture the relevant premium.
The demand for local foods has extended beyond household consumption, and has
a growing presence in public and private institutions like schools, colleges, hospitals and
nursing homes (Ralston et al., 2017). We apply the model developed in this paper to the
case of Farm to School ( FTS) programs, where public K-12 schools procure local foods
for sales in cafeterias, so we will explore the demand in the K-12 FTS market in
particular.
Like consumers’ household demand for local in general, FTS advocates argue
that FTS programs create new markets for producers that may bring better profit
margins, improve nutrition and health for end consumers, improve connections between
producers and community, generate local economic growth, and improve environmental
sustainability of the food system (USDA, Food and Nutrition Service, 2016; National
Farm to School Network 2016). Demand for local product by FTS programs is intended
to support systems change, incorporating different actors with different goals, which the
National Farm to School Network summarizes:
Farm to school enriches the connection communities have with fresh, healthy food
and local food producers by changing food purchasing and education practices at
schools and early care and education settings (2018).

Programs incorporate education around nutrition, food preparation, and
production with procurement to support this goal. Agencies, funders, and policies that
166

aim to support FTS goals are generally oriented towards the institutional buyer, not the
agricultural producer, and the resulting interventions tend to focus on education and
procurement strategies. Nutrition and public health agencies tend to promote education
interventions that benefit students’ health outcomes (Berezowitz et al., 2015; Lyson,
2016), while producer-oriented organizations and agencies like USDA tend promote
interventions that support schools procurement of local foods (Ralston et al., 2017). In
general, FTS programs are perceived to be mutually beneficial to both consumers and
producers, and, like household consumers of local foods, the potential benefits to local
producers, local economic development, and the environment are valued in addition to
the perceived benefits from more healthful products and the opportunity to educate youth
about food and health (Izumi et al., 2010).
Unlike consumers’ household demand for local, however, there are a number of
barriers that school food authorities (SFAs) face to procure local food products. SFAs
struggle with local food availability, distribution logistics, operating costs, lack of staff
training and kitchen equipment to prepare unprocessed products, and ordering and
managing financial transactions (Bloom and Hinrichs, 2010; Boys and Fraser, 2017;
Fitzsimmons, 2011; Vo and Holcomb, 2011). In the 2015 Farm to School Census,
conducted by USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service, 75% of respondents that participated
in FTS programs reported problems with procurement. In Table 19. “Perceived Local
Food Procurement Problems, 2013-2014”, we divide the twenty procurement problems
identified by Census respondents into five problem categories: Transaction, On-Site,
Delivery, Product Availability, and Price. SFAs that participated in FTS were asked what
problems they experienced with FTS procurement. The most frequently noted problems
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include Product Availability and Transaction costs. For example, 66% of respondents that
participated in FTS programming reported at least one problem with product availability,
and 53% reported at least one transaction problem related to obtaining information,
negotiating terms, and monitoring compliance. Of the SFAs that did procure product for
FTS programs, 53% that reported at least on transaction problem, and 26% reported that
it was “Hard to coordinate procurement of local with regular procurement.”
Policy makers and funders have long recognized that the problems SFAs face in
procuring local product are barriers to program implementation, and have increased
funding for FTS programs and implemented policies to encourage schools to source
regional farm products to help SFAs overcome the barriers (Lyson, 2016). For example,
USDA began a $5 million annual FTS grant program in 2012 “to increase local food
procurement for school meal programs and expand educational agriculture and gardening
activities.” The program was established by the 2010 Healthy, Hunger Free Kids Act
(Lyson, 2016; Community Food Systems, 2017). The USDA’s FTS programs are
intended to increase procurement of local foods by local schools, primarily by addressing
the barriers to participation faced by schools (Ralston, et al., 2017). The grants are limited
to “training and technical assistance, planning, purchasing equipment, developing school
gardens, developing partnerships, and implementing FTS programs” (USDA, 2016).
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Table 19 Perceived Local Food Procurement Problems for FTS Participants
Specific
One or more
Problem
problems
On-Site
23%
Lack of kitchen equipment to process/prepare
12%
local foods.
GAP/ other food safety requirements
12%
Lack of compliance with your institution's
6%
purchasing policies
Delivery
24%
Lack of reliability in delivering ordered items
19%
Getting on time deliveries
8%
Quantity delivered equals quantity ordered
8%
Price
42%
Higher prices
38%
Unstable product prices
15%
Product Availability
66%
Hard to find year-round availability of key items
57%
Local items not available from primary vendors
27%
Vendors for local items don't offer a broad range
22%
of products
Lack of availability of processed/precut products
15%
Getting product delivered that meets your quality
15%
requirements & other specs (i.e., size)
Transaction
53%
Local producers aren't bidding
16%
Hard to coordinate procurement of local with
26%
regular procurement
Hard to find new suppliers/growers or
19%
distributors
Hard to get information about product
16%
availability
Hard to place orders with vendors
6%
Resolving problem deliveries
4%
Inability to pay farmers according to farmers'
8%
needs due to school district payment procedures
Number of SFA Respondents that participated in FTS programming, N=4718.
75% of SFAs Reported One or More Problems.
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While agricultural producers and producer groups are eligible for funding, less
than $300,000 out of the $15 million has been awarded to producers to increase supply
during the first three years of the grant’s existence (NSAC, 2016), and fewer than 9% of
grant applicants and 1% of recipients between 2013 and 2017 were agricultural producers
(Food and Nutrition Service, 2017). The USDA FTS grant program is focused on
procurement; between 2013 and 2017, 50% of funded projects were awarded directly to
schools and school districts, 49% to non-profits, state and local agencies, Indian tribal
organizations, and universities and colleges, while 0.008% has been awarded to
producers. Thus, it is not surprising that funded proposals supported school food
authorities in local food procurement, processing, and preparation activities, as well as
agriculture, food, and nutrition-based education and school garden activities, and did not
provide significant assistance to producer supply (Food and Nutrition Service, USDA,
2017).
The National Farm to School Network also tracks state-level FTS policy
proposals. Similar to the priorities of the USDA grant program, all of the three NFSN
legislative categories support demand by increasing 1) education related to food,
agriculture, health and nutrition; 2) school gardens; and 3) procurement, or school
purchasing, serving and promoting of local foods. An analysis of laws that provided
direct financial or program support to serve local foods found that such legislation was
associated with higher rates of FTS participation and frequency of serving local food at
the state level (McCarthy et al., 2017). 13 The category of procurement includes two

13

Categories included: Project or pilot program implementation, budget appropriations,
grant money allocation, local preference, FTS coordinator, and database (McCarthy et
al., 2017).
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legislative topics that may indirectly increase market prices, benefiting producers, despite
being aimed at schools: 1) increasing reimbursements for local food purchasing (19
proposed bills); and 2) establishing preferential purchasing policies for local food (57
proposed bills) (NFSN, 2016). To our knowledge, no legislation and no federal funding
has been proposed to directly support producer participation in FTS markets, although
producers have access to many non- FTS specific funding and financing opportunities.
In addition to funding SFAs to mitigate procurement costs at the school level, a
proposed solution to reduce the barriers to local foods procurement for FTS programs is
to leverage economies of scale in existing “conventional” food distribution supply chains
to improve efficiency and move larger volumes of product (Bloom and Hinrichs, 2010;
Abatekessa and Peterson, 2011; Conner et al., 2012; Clark and Inwood, 2015; Givens and
Dunning, 2018). The conventional wisdom is that distributors have access to more
efficient infrastructure, like refrigerated trucks and cold storage, that can reduce
marketing costs, and that they have ordering, billing and payment systems that are
compatible with SFAs and can reduce transaction costs. Distribution sector cost
information is generally proprietary, making it difficult to verify this claim. It is possible
that the sector’s cost efficiencies are easily transferrable to the FTS supply chain, but it is
also possible that distributors face supply chain costs associated with the same challenges
that SFAs and producers face. If using the distribution sector does achieve efficiencies
that lead to overall cost savings in the supply chain, distributors with market power may
retain some portion of the cost savings as rent, limiting the potential increase in quantity
supplied. Without explicitly accounting for the role of an intermediary distributor sector
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in the intermediated FTS market channel, by treating it as “frictionless”, it is difficult to
assess the net impact intermediaries may have on the quantity supplied.

6.2.2 Producer Market Choice
Three approaches dominate how producer choices in local foods markets are
modeled: 1) profit maximizing sales of a locally-differentiated product, 2) producer profit
maximizing choice of market channels, or 3) producer utility maximizing choice of
market channels. Local food is modeled as a vertically differentiated good, i.e. we
assume that at the same price, all consumers (schools) prefer the local product to the
commodity product. Models of firms’ strategic choices to differentiate products as local
allow producers or retailers a location-based comparative advantage in cost (Winfree and
Watson, 2017) or the capacity to diversify its product bundles by including local products
to exploit consumer demand for product bundles that include local foods (Richards, et al.,
2017). In these examples, firms offer different quality levels, where more efficient or
proximate firms typically supply high-quality product or product bundles, and lessefficient or distant firms supply low-quality product or product bundles. Firms make a
choice regarding whether to differentiate products, and aggregate supply is a function of
heterogeneity in producers’ efficiencies. Firms’ choices to differentiate products as local
are profit maximizing choice. Modeling producers’ choices to differentiate products to
meet consumer demand is the standard approach that has been used in the literature.
Modeling producer choice of market channels is preferable to some authors
because it is a more accurate reflection of the practical choice that small and medium-
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sized producers face (Hardesty and Leff, 2010;Kim, Curtis and Yeager, 2014; Leroux et
al., 2010; Parks and Lohr, 2008). Models of profit and utility maximizing choice between
markets or portfolios of markets implicitly embeds product differentiation within the
market channel – products are differentiated as local because they are sold through a
venue that is local. In these models, producers choose either to market the product as a
commodity through a wholesaler, or directly to the consumer through a direct subchannel like a CSA, farmers market, or farm stand. The above local foods literature may
favor this approach because of its practical application, but also the framing of the
decision as market channel choice appears to be, in large part, a legacy of federal policy.
The Farmer-To-Consumer Direct Marketing Act Of 1976 was enacted to
“…promote…the development and expansion of direct marketing of agricultural commodities
from farmers to consumers…” and it directed the USDA Secretary of Agriculture to “…initiate
and coordinate a program designed to facilitate direct marketing from farmers to consumers for
the mutual benefit of consumers and farmers…”

While the Act expressly did not limit the definition of direct marketing, the
definition that first appeared in the 1978 and 1982 Agricultural Censuses was based on
language used in the act, and has, in practice, provided a benchmark for how researchers
quantify direct marketing. Producers were asked:
“During 1978 did you SELL any crops, livestock, or livestock products DIRECTLY to individuals
FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION - roadside stands, farmers markets, pick your own, etc.?”
(Bureau of the Census, 1978)

14

.

14

USDA NASS took over administration of the Census of Agriculture in 1997, which
had previously been administered by the Bureau of the Census.
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The result has been that this Census category, with modest variation over subsequent
censuses, has served as the sole national data source for agricultural products not
marketed as commodities. More recently, the 2015 Local Food Marketing Practices
(LFMP) Survey was conducted by USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service
(NASS) to provide data about producers’ local food marketing practices. The survey
identified four different “direct” marketing channels: “direct to consumer”; “direct to
retail”; “direct to institution”; and “direct to intermediate”. The survey design is
particularly interesting in that the definition of the “direct to intermediate” market
channel explicitly identifies locally branded products, while the others do not. Table 20.
“Local Food Marketing Practices Survey Channel and Sub-Channel Definitions”
provides the market channel definitions used by USDA NASS in the 2015 LFMPS.
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Table 20 USDA 2015 Local Food Marketing Practices Survey Channel and SubChannel Definitions
Channel

CONSUMER

RETAIL

INSTITUTION

Sub-Channel
Farmers markets, on-farm stores or farm stands, roadside stands or stores,
CSA (Community Supported Agriculture), online marketplaces.
Supermarkets, supercenters, restaurants, caterers, independently owned
grocery stores, food cooperatives.
K-12 schools, colleges or universities, hospitals, workplace cafeterias,
prisons, foodbanks
Businesses or organizations in the middle of the supply chain marketing

INTERMEDIATE

locally- and/or regionally-branded products, such as distributers, food hubs,
brokers, auction houses, wholesale and terminal markets, and food
processors.

Producers may sell the product directly to a consumer, they may brand the
product as “local” and sell it to a middle-man, or they may sell the product to a wholesale
distributor as an unbranded commodity. In the case where the producer sells the product
directly to a consumer, the product is presumed to be “local” by virtue of the lack of
middle-men. In retail, institution, and intermediated markets, however, the process of
branding the product as local and enforcing the branding through the supply chain so that
the value of the local premium is realized at the point of purchase is costly (Hardesty and
Leff, 2010; Leroux, et al., 2010). Further, intermediaries within the supply chain are
concentrated and have the potential to act as oligopolists and/ or oligopsonists and
capture a price premium and lower the price paid to farmers (Hardesty and Leff; 2010;
Boys and Fraser, 2017). An additional consideration is that individual or family farm
operators may be motivated to make marketing choices that are not solely profit
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maximizing (Conner et al. 2012; Barrowclaw et al., 2015; Heiss et al, 2014; Lehnerd et
al., 2018; Lyson, Gillespie and Hilchey, 1995; Hunt, 2007).
Whether local food marketing is necessarily profitable to producers is
inconclusive, particularly as the high cost of labor for direct marketing may offset the
available premium for local (Hardesty and Leff, 2010; Lehnerd et l., 2018; Leroux, et al.,
2010; Sitaker, et al., 2014). Much of the research on producer profitability has been
limited by the lack of available data, and instead relies on region-specific small-sample
studies (Fitzsimmons and Lass, 2015; Hardesty and Leff, 2010; Leroux, et al., 2010). The
national LFMPS asked producers to identify some channel-specific marketing practices
costs and revenues. Unfortunately, the response rates for these questions were too low to
provide reliable inference for any given marketing channel, though future research may
supplement these data with USDA Economic Research Service Agricultural Resource
Management Survey data to find some channel-specific profitability measures. There is
limited available research, however, that demonstrates that producers’ costs to
differentiate the product as local are less than the increased returns from the product
differentiation (Fitzsimmons and Lass, 2015; Hardesty and Leff, 2010; Leroux; 2010).
The costs of differentiation are inextricably tied to marketing channel choice. Implicitly
differentiating products as local by selling at a farm stand, through Community
Supported Agriculture (CSA), or at farmers’ markets, are costly labor-intensive activities
(Boys and Fraser, 2018; Fitzsimmons and Lass, 2015; Hardesty and Leff, 2010; Leroux;
2010). Explicitly differentiating products as local by labeling products, or otherwise
transmitting information through an intermediated marketing channel increases variable
costs, as well as enforcement costs. Importantly, explicitly differentiating products also
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involves uncertain downstream negotiation, information, and monitoring costs, or
transactions costs, particularly when supply chain intermediaries are not committed to
preserving the value of a label along the supply chain (Hobbs, 1997). In the case of FTS
markets, SFAs who negotiate food service contracts and make procurement decisions
have restricted budgets and may not have the ability to pay for locally differentiated
products. Producers face increased transaction costs associated with explicitly
differentiating their local product in the Farm to School marketing channel (Boys and
Fraser, 2015; Vo and Holcombe; 2010). While other direct marketing practices have
shown promise to be profitable in these small-scale studies, the potential profitability of
FTS programs is less convincing (Sitaker et al., 2014).
Producers’ ability to exercise market power derived from limited competition is
another possible source of profitability in direct to consumer markets for locally
differentiated food (Hardesty and Leff, 2010). A local product is defined by restricting
the distance it has traveled from the producer to the end consumer. This restriction also
limits the number of competitive producers that may sell “local” products to any group of
consumers, effectively restricting market entry and potentially granting producers
oligopoly power in the market for local foods. If direct-to-consumer marketing of locally
differentiated food is, in fact, generally profitable for producers, the price-cost margin
may be a result of both product differentiation and producers exercising oligopoly power.
If the profitability of direct-to-consumer local foods is partially due to producers
exercising oligopoly power, this market power may be countervailed in an intermediated
market with a downstream intermediary exercising oligopsony power. In the FTS market
channel, producers increasingly sell product to intermediaries (Ralston, et al., 2017),
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which then sell to schools where product is provided to end consumers. These
intermediaries potentially limit producers’ abilities to reap benefits from oligopoly power
and may subject them to oligopsony power. Market concentration upstream of SFAs
validates the possibility that market power may be a factor. In FTS markets, SFAs may
contract with food service management companies, who hire management staff and
arrange procurement, or they may be self-operated by the authority. School food service
management companies comprise about 25% of the food service contracting industry, in
which 66% of revenues are accrued by the top four companies in the industry nationwide,
indicating the potential for upstream market power (IBISWorld, 2018). While the
national concentration of wholesale food distribution companies is lower in general, the
broad line food distribution companies that often supply school food services are also
concentrated, with the top three companies earning 60% of revenues, suggesting that
even self-operated food service management may be subject to market power
(Technomics, 2017). Regardless of food service management, upstream market
concentration is a reasonable expectation.
Finally, agricultural producers’ decisions are not always modeled as profit
maximizing decisions. Often, producers’ choices are modeled as utility maximizing
choices. This modeling choice stems from Lin (1974) who demonstrated that commodity
farm operators’ choices are best explained in some circumstance as utility-maximizing.
Agricultural producers’ household income (off-farm employment) and farm operation
income are combined in the household budget constraint, and off-farm economic factors
influence on-farm economic decisions. The left-hand side of the producers’ objective
function might be defined as “viability”, “survivability” and include off-farm income, for
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example, or simply be a utility function (Brown and Weber, 2013; Byerlee and Anderson,
1982; Parks and Lohr, 2008; Park, Mishra, Wozniak, 2011; Zuluaf, et al., 2014; UCSC,
2018). In addition, unlike firm operators in general, farm business operations may operate
past the point when other firms would exit the industry. Producers may be risk averse,
may dislike expending effort to enter new marketing channels, may have off-farm
income, and may make decisions based on other non-pecuniary benefits, like preferring
self-employment, independence, and the agricultural life-style (Lin, 1974; Low, et al.,
2015; Hamilton, 2000; Key and Roberts, 2009). Producers may respond to
encouragement or short-term incentives from entities that promote local foods, such as
USDA’s “Know Your Farmer, Know Your Food” campaign.
Low et al., (2015) suggest producers may enjoy the social aspects of direct-toconsumer marketing, and in some qualitative studies, producers’ choices to sell to locally
differentiated marketing channels are attributed to producers’ personal preferences for the
social goals identified with local foods (Lehnerd et al., 2018). Research also suggests
producers’ choices to sell to FTS are influenced by the outcomes attributed to Farm to
School in particular, like educating students about agricultural, supporting health and
nutrition outcomes, supporting the regional economy, or contributing to improved
environmental outcomes (Batemen, Engel, and Meinen 2014; Heiss et al., 2014; Lehnerd,
et al, 2018; Matts, 2011; Matts et al., 2015). Each of these circumstances represent a
motivation other than profit maximization that might lead a producer to choose a market
for locally differentiated products – personal attributes, encouragement or incentivization
by entities with pro-social goals, or the producer’s own pro-social goals.
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A broad literature demonstrates that consumers regularly make decisions that are
motivated by “pro-social behavior” rather than rational and self-regarding behavior
(Camerer and Fehr, 2006). An emerging literature further identifies the potential for
policy makers to employ non-price incentivization to encourage agricultural producer
decision making intended to lead to socially optimal other-regarding outcomes. In these
models, producers are utility maximizing, given exogenous cost and returns factors. The
main thread of this literature uses insights from behavioral economics to suggest that, like
consumer choices, producer choices to address environmental threats by adapting
farming practices and/or adopting conservation technologies might be influenced by
producers’ beliefs about environmental issues (Menapace, Colson, and Rafaelli, 2015)
beliefs about social norms of adoption (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Ferraro, Messer and Wu,
2017), and the influence of social networks (Khanna, Swinton and Messer, 2018).

6.2.3 Producer Choice to Market to Schools
Producers, of course, should sell products to institutional buyers in general, and
more specifically, FTS markets, if the markets contribute to farm profitability.
Advocates for FTS suggest various reasons that explain why the markets should
contribute to farm profitability: FTS markets might provide a premium price for the
product, the costs associated with FTS sales may be lower than the price they receive, or
producers may be able to achieve efficiencies through sales volume (Painter, 2008;
Hardesty and Leff, 2010; Heiss et. al, 2014 ). FTS markets could reduce risk by
diversifying the marketing portfolio or creating a stable future marketing relationship.
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Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence to rely upon to test profitability in
this market, as price and quantity data are generally not publicly available. It is unlikely
that severely price constrained public schools will be able to pay premium prices for
commodities (Technomics, 2017). It is not clear that marketing costs are lower than those
in other wholesale markets; in fact, previous research would suggest the opposite ((Boys
and Fraser, 2017; Sitaker, et al., 2014). If FTS markets are chosen to primarily minimize
risk, producers are unlikely to allocate the bulk of their product to this market.
What is known is that there are very few producers who actually sell directly to
any institutional buyer. The 2015 LFMPS results show that the number of respondents
selling directly to institutional purchasers was so low that NASS is unable to publish
results from this category of sales without risking loss of producer anonymity, and
instead combines this category with another (Intermediated Sales) for publication
(Barham, Fitzsimmons, & O’Hara, forthcoming). It is not known how many producers
sell to schools through intermediated markets.

6.3 Model of Producer Market Channel Choice

The goal of this paper is twofold. We develop a theoretical model of markets for
local foods that encompasses value chain characteristics, and we apply the model to
examine the effectiveness of different policy tools to enhance local food markets, in
which there may be a trade-off between achieving different local foods systems goals.
We are particularly interested in policy applications to support markets that may not be
profitable to producers, but in which policy makers, advocates, and perhaps some
producers, would like to encourage to achieve health and education outcomes. We focus
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on Farm to School ( FTS) markets to demonstrate how subsidies and labeling may impact
market outcomes such as quantity supplied and welfare effects when we account for prosocial behavior of both producers and consumers in a competitive market.
Producers who “directly” market local foods choose a marketing portfolio that
can consist of just one marketing channel, or many. It can include direct and
intermediated marketing channels for local foods and wholesale commodity marketing
channels. To simplify and move closer to economic theory that can assist in modeling
markets for local foods, we move away from the LFMPS definitions presented above and
define two categories of marketing channels, Direct Marketing and Intermediated
Marketing, each with a number of sub-channels. The Direct Marketing category includes
marketing where the product is sold directly from the producer to an end consumer.
Direct marketing sub-channels include farm stands, Community Supported Agriculture
(CSAs), and farmers markets. The Intermediated Marketing category includes marketing
where the product is sold to one or more “middle-men” between the producer and the end
consumer. There can be just one middleman, or multiple middle-men. Intermediated
marketing channels with one middleman can include farm sales to restaurants or
institutional food service, and farm sales to retailers or grocers. Intermediated marketing
sub-channels with multiple middlemen can include farm sales to producer aggregators,
regional or broad line distributors, and food processors. These middlemen may then sell
to restaurants and institutional food service providers, retailers, and grocers. The
distinction between our definition and that of the LFMPS is the relationship between the
local product and the direct market. In our definition of direct marketing, locally
differentiated products do not need explicit labeling or coding, as the nature of the
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transaction verifies the product differentiation. Unlike the LFMPS definition, however,
we specify that any product that passes through an intermediary requires some kind of
labeling or coding to identify the “local” attribute of the product. The two categories that
LFMPS categorizes as “direct” but we categorize as “intermediated” are retail and
institutional markets in which “Businesses or organizations in the middle of the supply
chain (are) marketing locally- and/or regionally-branded products” (NASS, 2015).
We first disentangle the quality of the local food product from the quality of the
producer’s marketing practice. Next, we explore the impact of producers’ objective
functions, i.e., profit maximization vs. utility maximization (Lin, 1974), on the resulting
quantity marketed to FTS. The utility-maximizing framework includes a behavioral
model of choice for producers’ marketing decisions applying Mussa and Rosen’s model
(1978) of vertically differentiated product quality to the quality of markets. The model
allows both consumers and producers to derive utility from perceived benefits of direct
markets for local foods, and can be used to evaluate the welfare effects of various
policies.
This section is organized in the following way: We begin with a standard model
of consumer demand for a product that is viewed by SFAs (consumers) as vertically
differentiated given its “local” origin. Then we introduce a simplified model in which
producers maximize profit in an intermediated FTS market channel with a frictionless
intermediary distributor. The first contribution we make is to modify the producer’s
objective function to allow producers to maximize utility in their choice of market
channel. We use this utility-maximizing producer model as our “base case” in which the
distributor is assumed to be “frictionless”. We then add a distributor and analyze the
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effect of a distributor with market power and/ or economies of scale. Next we allow the
distributor to reduce transaction costs in the market by labeling the product as “local” to
consumers and label the market channel as “Farm to School” to producers. We then
determine the effects of different “quality” information mechanisms, and the potential for
such a distributor to exert market power, which may counteract the intended policy
effect. Finally, we explore the effect of subsidies to support school food authority (SFA)
procurement and producer marketing in the above cases.

6.3.1 Consumer Demand for Differentiated Local Product
We model consumer demand for locally differentiated food in the FTS market
within the structure of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Pietz (1995). We assume that
consumers perceive that the locally differentiated product L is the “high-quality” ( κ L )
product, and the wholesale product W is the “low-quality” ( κW ) product so that κ L > κW ,
according to the literature demonstrating consumers’ increased willingness to pay for the
credence attribute of locally differentiated products (Darby et al., 2008; Feldmann and
Hamm 2015; Fitzsimmons and Cicia, 2018; Loureiro et al., 2002; Martinez, 2010). While
consumers perceive a quality difference between locally differentiated products and nonlocal products, the product’s physical attributes are unlikely to be distinguishable from a
similar product sourced elsewhere, such as a pepper from Chile. The difference is the
information available to the consumer from interactions with producers or labeling
regarding the products’ origins and consumers’ valuation of that origin information
(Motta and Sharma, 2016). To simplify, we assume that end-consumer demand (students
in schools) are perfectly represented by the SFA’s purchasing. That is, we assume that
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SFAs have perfect knowledge of the end-consumers’ demands for local food in schools,
and incur no additional costs to realize that demand.
SFAs have a constant base level of utility ω 15, heterogeneous preferences ψ for
product quality κ L , κW , and the population of SFAs is characterized by a uniform
distribution of the preference parameter with ψ ∈ [0,1] . SFAs expend effort to procure
product, where effort to procure locally differentiated foods ( ν L ) is greater than that
required to procure wholesale products ( ν W ). Effort can be considered as the monetary
value of the representative SFA’s activities to procure product, including increased
operating costs, distribution logistics, and ordering and managing financial transactions
(Bloom and Hinrichs, 2010; Boys and Fraser, 2017; Fitzsimmons, 2011; Vo and
Holcombe, 2011). In what follows, we assume that ν L is the additional effort required to
procure the local relative to the wholesale product, and thus ν W = 0 with no loss of
generality.
Following Pietz (1995), we identify a numeraire good, q0 ≥ 1 with a normalized
price p0 ≡ 1 , so that the price for product quality and an SFA’s operating budget are
measured in units of the numeraire. We use an indicator function for product quality,
i ∈ [ L, W ] , to capture the SFA’s discrete choice with unit demand
1 if qL ≥ 1, qL ≥ qW for W<L, and qL > qW for W>L
Qi ( q ) = 
0 otherwise

, so that the function gives a value of

1 to the product quality of the chosen product, QL ( q ) = 1 , and 0 otherwise. The typical

15

This base level of utility can also be interpreted as the consumer’s reservation price for
a good with quality equal to zero (Pietz, 1995).
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∑ (ω + ψκ

SFA’s direct utility is U ( q0 , q;ψ=)

i = L ,W

i

− ν i ) Qi ( q ) + q0 − (ω + ψκ L ) .

The SFA with a

strength of preference ψ has an operating budget, Ω , which can be expressed as
Ω= ω + ψκ L

, the base level of utility for one unit of the high-quality local product. This

suggests that the higher the operating budget, the more strongly an SFA prefers product
quality. The operating budget constraint is pq + q0 ≤ Ω , where the two qualities are
available at prices pL and pW . We replace the operating budget Ω in the operating
budget constraint with the base level of utility for one unit of the high-quality local
product, so that pq + p0 =ω + ψκ L . The indirect utility function is
=
V ( p, Ω;ψ )

max {u ( q, q ;ψ ) | pq + q
0

0

≤ ω + ψκ L } .

The consumer decision is then to select the

q0 ,q

product that provides the highest indirect utility (V ) among the three possible options:
if the local product is bought
w + ψκ L − pL − ν L

V=  w + ψκW − pW if the wholesale product is bought

w
otherwise.


(12.0)

This set-up implies that the market is uncovered, that is, some SFAs with a low enough
ψ will not purchase a product. This might be the case where SFAs access free USDA

Foods or Department of Defense Fresh foods which can comprise between 15-20% of
food served on any given day (USDA FNS, 2016). The consumer indifferent between
purchasing the local versus the wholesale product is expressed as

ψˆ =

pL − pW + ν L

κ L − κW

.

(12.1):

For an indifferent consumer to exist, it must be the case that ψˆ > 0 , which implies that the
additional cost of acquiring local product versus wholesale product must be greater than
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zero, that is that pL + ν L > pW . The consumer indifferent between purchasing the wholesale
product and nothing can be expressed as:

ψ =

pW

κW

.

(12.2)

As the wholesale price pW increases relative to the quality of the wholesale product κW ,
(6.2) increases, and fewer consumers purchase the wholesale product while more
consumers buy nothing. As the wholesale price decreases relative to quality, more
consumers purchase the wholesale product and fewer consumers buy nothing. Figure 10
depicts the consumer demand for products of different qualities as a function of
consumers’ indirect utility curves for each of the two product qualities, and the opt-out.
The vertical axis measures consumers’ indirect utility, while the horizontal axis allots a
uniform distribution of consumers according to their strength of preference for product
quality.
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Figure 9 Consumer Indirect Utility from Product Quality
We consider the representative case where 0 < ψ ≤ ψˆ ≤ 1 . Consumers with ψ ∈ [ψˆ ,1]
buy the high-quality product, ψ ∈ [ψ ,ψˆ ] buy the low-quality product, and consumers with
ψ ∈ [0,ψ ] buy nothing. To ensure that consumers buy a non-negative quantity of the local

product, i.e., ψˆ ≤ 1 , the following condition must hold:

( pL + ν L ) − pW ≤ κ L − κW .

(12.3)

The value of the difference in quality for the consumer with the highest willingness to
pay must be greater than the additional cost of acquiring the local relative to the
wholesale product. Severely price constrained SFAs may not have the ability to pay a
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premium price per unit, but may have the ability to absorb effort costs from procuring
local. Equation (6.4) also implies that the sum of effort and price for the local product is
indexed to the wholesale price.
A non-negative quantity of the wholesale product will be purchased if ψ ≤ ψˆ , thus
κW
pW
>
,
κ L ( pL + ν L )

(12.4)

so that the quality ratio of the wholesale relative to the local product should be greater
than the cost of using the wholesale relative to the local product. Finally, the condition
for some consumers to choose to buy neither the local nor the wholesale product, that is,
0 < ψ

, necessarily holds given that pW and κW \ are assumed to be positive.
For a population of M consumers, the aggregate demand functions in the FTS

market are:
 p − pW + ν L 
X LD = M [1 − ψˆ ]= M 1 − L
,
κ L − κW 


(12.5)

 p − p +ν
p 
X WD= M [ψˆ − ψ =
] M  L W L − W ,
−
κ
κ
κ
L
W
W 


(12.6)

for the local product and the wholesale product respectively. The inverse demand
functions are
pL ( X LD , X WD ) = κ L − ν L −

and
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κW X WD
M

−

κ L X LD
M

,

(12.7)

 XD XD
pW ( X LD , X WD ) = κW 1 − W − L 
M
M 


,

(12.8)

in the wholesale market.
Finally, we provide expressions to show the relationship between the fixed
wholesale price, pW and the local product price pL . We first solve (6.7) for pL ( X LD ) to
obtain
 XD
pL ( X LD ) = pW − ν L + (κ L − κW ) 1 − L  ,
M 


(12.9)

and (6.8) for pW ( X WD ) to obtain

pW ( X WD )
=

κW ( pW + ν L ) X WDκW (κ L − κW )
.
−
MκL
κL

(12.10)

6.3.2 Producer Supply
The producer supply model builds upon the profit-maximizing market channel
choice literature, as in Leroux (2010) and Kim, Curtis and Yeager (2014), but diverges
from the profit-maximizing producer choice to differentiate local product (Winfree and
Watson, 2017). The typical producer’s objective function is to maximize net income (NI)
over the life of the farm operation for years h = 1,..., H , by choosing a portfolio of market
channels that may include up to five mutually exclusive channels l in a given year. The
five channel categories are chosen based on the market channel costs and returns, with
the intention of grouping channels with similar costs structures together. Four channels
l = d , s, h, r represent categories similar to those in the Local Food Marketing Practices
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Survey (LFMPS). The four categories represent locally branded products sold; direct to
consumer, 1 = d ; through intermediated channels such as schools and institutions 2=s ;
through distributors or food hubs, 3 = h ; or through retailers 4 = r . The final market
channel 5 = u represents the traditional intermediated wholesale market channel for
products not branded as local, in which the end buyer is not known to be a school food
authority.
H

5

max NI hl = ∑∑ π hl .

(12.11)

=
h 1 =l 1

As in the LFMPS, each market channel may include several sub-channels, so that market
channel, d , for example, may represent any combination of farm stands, farmers markets,
or CSAs.
Note that (6.11) allows flexibility in the definition of both net income from any
particular marketing channel and the relationships across marketing channels. It would be
straightforward to introduce any number of modifications to this model to account for the
many factors that influence an agricultural producers’ net income. For example, expected
profits or expected net present value of profits (Byerlee and Anderson, 1982; Kim, Curtis,
and Yeager, 2014; Marra, 2002) off-farm income, crop insurance, risk aversion, portfolio
diversification (Izumi, Wright and Hamm, 2010; Park and Lohr, 2008; Park, Mishra,
Wozniak, 2011), cross-market branding effects 16 (Izumi, Wright and Hamm, 2010)
would all be simple modifications to the LHS of (6.11). The model presented ignores
those modeling possibilities in favor of modeling the parameter of interest, producers’

16

Some FTS advocates suggest that selling to schools is a branding tool to market the
local farm to parents.
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strength of preference for social outcomes from local food marketing channels. In
addition, a key feature of (6.11) is the ability for producers to earn negative net income in
any given year through any given marketing channel, but to remain viable they must earn
non-negative profits over the life of the farm operation.

6.3.2.1 Producer Supply: Profit Maximizing Producer

In applications of the canonical Mussa and Rosen (1978) model to markets with
differentiated products, producer supply results from competition among heterogeneous
firms that vary in production efficiency (Plastina, Giannakas, and Pick 2011; Joseph,
Lavoie, and Caswell, 2014). Recall that models of firms’ strategic choices in markets for
local foods allow firms to choose to differentiate product or product bundle as “local”
Winfree and Watson, 2017; Richards, et al., 2017). These models stand in contrast to
literature that examines producer’s choice of market channel, in which producers choose
a market channel or portfolio of market channels to maximizing profit or utility and
prices are exogenous (Hardesty and Leff, 2010;Kim, Curtis and Yeager, 2014; Leroux et
al., 2010; Parks and Lohr, 2008; Brown and Weber, 2013; Byerlee and Anderson, 1982;
Parks and Lohr, 2008; Park, Mishra, Wozniak, 2011; Zuluaf, et al., 2014).
To demonstrate the contrast between the profit-maximizing and utilitymaximizing producer choice to sell to a local foods market channel that we present in this
paper, we first frame the producer’s objective function as a profit-maximizing choice. We
simplify the objective function (6.11) above by limiting the typical producers’ profit
maximizing choice between selling to one of two intermediated marketing channels,
l = s, u , in a given year, where s is FTS sales and u is sales to an NS (Not School) buyer.
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One channel delivers the product to students through school meals; the other to the NS
consumer. A strictly profit maximizing producer will choose to sell the unit of product to
the most profitable channel, so that (6.11) becomes
π
max NI l =  s
π u

if π s > π u
if π u > π s

.

(12.12)

To begin, under assumptions of profit maximization in perfect competition, the
producer sells the product to a frictionless distributor which then sells the product to an
end buyer in either the FTS or NS market channel. A typical producer’s profit in market
l

is revenues from sales minus variable and fixed costs. Both variable and fixed costs

have three components: production, marketing, and transaction costs (Hardesty and Leff,
2010; Hobbs, 1997). We assume producers are homogenous in production (that is, all
producers face the same production costs and do not vary in expertise or efficiency). The
profit π l of a typical producer in market channel l is given by:
p l = pl ql − (c + γ l + t l )ql − ( FC + ml + tl ) ,

(12.13)

where pl and ql are the market price and quantity sold in market l , c , and FC are the
constant marginal and fixed costs of production, which do not vary across market
channels chosen; γ l and ml are the constant marginal and fixed marketing costs, which
may vary across marketing channels; and τ l and tl are the constant marginal and fixed
transaction costs to ensure delivery to each end buyer, which may also vary across
marketing channels. In the FTS market, producers incur additional variable and fixed
transaction costs t s , ts to obtain information regarding distribution and terms of sales to
SFAs as end buyers, negotiate ordering and payment terms and conditions, and monitor
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contracts (Boys and Fraser, 2017; Fitzsimmons and Lass, 2015; Matts et al., 2015).
Without loss of generality, we assume that variable and fixed transaction costs in the
“Not FTS” (NS) marketing channel are equal to zero, t u , tu = 0 while transaction costs in
the FTS market are greater than zero, t s , ts > 0 . Marketing costs include packaging,
storing, and transporting products to the wholesaler. Without loss of generality, we also
assume that fixed marketing costs in the NS marketing channel and fixed marketing costs
in the FTS marketing channel are equal to zero mu , ms = 0 , while variable marketing costs
in the FTS marketing channel are greater than in the NS market γ s > γ u . Note that only
the producers’ cost of marketing product to a distributor enters the producer’s profit
function. In practice, a distributor will incur additional marketing costs, which are not
accounted for when the distributor is “frictionless”.
We normalize quantity to 1 and find a typical producer’s profit in the FTS market
s
p s = p − (c + t s + γ s ) − FC − ts ,

(12.14)

while a typical producer’s profit in the NS market u is
p u = p − c − γ u − FC.

(12.15)

Price in the FTS and Not FTS market, p , are the same. While consumers have an
increased willingness to pay a premium for locally versus non-locally differentiated
products, producers supply a homogeneous product sold through the distributor, which
does not label the products as local versus non-local. Instead, producers must incur
transaction costs to guarantee that supply is delivered to the FTS market, as in (6.14),
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and SFAs incur effort costs to obtain the high-quality local product (12.0) . Given that a
producer selling to FTS will incur additional variable transaction costs and will gain no
monetary benefit from sales to schools, a profit-maximizing producer will choose to sell
to the NS marketing channel, all else equal, and no product will be sold to the FTS
marketing channel.
Alternatively, we may allow price to be endogenously determined as a function of
consumer demand and producer supply, while the price of the good received from the
Not FTS is a constant determined in a separate perfectly competitive market. Because
producers are homogeneous, a typical producer’s profit function in a given market will
mirror those equations (6.14) and (6.15), so that FTS market profit is
p s = ps − (c + t s + γ s ) − FC − ts ,

(12.16)

p u = pu − c − γ u − FC ,

(12.17)

And NS profit is

so that a producer will be indifferent between selling to the FTS market channel and the
NS channel when π s = π u , or when the premium from the FTS channel exactly covers the
additional costs of selling through that channel, i.e., ps − pu = t s + ts + γ s − γ u . When
ps − pu ≥ t s + ts + γ s − γ u

, the difference between the SFA price and the NS market price is

greater than the additional costs of selling to the FTS market, and all producers will
supply to the FTS market. Assuming a population of N producers, X sS = N . When
ps − pu < t s + ts + γ s − γ u ,

the premium is less than the additional cost of selling to the FTS

market, and no producers will supply to the FTS market, so that X sS = 0 , which is a
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plausible outcome given that SFAs are significantly price constrained (Izumi, Wright and
Hamm, 2010; Motta and Sharma, 2016: IBISWorld, 2018).

6.3.2.2 Producer Supply: Utility-Maximizing Producer

While producer choice in markets for local foods is typically modeled as a profit
maximizing choice to differentiate products or product bundles, the literature on how
producers choose market channels when selling locally differentiated products does not
model supply decisions in this way. Instead, producer choice of market channel is
modeled as either a profit-maximizing (Park and Lohr, 2006; LeRoux, et al., 2010) or a
utility-maximizing (Park, 2009) choice of market channel portfolios. In these models, the
dependent variable is the choice of market channel portfolio, where market channel
prices are exogenous. Aggregate supply functions are not obtained from these models,
thus welfare effects of policy interventions are also not obtained.
Neither cost efficiencies nor portfolio choice models allow observed
heterogeneity in producer motivations to supply to high-quality markets for local food for
the purpose of contributing to social goals. Like incentivizing producer choice to
implement on-farm environmental conservation techniques to achieve environmental
goals (Khanna, Swinton, and Messer, 2018), a key insight to increasing supply of local
foods to FTS markets may be to incentivize producer choice to market to SFAs,
particularly given the evidence that such sales may satisfy producers’ preferences for
social goals to support the health and education of children in the producers’ community
(Izumi, Wright and Hamm, 2010; Lehnerd, et al., 2018).
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To address this gap, we model the typical producer’s choice between two
vertically differentiated marketing channels, where, from the producers’ point of view,
the quality of the FTS marketing channel is assumed to be higher than that of the nonschool marketing channel in which the end buyer is unknown, all else equal. This utilitymaximizing model follows from both the literature reviewed above suggesting that
agricultural producers are unique firms that consider non-pecuniary factors in their firm
decision making, as well as from the growing literature suggesting that producers in FTS
markets in particular are motivated by social considerations to supply to the FTS market.
A typical producer’s utility from choice of marketing channel is a function of profits
earned in the marketing channels plus the strength of preference producers have for the
“quality” of the marketing channel, as has been suggested by Barrowclough and Boys,
(2017); Boys and Fraser (2017); Heiss et al., 2013; Matts et al. (2015), Lehnerd et
al.(2018), Fitzsimmons and Lass (2015).
We model producer supply to a farm-to-school market channel within the
consumer demand structure of Mussa and Rosen (1978) 17. Market channels are vertically
differentiated, and producers sell to one market channel, where the FTS market channel s
is assumed to be the “high-quality” channel (ks) in which food is delivered to school
cafeterias, and the Not FTS market channel u is the “low-quality” market channel (ku) in
which the end-buyer is unknown, where ks > ku.
Producers have heterogeneous preferences (θ) for market channel quality, and the
population of producers is characterized by a uniform distribution function of this
17

In the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model, consumers are assumed to be heterogeneous on
their willingness to pay for quality. We adapt this model to heterogeneous producers with
respect to preferences for market channels with different perceived qualities.
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preference parameter with θ ∈ [0,1] . A typical producer’s indirect utility is equal to the
profit from the chosen market channel plus the strength of preference for quality θ for
the market channel quality kl .
π + θ k s
W = s
π u + θ ku

FTS market channel is chosen
,
NS market channel is chosen.

(12.18)

where π s and π u are the profit from selling to the FTS and NS markets respectively and
are given in equations (6.14) and (6.15) respectively. Because we assume a covered
market, profit for the NS market channel is implied to be positive.
If π s > π u , or the price premium ( ps − pu ) more than covers the additional cost of
selling to the FTS market (t s + ts + γ s ) ,all producers will choose to sell to this market,
and the outcome of the utility-maximizing model is the same as that of profit
maximization. However, if π u > π s > 0 , due to higher transaction costs in the FTS market,
then the producer’s decision is to select the market channel that provides the highest
indirect utility (W ) among the possible options. The producer indifferent between selling
to the FTS market channel and the market channel with the not FTS buyers is expressed
as

θˆ =

πu − πs
k s − ku

.

(12.19)

Substituting (6.14) and (6.15) into (6.19), the indifferent producer can be expressed as:

θˆ =

pu − ps + t s + ts + γ s − γ u
.
( k s − ku )
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(12.20)

The indifferent producer must satisfy 0 ≤ θˆ ≤ 1 . In the profit maximizing models
presented above where π s > π u , all product will be supplied to the FTS market, but when
π s < π u , all product will be supplied to the NS. In contrast, (6.20), implies that
18
pu > ps − t s − ts − γ s − γ u , θˆ > 0 must hold for both the FTS and NS markets to be served .

When θˆ ≤ 0 , only the FTS market is served because the profit from that market to the
producer that does not value market quality (maximizes profit rather than utility) is
positive. Unlike the profit maximization model where the aggregate supply to the FTS
market is zero unless the price premium covers the cost of marketing, the utility
maximization model allows a positive aggregate quantity to the FTS market when the
premium does not cover costs. Since net income is realized over the life of the farm
operation, producers absorb economic loss to sell to the high-quality market in any given
year.
Producers with θ ∈ (θˆ,1] will sell to the high-quality channel ( FTS), producers
with θ ∈ [0, θˆ] will sell to the low-quality channel. For, θˆ ≤ 1 , the following condition must
hold: pu − ps + t s + ts + γ s − γ u ≤ ks − ku , that is, the difference in profit between the two market
channels must be smaller or equal to the value of the quality difference between the two
marketing channels according to the producer with the highest preference for quality.
When θˆ > 1 , the additional profit from the NS market is greater than the additional value
of the FTS market quality, and only the NS market is served. To ensure that the market is
covered, utility must be greater than zero π u + θ ku ≥ 0 , when θ = 0 , so that π u ≥ 0 . Figure
11 depicts the producer supply to markets with different qualities as a function of

18

We ignore the extreme cases where θˆ > 1, θˆ < 0 .
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producers’ indirect utility curves for each of the two market qualities. The vertical axis
measures producers’ indirect utility, while the horizontal axis allots a uniform distribution
of producers according to their strength of preference for market quality.
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Figure 10 Producer Indirect Utility from Markets Quality
Given a population of N producers, market channel supply is obtained by
integrating the unit supply of each producer given the distribution of producer types.
Given the uniform distribution assumption, the aggregate market supply function for the
S
FTS market channel is X=
N [1 − θˆ] so that
s

 p − ps + t s + t s + γ s − γ u 
X sS = N [1 − θˆ] = N 1 − u
.
( k s − ku )



(12.21)

We further assume that the quality of the NS marketing channel is ku = ϑ ks where
ϑ ≤ 1 . We name the difference between variable marketing costs in the FTS and NS

201

markets as γ s − γ u =
∆γ . In a covered market, we are unable to find the inverse supply
functions, however, with a fixed price in the NS market, p u , we can express the price for
product sold in the FTS market as a function of aggregate supply,
 p − ps + t s + ts + ∆γ 
S
θˆ N  u
X=
N=

u
k s (1 − ϑ )



.

(12.22)

Note that as the difference in market quality increases, the quantity supplied to the FTS
market increases and the quantity supplied to the NS market decreases.
The utility maximizing choice between the high and low quality market provides
a model of producer choice of marketing channel in local foods markets that is consistent
with the literature on producer choice in local foods and FTS markets, and that allows
price to be endogenous.

6.3.3 Market Equilibrium
To find the market equilibrium we equate food service consumers’ demand for
locally differentiated products (6.5) and producers’ supply to FTS market channels
(6.21)
 p − p W + ν L 
 p − ps + t s + ts + Dγ 
X LD =
M 1 − L
N 1 − u
X sS ,
=
=
−
−
kk
k
k
L
W
s
u





(12.23)

Recall that we assume that SFAs perfectly represent end consumer demand. We assume
that the market price paid by food service consumers is equal to that received by
producers, ps = p . Note that we do not assume that the product supplied to the NS
L

market is the wholesale product purchased by the SFA. Instead we assume that the
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wholesale market for commodity products and the NS market are unrelated and are much
larger than the market for local products, so that producers and SFA cannot affect the
price in these markets. Thus, p u and pW are constant and are not provided any a priori
relationship. We further simplify by expressing difference in market qualities as
∆κ=

(κ L − κW ) and product qualities as

*
*
p=
p=
L
s

∆k = k s − ku .

The equilibrium price is

M ∆k ( ∆k + pW − ν L ) + N ∆k ( p u + t s + ts + ∆γ − ∆k )
,
N ∆k + M ∆k

(12.24)

The equilibrium market quantity is
D
*
S
*
X=
X=
L ( ps )
s ( ps )

MN [ Dk + Dk + p W − ν L − p u − t s − ts − Dγ ]
N Dk + M Dk

.

(12.25)

If the equilibrium price increases to a point where ψ > ψˆ , then there are no consumer
willing to buy local product. Note that the equilibrium quantity of local increases as
k k s (1 − ϑ ) , and/ or product quality difference ∆κ= (κ L − κW )
market quality difference ∆=

increase. To ensure a positive quantity of product to FTS programs X ( pL* ) > 0 , it must be
the case that


(kk
L − W − ν L ) + ( k s (1 − ϑ ) − t s − t s − ∆γ ) > pu − pW .

(12.26)

That is, the net value of the local product to the buyer and the FTS market to the seller is
higher than the alternative. We can rearrange (6.26) to offer an additional interpretation
comparing consumer valuation of the product versus producer valuation of the market.
The difference between the total value of the local product to the consumer (that value of
the product less the cost of effort to procure the product) and the total value of the
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wholesale product, k L − ν L + pW − kW > p u + t s + ts + ∆γ − ks (1 − ϑ ) , must exceed the difference
between the total value of the FTS and NS market to the producer. In the utility
maximizing model, market specific fixed costs ts continue to influence the producer’s
market channel choice.
As long as condition (6.26) holds, the model of utility maximizing producers
allows the market to allocate a positive quantity of product to the FTS market for local
product in equilibrium. Note that this is a different result from the profit maximizing
model, in which either all product was allocated to this market, or none of the product
was allocated to this market. Our results reflect the findings of the social sciences
literature and empirical observations that some proportion of producer will supply to this
market, though it is unlikely to be profitable to be the profit maximizing choice of
market.
Substituting the equilibrium price pL* into equation 0.17, we find the equilibrium
aggregate quantity of wholesale product demanded by SFAs
 M Dk ( kW − p W ) + N (kW (ν L + p u + t s + ts + Dγ − Dk ) − p W k L ) 
X WD = M 
.
kW [ N Dk + M Dk ]



(12.27)

For the equilibrium quantity of wholesale product bought by SFAs to be greater than or
equal to zero, it must be the case that

(

)

M ∆k ( k W − p W ) + N kW (ν L + p u + t s + ts + ∆γ − ∆k ) − p W k L ≥ 0

.

(12.28)

The first term of (6.29) can be interpreted as the consumer residual value of the wholesale
product (κ

W

− p W )

weighted by the total number of SFAs and market quality that
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producers face. Recall that from (6.02) that the SFA that is indifferent between buying
the wholesale product or not buying any product is ψ =

pW

κW

. For any product (local or

wholesale) to be demanded, the value of ψ < 1 , so that κW > pW , indicating that the
residual value of the wholesale product must be greater than one. Wholesale quantity
increases as the costs specific to the FTS market for local foods and the price paid to
producers in the NS market increase, and decreases as wholesale price increases.
Substituting the equilibrium price pL* into (6.23), we find the equilibrium
aggregate quantity of product supply by producers to the NS market
 N ∆k + M (ν L + p u + t s + t s + ∆γ − ∆k − p W ) 
X us = N 
.
N ∆k + M ∆k



(12.29)

The equilibrium quantity to the NS market decreases as product quality difference and
market quality difference increases. Quantity supplied to the NS market increases as the
costs in the alternative market increase, and decreases as the price paid for the wholesale
product increases. Rewriting the numerator inside the brackets of (6.29) as
∆κ ( N − M ) + M (ν L + p u + t s + t s + ∆γ − p W ) ,

we can see that quantity supplied to the NS market

is sensitive to the relative number of producers and SFAs in the market.
When the number of producers is equal to or greater than the number of SFAs
N≥M

, increases in product quality difference increase producer surplus from sales to the

NS market. When the number of SFAs is greater than the number of producers M > N ,
the product quality difference decreases producer surplus from the NS market. This is
expected, as fewer producers would indicate a restricted supply to the FTS market, so
that as the quality of the local product increases relative to the commodity product, more
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SFAs buy local from producers, so that producers sell fewer units to the NS market. For
the quantity supplied to the NS market to be greater than or equal to zero, it must be the
case that
N ∆κ + M (ν L + t s + t s + ∆γ − ∆κ + p u − p W ) ≥ 0 .

(12.30)

The common denominator N ∆k + M ∆k is the sum of product quality difference weighted
by the number of producers and market quality difference weighted by the number of
SFAs.
Subtracting the quantity purchased in the wholesale market (6.27) from the
quantity sold to the NS market (6.29) , we find that

X uS − X WD =N +


 
M (kkk
W − pW )( N W − M Dk ) − N L pW 
kk
W ( N D + M Dk )

.

(12.31)

We call M (κW − pW ) the aggregate residual value of wholesale, which is weighted by

( NkW − M ∆k ) . If the difference between this term and

MN κ L pW

is positive, then the

quantity that producers supply to the NS market is greater than the quantity of wholesale
product purchased by SFAs. If this term is negative and greater than the number of
producers in the market, N , then it will be the reverse. This might be the case, for
example, if the number of SFAs is larger than the ratio of quality of the wholesale
product to the difference in the market qualities weighted by the number of producers,
M >

N kW
∆k

, given that κW − pW > 0 . If N = M , for example, then the quantity of wholesale

product demanded would exceed that of quantity supplied to the NS market if the quality
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of the wholesale product is less than the quality difference between the FTS and NS
markets.
The residual value to the buyer from purchasing the wholesale product is κW − pW ;
κ L − ν L is the residual value to the buyer from buying the locally differentiated product;
k s − t s − ts − ∆γ

is the residual value to the producer from selling the product to the

differentiated FTS market; and p u + ϑ ks is the residual value to the producer from selling
the product to the NS market. Restating
k L − ν L + ks − t s − ts − ∆γ > p u + ϑ ks + kW − pW ,

(12.32)

we see that the total residual value for the FTS market is the sum of producer and
consumer residual values from selling and buying in the market, which must be greater
than the difference between the producers’ residual value of selling to an Not FTS and
the buyers’ residual value of buying undifferentiated local products.
Next we take equation (6.24) and ensure that the equilibrium market price is
positive, ps* > 0 , providing M ∆k ( ∆k + pW − ν L ) > − N ∆k ( p u + t s + ts + ∆γ − ∆k ) . Rearranging, we
find

∆k + pW − ν L
N ∆k
>
.
∆k + p u − t s − ts − ∆γ M ∆k

The RHS numerator is the product quality difference

weighted by the number of producers, and the denominator is the market quality
difference weighted by the number of SFAs. For the equilibrium price to be positive, the
ratio of weighted product and market quality difference must be less than the ratio of the
residual value of the local product to the consumer to the residual value of the FTS
market to the seller, relative to the alternative.
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6.3.4 Welfare
To capture Total Welfare, we add the sum of Consumer and Producer Surplus in
the FTS market for local foods to the sum of Consumer and Producer Surplus in the
wholesale market for SFAs and the NS market for producers, calculated from supply and
demand curves in each market TW 0 = TS L0 + PSu0 + CSW0 . Total surplus from local is the sum
0
of consumer and producer surplus in the FTS market, TS
=
CS L0 + PS L0 , where consumer
L

surplus from local food is CS L0 =

M ∆k
2

 N [ ∆k + ∆k − ν L − t s − ts − ∆γ + pW − p u ] 

 , and
( N ∆k + M ∆k )


2

N ∆k  M [ ∆k + ∆k − ν L − t s − ts − ∆γ + pW − p u ] 

 .
2 
N ∆k + M ∆k

2

producer surplus in the FTS market is

0
PS L

=

Total Surplus from the FTS market for local foods is obtained by taking the sum of the
producer and consumer surplus and corresponds to
MN [ ∆k + ∆k − ν L − t s − ts − ∆γ + pW − p u ]
.
2 ( N ∆k + M ∆k )
2

0

TS L =

Surpluses from the FTS market for local

food decreases as the residual values of either the wholesale product (κW − pW ) or the NS
market ( p u + ϑ ks ) increase, and increases as the residual value of either the local product

(κ L − ν L ) or the FTS market ( ks − t s − ts − ∆γ ) increase. Surpluses from the FTS market for
local decrease as SFA effort, transaction, and marketing costs increase.
Similarly, total surplus from the wholesale product and NS market is the sum of
surpluses
0
TS=
CSW0 + PSu0
W +u
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.

(12.33)

Consumer surplus in the wholesale market is
CSW0

=

(

) . The equilibrium




 
M  M ∆k (kk
W − pW ) + N
W (ν L − ∆k + t s + t s + ∆γ + pu ) − k L pW


2kk
[ N ∆ + M ∆k ]
W 


2



condition to ensure that the quantity of wholesale product (6.27) is at least zero also
guarantees that consumer surplus from wholesale product is positive.
Producer surplus in the NS market is
N ∆k
PS =
2
0
u

  M ( p + t + t + ∆γ − p + ν ) + ∆k ( N − M )  2 
u
s
s
W
L
 .

N ∆k + M ∆k





Producer surplus in the NS

market increases as the costs in the alternative market increase, and decreases as the price
paid for the wholesale product increases.
Total Surplus from the Wholesale product and NS market is
2



  
M   M ∆k (kk
W − pW ) + N ( W (ν L − ∆k + t s + t s + ∆γ + pu ) − k L pW ) 

=
TS
2

2kW 
N
M
k
k
∆
+
∆
[
]


2



N kkk
) + N∆ ] 
W ∆ ( N ∆ + M ∆k ) [ M ( pu + t s + t s + ∆γ − pW + ν L − ∆kk
+


2
2kW


[ N ∆k + M ∆k ]

0
W +u

.(12.34)

Total surplus from wholesale product and NS market is decreasing in wholesale product
price and increasing in effort costs, transaction and marketing costs, and NS price.
Following our conditions to ensure that the equilibria in the alternative markets are
positive, (6.27) and (6.29), we can see that total surplus from the alternative product/
market is positive.
We are interested in how changes in costs in the FTS market for local product
impact total welfare. Recall that market-specific costs include SFA’s effort to procure
product and the producer’s transaction and marketing costs. While the quantity supplied
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to the FTS market X LD and total surplus in the FTS market for local products TS L0 are
decreasing in market-specific costs, surplus in the alternative product/ market TSW0 +u is
increasing in FTS market-specific costs. Policy makers wishing to increase the quantity
of product supplied to the market by reducing market –specific costs may be interested in
the trade-off between increasing product supplied and total welfare. To understand the
potential trade-offs, we simplify the costs in the FTS market for local product
F= t s + ts + ∆γ + ν L and

compare the magnitude of the decrease in surplus from local FTS

to the magnitude of the increase from wholesale NS. We find that
0

∂TS L

∂F

= −

MN ( F − ∆k − ∆k − pW + p u )
, where the expression inside the parenthesis is positive
( N ∆k + M ∆k )

per our equilibrium condition (6.28) and

( M ( F − pW + p u ) + ∆k ( N − M ) ) + M ∆k ( W − pW ) − N L pW + N W ( F − ∆k + p u ) ,
∂TSW0 +u MN  ∆kkkk
=
2
∂F
[ N ∆k + M ∆k ]
where the expressions inside the brackets are positive as a result of conditions (6.27) and
(6.29).
We equate the change in Total Surplus from local in the FTS market to the
change in Total Surplus from NS markets and wholesale products, obtaining
+ M ∆k ) [ ∆k − F − p u ] − ( N W + M ∆k ) [ pW − F − p u ] > W ( N + M ) ∆k + 2 N ∆  . (12.35)
( N ∆kkkk

When the LHS of (6.35) is greater than the RHS, the increase in total welfare from an
increase in FTS market-specific costs will be increasing. Recall that we have assumed
that κ L > κW , so that N ∆kk
+ M ∆k > N W + M ∆k and therefore
+ M ∆k ) [ − F − p u ] − ( N W + M ∆k ) [ − F − p u ] > 0 . When market quality difference times
( N ∆kk
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the sum of product quality difference weighted by the number of producers and market
quality difference weighted by the number of SFAs is greater than the wholesale price
times the sum of wholesale product quality weighted by the number of producers and
market quality difference weighted by the number of SFAs,
∆k ( N ∆kk
+ M ∆k ) > pW ( N W + M ∆k ) , the LHS of (6.35) will be positive. The RHS is positive

as a result of our assumptions. Another way to consider this relationship is to assume that
∆k =pW ,
∆k >

and simplify so that F + p u =
0 . The inequality (6.35) now reduces to

2 N kk
L W
−M W
N ∆kk

so that the welfare trade-offs depend on the relative qualities of the two

markets. Further analysis of this trade-off can best be determined through simulation.

6.4 Quality Information Costs and Distributor Market Power

The base case model above treats the distributor as “frictionless” and so does not
explicitly include the role of market intermediaries. Market intermediaries with the ability
to exert market power may reduce quantity supplied in the FTS market which is not
accounted for when the distributor is “frictionless”. In the following sections, we add a
distribution sector that distributes product to markets and may provide information,
negotiation, and monitoring services more efficiently than SFAs and producers by
labeling product and market quality, but that may also exert market power. 19 We
subsume the possible market structures that may exist between upstream producers and
downstream SFAs into a single distribution sector. For example, some SFAs are selfoperated, while others are managed by a contracted food service management company.
19

Quality information services differ from distribution services performed by the
distributor, which include the costs of storing and transporting products.
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Self-operated SFAs procure inputs from the wholesale distribution sector, which is a
highly concentrated industry with potential upstream and downstream market power
(Technomics, 2017). Food service management companies are themselves a highly
concentrated sector, and may exert market power in setting contract terms that include
food procurement price schedules (Hyland, 2018). In both cases, mid-market
concentration is indicated, though the actor exercising market power may vary.

6.4.1 Quality Information Costs/ Labeling
Farm to School and local foods literature suggests that quality information in
direct markets for local food is communicated via point-of-sale interaction and producerconsumer relationships (Colasanti, Matts, and Hamm, 2012). One byproduct of an SFA’s
cost of procurement efforts and producers’ transaction costs is to communicate the value
of the product and market quality along the supply chain. Another option to communicate
the value of the product to consumers and/ or the market to producers is for the
distributor to provide quality information through labeling or coding. Typically,
information is provided to the downstream actor, but in the case that producers value the
quality of the FTS market, we must also consider the transfer of information back to the
upstream actor. To simplify, we will refer to the distributor provision of product and
market quality information as “labeling”. 20
We present and discuss model results with policy applications that demonstrate
the unique contribution of the model. The “base case” equilibrium price (6.24) and
quantity (6.25) depict a frictionless model that omits the potential role of distributors. We
20

Quality information for product may also be provided by coding, for example in the
case of bulk delivery to processors, restaurants, and cafeterias.
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choose the frictionless model as our base case because it reflects the current assumptions
of FTS advocates and policy makers. In the following Scenarios, we include the
distributor, change its role in providing quality information, and allow it to exercise
market power. Since FTS procurement is only valuable to SFAs when product quality κ L
is known, either as a result of effort ν L or as a result of the distributor labeling product as
local, we restrict the models presented to those where product quality is known to the
buyer. On the other hand, producer’s access to market quality information ks is generally
only known when producers are actively involved in coordinating supply to SFAs as a
result of transaction and marketing costs t s , ts , γ s , or when market quality information is
provided upstream to producers by downstream distributors via labeling.
In Scenario A, we depart from the base case utility-maximizing producer
presented above in that a distributor is included, incurring distribution costs. Both
upstream and downstream actors continue to have preferences for product and market
quality and the quality is communicated as a byproduct of interactions, incurring
transaction and effort costs. Utility-maximizing producers prefer the FTS market, but in
the absence of labeling, only know whether sales to a distributor will be sold downstream
to a FTS market if they incur transaction costs to coordinate sales with an SFA. In
Scenario B, we allow the distributor to label both downstream product quality and
upstream market quality to producers in lieu of SFA effort and producer transaction costs.

6.4.2 Distributor with Market Power
Following Alston, Sexton and Zhang (1997), we include a distribution sector with
Z distributors with market power, and in some cases, the ability to label quality, so that
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the costs of distribution and quality information vary. All intermediary distribution
functions are subsumed within a single sector called “distribution,” with multiple
homogenous distributors nesting the possibility of a single distributor. We assume
constant returns to scale in the distribution sector. 21 We present two Scenarios, one in
which a distribution sector with the ability to exert market power is included, and another
in which the added distribution has the ability to label products
For each Scenario, we first present equilibria and welfare effects, and then
compare the Scenario results with the base case presented above.

6.4.2.1 Scenario A: Known Qualities, No Labeling

To determine the equilibrium quantities and prices with a distribution sector, we
solve a representative distributor’s profit-maximization problem where utilitymaximizing producers incur transaction costs and SFAs incur effort costs. Like the base
case, market and product qualities are known in the FTS market as a result of
interactions between SFAs and producers, where procurement effort costs, ν L are incurred
by SFAs and FTS market transaction costs, t s , ts , are incurred by producers. We now
further assume that product sold to the NS market may be sold by a distributor as a
wholesale, commodity product to SFAs, where the input and market prices of the good
are constants determined in separate perfectly competitive markets. Recall that base case
inverse demand for local product is

21

This simplification suggests that the management and contracting structure of any
given SFA’s food service operation does not affect the oligopsony power of the
intermediary. Both self-operated and contracted food services face upstream market
power.
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 κ X D + κ L X LD 
pL ( X LD , X WD ) = κ L −ν L −  W W

M



,

(12.36)

while the base case inverse demand for wholesale product is
 ( X WD + X LD ) 
D

=
κ
pW ( X LD , X
W )
W 1 −
M



.

(12.37)

The typical distributor maximizes profit from both sales of local product to the
FTS market and wholesale product sourced from local producers to the NS market. The
quantity of product purchased by distributor i from producers marketing to the FTS
channel is denoted as qis , the quantity of locally differentiated product distributed to
SFAs is qiD , and we assume fixed proportions in the FTS market for local foods so that
all product marketed by producers to FTS is distributed to SFAs, such that q=
q=
qiL .
is
iD
The quantity of product purchased by a distributor from producers marketing to the NS
channel is denoted by qiu , and qiW is the quantity of product distributed as a wholesale
commodity product. We use superscript A to denote results from Scenario A, to write
distributor 1’s profit function as

(

)

D
D
D
s
S
S
=
p 1A  pL ( X L , X W ) − ps ( X s , X u ) + y  q1L + pW q1W − ( p u + g ) q1u ,

(12.38)

max q1 L ,q1W

where y represents variable distribution and transaction costs for the local product, such
as segregated docking and traceability protocols per unit distributed in the FTS market,
and g represents the variable costs of distribution for the commodity product. Consistent
with Motta and Sharma (2016) which found increased transaction costs associated with
the purchase of locally grown products, and Izumi Wright and Hamm (2010) which
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found that increased information, negotiation and payment costs for SFAs and increased
delivery and storage costs for producers, we restrict variable costs for the undifferentiated
product g to be less than in the FTS market, g < y .
The inverse demand for local is

XD
XD 
pL ( X LD , X WD ) = κ L 1 − L  − κW W − ν L .
M 
M


(12.39)

Because the price of the wholesale product is constant and given from the wholesale
market, the SFAs’ aggregate quantity demanded for wholesale product can be expressed
as a function of aggregate quantity of local and the fixed price for wholesale product by


inverting (6.39), so that X W ( X L , pW ) = M 1 −


pW 

− X L . Substituting this expression into the
κW 

SFAs’ inverse aggregate demand for local product is a function of aggregate quantity of

∆κ 1 −
local and the fixed price for wholesale product, pL ( X L , pW ) =


XL 
+ pW − ν L .
M 

On the supply side, the market is covered (producers sell an aggregate quantity N
to either the FTS or the NS market channel). Thus, the quantity sold to the NS market is
S
X u=
N − X sS

.

(12.40)

Aggregate input supply from producers to the NS market can be expressed as the sum of
Z

q1u + ∑ qiu .
the NS product from distributor 1 and the product of the other distributors X=
u
i =2

Aggregate quantity of wholesale product demanded can be expressed similarly,
Z

X=
qiW + ∑ qiW . Producers’ inverse input supply of product to the FTS market,
W
i =2
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 X sS

− 1 + p u + t s + ts + ∆γ
N



expressed as a function of fixed input price p u , is Ps ( X sS ) = ∆k 

,

S
D
where X=
X=
X L so that the expression becomes
s
L

X

psA ( X L , p u ) = ∆k  L − 1 + p u + t s + ts + ∆γ . Substituting these expression into distributor 1’s
N


profit function yields
Z
Z




s
A







,
,
,
p
X
p
p
X
p
y
q
p
X
X
p
q
p
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−
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−
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1
L
L
W
s
L
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W
iW
u
L
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i 2
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(

)

max q1 L ,q1W

(12.41)
The first-order necessary condition for maximizing equation (6.41) is
∂X ∂X L
∂p s ∂X Ls
∂p 1A
∂p ∂X L
∂X
pL ( X L , pW ) + L
q1L + W
pW − pss ( X Ls , p u ) − y − s
q1L + ( p u +=
g) L 0
=
∂q1L
∂X L ∂q1L
∂X L ∂qi1L
∂X L ∂q1L
∂q1L

.

(12.42)
We manipulate this expression as follows to introduce conjectural variation

elasticities
pL ( X L , pW ) +

∂X ∂X L
∂X L q1L ∂pL
∂X s q ∂pss
∂X
0.
XL + W
p W − pss ( X L , p u ) − y − L 1Ls
X L + ( p u + g ) L =
∂q1L X L ∂X L
∂X L ∂q1L
∂q1L X L ∂X L
∂q1L

(12.43)
Recall that the distribution sector’s aggregate demand for wholesale

p
X WD ( p W , X LD ) = M 1 − W
 κW


D
 − XL ,


so that a one unit change in the aggregate quantity in the

FTS market results in a one unit decrease in aggregate quantity in the wholesale market,
∂X W
= −1 .
∂X L

The aggregate quantity supplied to the FTS market is the sum of individual
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N

distributor’s supply X L = ∑ qiL , so that
i =1

∂X L
= 1.
∂qiL

For any distributor i , the conjectural

 ∂X D   q 

elasticity of demand is ξi =  L   iLD  , and conjectural elasticity of supply is
 ∂qiL   X L 
 ∂X LS   qiL 
 S  .
 ∂qiL   X L 

ςi = 

As with Alston, Sexton and Zhang (1997), conjectural elasticities

represent indices of market power, rather than conjectures regarding competitive
behavior, so that
pL ( X L , pW ) +

∂p
∂pL
ξi X L − pW − ps ( X L , p u ) − y − s ς i X L + ( p u + g ) =
0 .
∂X L
∂X L

(12.44)

Homogenous distributors have identical conjectural variations in equilibrium, i.e.,
ξi = ξ and ς i = ς , where ξ , ς ∈ [ 0,1] indicates perfect competition when equal to 0, and

monopoly/ monopsony when equal to 1. Intermediate forms of market power, such as
oligopoly or oligopsony competition, are represented by ς , ξ values between 0 and 1,
with higher values representing less competitive markets. Since distributors are
homogenous and have identical conjectural variations, distributor 1’s objective function
can be treated as the representative objective function for each distributor in the sector, as
well as the industry equilibrium condition, and is represented by
pL ( X L , pW ) +

∂p
∂pL
ξ X L − pW − ps ( X L , p u ) − y − s ς X L + ( p u + g ) =
0 .
∂X L
∂X L

(12.45)

We denote results from Scenario A with a superscript A , so that the aggregate
quantity supplied to the FTS market is

X LA* =

MN  ∆k + ∆k − ν L − t s − ts − ∆g − ( y − g ) 
N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ
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,

(12.46)

where λ = 1 + ξ and µ = 1 + ς . Note that for the equilibrium quantity X LA* to be positive,

( ∆k + ∆k − ν

L

− t s − ts − ∆g − ( y − g ) ) > 0

(12.47)

The equilibrium quantity of local product supplied to FTS markets when a distributor is
included is increasing in wholesale NS distribution costs and market and product quality
differences, and is decreasing in effort, transaction, marketing, and local FTS distribution
costs. The equilibrium quantity is decreasing in distributor market power.
We use the X LA* to find the equilibrium quantity in the wholesale market

X WA* ( X LA* , pW ) =



+ M ∆k µ ) − N kk
M (kkλ
W − pW )( N ∆
W ( ∆ + ∆k − ν L − t s − t s − ∆g − ( y − g ) ) 
.
kkλ
N ∆ + M ∆k µ
W

(12.48)
The equilibrium quantity in the wholesale market increases as residual value in
the wholesale market (κW − pW ) and FTS market-specific costs increase, and decreases as
the differences in market and product qualities increase and the wholesale distribution
costs increase. Given condition (6.47) holds, the wholesale quantity supplied increases as
distributor market power increases. As distributor market power increases, the
distribution sector restricts quantity supplied to the FTS market to increase market price
and maximize profit from the market. Distributors shift product to the wholesale market.
Recall that all producers supply to either the FTS or NS market so that the sum of
supply is equal to the number of producers in the market. The equilibrium quantity of
product supplied by producers to the NS market is therefore the difference between the
*
number of producers and the quantity supplied to the FTS market, X uA=
N − X LA* ,
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 M ( ∆k + ∆k − ν L − t s − ts − ∆g − y + g ) 
A*
X=
N 1 −
.
u
( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ )



(12.49)

We compare the quantity sold as a wholesale product (6.48) X WA* to the quantity
supplied to the NS market (6.49), X uA* . Recall that

pW

κW

= ψ

, is the equilibrium value of the

indifferent consumer between those who buy the wholesale product and those who opt


out and buy nothing, so that M 1 −


pW 
κW 

represents the quantity of total products (local or

wholesale) bought by SFAs. Given, by assumption in our consumer model, that each SFA
buys one unit of product, this expression also represents the number of SFAs that choose
to buy either local or wholesale product. We find that when the number of producers is
greater than the number of SFAs that purchase either the local or wholesale product,
 p 
N > M 1 − W 
 κW 

, the quantity supplied to the NS market will be greater than that bought as


a wholesale product then X uA* > X WA* , and when N < M 1 −


pW 
κW 

it is the reverse.

The downstream price to the SFA is
pLA* =( ∆k − ν L + pW ) −

N ∆kk
[ ∆ + ∆k − ν L − t s − ts − ∆g − y + g ]
N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ

,

(12.50)

The equilibrium price paid by SFAs for local product supplied to FTS markets when a
distributor is included is increasing in transaction costs, marketing costs, wholesale price,
and local FTS distribution costs, and is decreasing in wholesale NS distribution costs and
effort costs. An increase in wholesale product quality will increase the equilibrium price
of local product in the FTS market. Since from (6.47), ( ∆k + ∆k − ν L − t s − ts − ∆g − y + g ) > 0
220

, equilibrium price paid by SFAs increases as distributor market power increases,
A*

∂p L

∂λ

> 0,

A*

∂p L

∂µ

>0

.

Upstream input price paid to the producer is

A*

ps

=

 M ∆k [ ∆k + ∆k − ν − t − t − ∆g − y + g ] 
.
N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ



( p u + t s + ts + ∆g − ∆k ) + 

L

s

s

(12.51)

The upstream input price paid to the producer is increasing in the price received in the NS
market, wholesale distribution costs, transaction and marketing costs, and decreasing in
FTS distribution costs, and FTS market quality. Because from (6.47)

( ∆k + ∆k − ν L − t s − ts − ∆g − y + g ) > 0 , the input price paid to the supplier decreases as the
distributor market power increases,

∂psA*
∂p A*
< 0, s < 0 .
∂λ
∂µ

We compare the downstream price paid by the SFA, pLA* , to the upstream price
that the distributor pays to the producer, psA* . The upstream price is greater than the price
paid to producers pLA* > psA* in perfect competition λ , µ = 1 , when
∆k + ∆k − ν L − t s − ts − ∆gk
+ pW − p u > ∆ + ∆k − ν L − t s − ts − ∆g − y + g ,

( pW − p u ) + ( y − g ) > 0 ,

so that
(12.52)

Setting E = ∆k + ∆k − ν L − t s − ts − ∆γ , we can see that since (6.47) says that E − ( y − g ) > 0 , it
must also be the case that E + ( y − g ) > 0 . Recall that we have assumed that ( y − g ) is
positive, since distribution costs in the FTS market are greater than those in the NS
market. If we further assume that the price paid by the SFA for the wholesale product is
greater than the input supply price paid to the farmer in the NS market pW > p u , which is
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plausible since distributors will incur some positive operating costs to distribute the
product.
When the distributor is a monopolist/ monopsonist such that λ , µ = 2 , the price
difference grows so that the when E + 2 ( pW − p u ) + ( y − g ) > 0 , price paid by SFAs is greater
than that received by producers, as the distributor is able to extract the value of product
and market qualities and excess market costs.

6.4.2.2 Base Case versus Scenario A Equilibria

Comparing the FTS market equilibria results in Scenario A to the base case
aggregate equilibrium quantity (6.24) we find that
X L0* − X LA* =
MN  N ∆k ( λ − 1)( ∆k + ∆k − F ) + λ ( pW − p u ) + ( y − g )  + M ∆k ( µ − 1)( ∆k + ∆k − F ) + µ ( pW − p u ) + ( y − g )  

( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ )( N ∆k + M ∆k )
(12.53)

where we simplify the additional costs specific to the FTS market as F= ν L + t s + ts + ∆γ .
Under perfect competition this reduces to
 ( p − p u ) + ( y − g ) 
X L0* − X LA* =
MN  W

 N ∆k + M ∆k


.

(12.54)

The difference in equilibrium quantity between the base case and Scenario A will
therefore be positive X L* − X LA* > 0 if ( pW − p u ) + ( y − g ) > 0 . Recall that we have assumed
that ( y − g ) is positive. Thus, under the reasonable assumption that the price paid by the
SFA for the wholesale product is greater than the input supply price paid to the farmer in
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the NS market pW > p u , the quantity marketed to SFAs under perfect competition and a
frictionless distributor is greater than that under a distributor that incurs positive
distribution costs. In the base case model where the distributor is “frictionless”, producers
and SFAs do not account for downstream distribution costs, but in Scenario A these costs
have the effect of reducing the equilibrium quantity of local product supplied to FTS
markets. Similarly, the quantity supplied is affected by the alternative prices received by
distributors for wholesale product and that is paid to producers who supply to the NS
market. As the difference between these prices increases, the difference between the
equilibrium quantities with and without the distributor increases.
Distributors, even when acting as perfect competitors, have an advantage that
individual producers do not have. Distributors can allocate the entire quantity produced
between two markets in a profit-maximizing way, whereas individual producers, in this
model, are restricted to a choice between two markets.
With an increase in distributor market power, the aggregate quantity supplied to
the FTS market decreases,

∂X LA*
∂X A*
< 0, L < 0 ,
∂λ
∂µ

and the difference between the base case

quantity and the quantity in Scenario A increases. The difference is largest when the
distributor is a monopolist/ monopsonist, and corresponds to
 ( ∆k + ∆k − F + ( y − g ) ) + 2 ( p W − p u ) 
X L0* − X LA*Mon =
MN 

2 ( N ∆k + M ∆k )



.

(12.55)

The difference between the perfect competitive quantity and quantity in a
monopsony/ monopoly increases with FTS market-specific costs and product and market
qualities.
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Including a distributor in the model of this market, in contrast to the base-case
model in which a distributor is assumed to be “frictionless,” raises the price paid by
SFAs, even under perfect competition. There are two reasons why this is the case. First,
profit maximizing distributors have the ability to allocate product between markets, and
second, including a distributor more accurately reflects distribution-specific costs. When
the distributor has market power, the quantity allocated to SFAs decreases, relative to a
frictionless distributor. Policy makers and FTS advocates that do not account for the role
of market intermediaries run the risk of over-estimating the quantity of product that is
allocated to the FTS market for local foods.
We compare the equilibrium quantity supplied to the wholesale market in the base
case to that in Scenario A, so that when
 N kk



M ∆k (kkk
W ( ∆ + ∆k − F − y + g ) 
 .,
W − pW ) + N W ( F + pu − ∆k ) − N L pW
> (kW − p W ) − 
+ M ∆k )
N ∆ + M ∆k µ
( N ∆kkλ

the

equilibrium quantity of wholesale is greater in the base case X W0 > X WA* . When this
condition does not hold, the reverse is true. In perfect competition, we find that the base
case will be larger than Scenario A when

p u − y + g pW
>
2κ L − κW
κW

. When the distributor is a

monopolist/ monopsonist , the base case will be larger when

F + 2 p u − ∆k − y + g p W
>
kkk
L + W
W

.

Comparing the FTS market price for local in the base case to that in Scenario A,
 ( ∆k + ∆k − F + pW − p u ) [ ∆k + ∆k − F − y + g ] 
pLA* − pL0* =N ∆k 
−
.
+ M ∆k )
( N ∆kkλ
( N ∆ + M ∆k µ ) 


When the distributor has no market power =
λ 1,=
µ 1 , the difference will be
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(12.56)

 p − p u + y − g 
pLA* − pL0* =N ∆k  W
 .
 ( N ∆k + M ∆k ) 

(12.57)

Following the treatment above (6.56), this is a positive difference so that the downstream
price paid by the SFA is higher under Scenario A than in the base case. When the
distributor is a monopolist/ monopsonist,
 ( ∆k + ∆k + 2 p W − 2 p u − F + y − g ) 
pLA*Mono − pL0* =N ∆k 
 .
2 ( N ∆k + M ∆k )



(12.58)

The difference is decreasing in SFA effort, market quality, transaction, marketing, and
wholesale distribution costs, and increasing in product quality difference and FTS
distribution costs. The comparison is similar to the above comparison of quantity
differences between the frictionless base case and Scenario A in which there is an explicit
distribution sector. With the addition of the distributor, the price paid by SFAs increases
and the price difference increases when the distributor has market power, so that
 ( ∆k + ∆k − F − ( y − g ) ) 
 . Policy
2 ( N ∆k + M ∆k )



subtracting (6.58) from (6.59) we have a difference of N ∆k 

makers and FTS advocates that do not account for the role of market intermediaries run
the risk of under-estimating the price of product that is allocated to the FTS market for
local foods.

6.4.2.3 Scenario A: Welfare

Total welfare is now the sum of distributor profit, consumer and producer
surpluses in two markets, the FTS market for local product and the NS market for
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A
undifferentiated wholesale product, TW=
TS LA + TSWA +u , calculated from supply and

demand curves in each market. Consumer surplus in the FTS market for local food is
M ∆k
CS =
2
A
L

 N ( ∆k + ∆k − F − y + g )  

 ,
N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ


2

(12.59)

Similarly, total producer surplus is the sum of producer surplus in the FTS
market and the NS market where FTS producer surplus is

PS LA

N ∆k  M ( ∆k + ∆k − F − y + g )  
=


2 
N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ


2

.

(12.60)

Both consumer and producer surpluses from local product sold in the FTS market are
decreasing in FTS market effort, transaction marketing, and FTS distribution costs, and
increasing in wholesale distribution costs, and market and product qualities.
We find profit in the distribution sector from the FTS market by solving the
distribution sector profit from sales of local product purchased from producers supply to
the FTS market in equation (6.41) p LA* =  pLA* ( X LA* , pW ) − ( psA* ( X LA* , p u ) + y )  X LA* with the
equilibria to obtain
MN [ ∆kkk
+ ∆k − F − y + g ] 
( N ∆ + M ∆k ) [ ∆ + ∆k − F − y + g ]  .
A*
pk
[ ∆ + ∆k − F − y + p W − p u ] −

L =
( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ )
( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ )



(12.61)
When the distribution sector has no market power λ , µ = 1 , profit in the
distribution sector from sales of local product to FTS markets is
p LPC , A*

=

MN [ ∆k + ∆k − F − y + g ]
( pW − p u − g ) . As we would expect, distribution sector profit
( N ∆k + M ∆k )
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in the FTS market for local food is decreasing in FTS market distribution costs,
transaction effort and marketing costs, and increasing in product and market quality.
Distributor profit is increasing in the wholesale price paid by consumers, and decreasing
in the input price paid to producers for the NS market, and positive distribution costs in
the wholesale market. Following the analysis above, we would expect that the wholesale
price paid by SFAs is greater than the input price paid to producers for the NS market,
pW > p u and

that ∆k + ∆k − F − y + g > 0 . When pW − p u > g , the distribution sector will earn

positive profits from the FTS market.
When the distributor is a monopolist/ monopsonist, profit becomes
MN [ ∆k + ∆k − F − y + g ]
M , A*
=
pk
L
  ∆ + ∆k − F − y + 2 ( pW − p u )  − g  . Distributor profit is
4 ( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ )

positive when ∆k + ∆k + 2 ( pW − p u ) > F + y + g , and increases as product and market quality
increase, and decreases as marketing, transaction and distribution costs increase. Recall
that the oligopolist/ oligopsonist distributors restrict quantity supplied to the FTS market.
Note that in both the perfectly competitive and the monopolist/ monopsonist environment
additional efficiencies in the distribution sector that decrease distribution costs y, g will
increase profits in the distribution sector.
Consumer surplus in the wholesale market is
 N kk
M 
W ( ∆ + ∆k − F − y + g ) 
 ,
=
(kW − pW ) −

2kkλ
N ∆ + M ∆k µ

W 

2

CSWA +u

with NS

N ∆k
buyers =
PS
2
A
W +u

and producer surplus in the market

  M ( ∆k + ∆k − F − y + g )  
1 −

N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ



2

. Both Producer and Consumer

Surpluses in the NS market for wholesale product increase in wholesale product quality,
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SFA effort and producer FTS market costs, and decrease in wholesale market costs.
Consumer Surplus from wholesale also decreases in wholesale price. More efficient
distribution decreases consumer surplus from wholesale product, and increases in market
S
power decrease it. Note that in the base case X u*=
N − X L* , but that is not the case in

Scenario A.
In the NS market with wholesale product, the distribution sector profit is found by
solving (6.41) for the sales of wholesale product purchased from producers supply to the
NS=
market, p WA*+u pW  X W +u ( X LA* , pW )  − ( p u + g )  N − X LA*  yielding

p WDist+u, A*

=

MN ( p u + g − pW ) [ Dk + Dk − F − y + g ]
. (12.62)
kkλ
( N D + M Dk µ )
W

MpW 2

+  MpW − N ( p u + g )  +

Distribution profit in the NS market with wholesale product is increasing in input
price paid to the producer, NS market distribution costs, transaction effort and marketing
costs, and decreasing in FTS distribution costs. Distribution profit is decreasing in
wholesale product quality, and increasing in local product quality and FTS market
quality. The decrease in profit due to wholesale product quality results from an increase
in sales from a product/ market combination in which consumers have no increased
willingness to pay. When the distribution sector has no market power λ , µ = 1 , profit in
the distribution sector from sales of wholesale product to NS markets is
p WDist+u, A*

=

MN ( p u + g − p W ) [ Dk + Dk − F − y + g ]
. Total distributor
kk
( N D + M Dk )
W

Mp W 2

+  Mp W − N ( p u + g )  +

profit is the sum of profits in the FTS market for local food and profit in the alternative
Dist , A*
, A*
market, π=
π WDist
+ π LDist , A* . Under perfect competition, when λ , µ = 1 we find that total
+u
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distributor sector profit is the difference between wholesale revenues and input costs


κ 

from the NS market p Dist , A*= MpW 1 − W  − N [ p u + g ] where prices are exogenous.
 pW 
Total surplus from local in Scenario A is TS LA = CS LA + PS LA + π LA . Summing profit
with producer and consumer surpluses in the FTS market for local product, we find

TS LA*

=

MN ( N ∆kk
+ M ∆k ) [ ∆ + ∆k − F − y + g ]
2 ( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ )

2

+

 ( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ ) [ ∆kk
+ ∆k − F − y + pW − p u ] − [ ∆ + ∆k − F − y + g ] 
MN [ ∆k + ∆k − F − y + g ] 

( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ )



.

(12.63)

Note that as the costs of effort, transactions, and local FTS distribution increase, Total
Surplus from local decreases, but increases in the quality difference of products and
markets, as well as distribution costs from wholesale product to the NS market. In perfect
competition, this simplifies to
TS LA*

=

1 − 2 [ ∆k + ∆k − F − y + g ]

MN [ ∆kk
+ ∆k − F − y + g ] 
− [ ∆ + ∆k − F − y + pW − p u ] .
2
N
∆
k
+
M
∆
k
(
)



We denote the base case welfare with the superscript 0, and show welfare in the FTS
MN [ ∆k + ∆k − F + pW − p u ]
2 ( N ∆k + M ∆k )

2

market for local product as

PS L0 + CS L0 =

. We subtract Total

Surplus in Scenario A from the base case ∆ 0,PCATS L =  PS L0 + CS L0  −  PS LA + CS LA + π LA  and find
that is less than that in the base case under perfect competition when
+ ∆k − F − y + g ] − 2 [ ∆ + ∆k − F − y + g ]
[ ∆kk
. By inspection, the LHS is
−2 ( N ∆kkk
+ M ∆k ) [ ∆ + ∆k − F − y + g ][ ∆ + ∆k − F − y + pW − p u ] < 1
2

likely to be less than one. Compared to the base case, welfare in the FTS market
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decreases with the addition of the distribution sector. When the distributor has monopoly/
monopsony power, Total Surplus decreases
A, Mono

TS L

= PS LA + CS LA + p LA

=

1 − 2 [ ∆k + ∆k − F − y + g ]
.
+ ∆k − F − y + g ] 
− [ ∆ + ∆k − F − y + pW − p u ]
MN [ ∆kk
4 ( N ∆k + M ∆k )



(12.64)

Welfare from the wholesale product sold to the NS market is
A



+ M ∆k µ ) − N kkkkλ
+ M ∆k µ ) −  MGWA +u  
M (kkλ
W − pW )( N ∆
W GW +u  + N ∆
W ( N ∆
=
2
+ M ∆k µ )
2kkλ
W (N∆
2

A
W +u

TS

,

(12.65)

where we simplify so that ∆k + ∆k − ν L − t s − ts − g s − y + g =GWA +u . Here, wholesale quantity
supplied and Total Surplus from wholesale product to the NS market increases as the
costs of effort, transactions, and local FTS distribution increase, but decreases in the
quality difference of products and markets, as well as distribution costs from wholesale
product to the NS market.
Summing total surplus from the FTS market for local products with total surplus
from the wholesale product from the non FTS market, we find that, like in the base case,
total welfare increases as the costs of effort, transactions, and local FTS distribution
increase, but decreases in distribution costs from wholesale product to the NS market.
Recall that the quantity supplied to the FTS market decreases in these costs, suggesting
that there is a trade-off between total economic welfare and the quantity supplied to the
FTS market. This trade-off becomes more striking as intermediary market power
increases.
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6.4.2.4 Efficient Distribution Sector

The addition of an explicit distribution sector has two potentially conflicting
effects on equilibria. On one hand, adding a distribution sector with market power may
restrict the aggregate quantity and increase the price of local product in the FTS market,
as seen above. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the distribution sector is
more efficient and therefore reduces the overall costs in the supply chain, increasing the
aggregate quantity and reducing the price of local product in the FTS market.
While we have not restricted the distributor costs, y, g to be positive, we have
proceeded with our interpretation of results as if they are. However, policy makers and
advocates argue that existing food distribution systems are specialized businesses with
expertise in procurement, shipping, storage, traceability, ordering, and billing and
payment systems. This expertise may make distributors more efficient at procuring and
distributing product, and thereby may reduce total supply chain distribution costs.
Distributors’ expertise, however, may be less applicable in FTS markets. For example,
efficiencies established when distributors procure product from large wholesalers may
not apply when procuring product from individual producers, and traceability information
such as local or regional origin may not be compatible with existing information tracking
systems. If distributors are in fact more efficient, they may pass some cost savings on to
SFAs in the perfectly competitive case, however, a distributor with monopoly/
monopsony power may instead extract some portion of the savings. The frictionless base
case model presented above may be unrealistic in that it assumes the potential benefits
from efficiencies that might accrue from the use of a distribution sector in FTS markets,
but ignores the potential negative effects from distribution sector that exercises market
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power. The addition of the distribution sector in Scenario A allows us to explore the
possible conflicting effects of that sector on equilibria.
First we consider how our model allows efficient distributors to reduce costs in
the supply chain. Recall that in both the base case and Scenario A we have expressed the
difference in producers’ marketing costs between FTS and NS markets as ∆γ = γ s − γ u and
transaction costs ts ,t s , and SFA effort ν L , as components of the total FTS marketspecific costs, F= ν L + t s + ts + ∆γ . Previously we interpreted the distribution costs as being
positive y, g > 0 , and assumed distributors’ costs to supply the FTS market would be
higher than costs to supply the NS market ( y > g ) so that the effect of adding a
distribution sector resulted in increased costs, ( y − g ) > 0 . We now allow distributors’
costs to be less than zero y, g < 0 , so that they reduce the overall marketing and
distribution costs in each market. We look at two possible relationships between
distribution efficiencies in the FTS and NS markets. First, distributors could reduce costs
through efficiencies, y, g < 0 , but the cost reductions in the NS market exceed those in the
FTS market, y < g . This might be the case if the FTS market is still relatively more
costly to supply, even if distributors realize relative efficiencies and reduce overall
distribution costs, F . The outcomes for equilibria are qualitatively equivalent to those in
Scenario A, since ( y − g ) > 0 . Alternatively, cost reductions in the NS market could be
less than or equal to those in the FTS market, y ≥ g . This might be the case if
distributors reduce FTS market costs more than NS market costs, or if the costs to
distribute are equal in both markets. All else equal, equilibrium quantities of local
product supplied to the market increases relative to Scenario A as a result of decreased
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overall supply chains costs, equilibrium price paid by SFAs for local product decreases,
and the equilibrium price paid to producers increases, since ( y − g ) ≤ 0 .
When ( y − g ) ≤ 0 , price decreases and quantity increases in the FTS market
whether the distribution sector is concentrated or is perfectly competitive. Recall
Equation (6.54), the difference between the base-case versus the Scenario A equilibrium
quantity of local product supplied under perfect competition
 ( p − p u ) + ( y − g ) 
X L0* − X LA* =
MN  W
.
 N ∆k + M ∆k


Clearly, distribution costs savings could reduce the

discrepancy between these models, and might erase them if ( pW − p u ) < ( y − g ) . The net
effect on equilibria, however, may vary, depending on the relationship between cost
savings and market power. To demonstrate, we compare the effect of a change in the net
distributor costs

∂X LA*
> 0 when ( y − g ) ≤ 0 , on equilibrium aggregate quantity (6.47) to
∂( y − g)

the effect of a change in market power parameters

∂X LA*
<0,
∂λ

where we simplify by

assuming that the distributors’ upstream and downstream market power are equal, µ = λ .
When λ > ( F − ( y − g ) − ( ∆k + ∆k ) ) , the increase in aggregate quantity of local product that
results from cost efficiencies dominates the decrease that results from market power. The
term ( F − ( y − g ) ) can be interpreted as the extent to which distribution sector cost
efficiencies mitigate FTS market-specific costs. In perfect competition, λ = 1 , the cost
efficiency effect dominates when this mitigation effect does not exceed the qualities of
the local product and FTS market by more than a value of 1, 1 > ( F − ( y − g ) − ( ∆k + ∆k ) ) .
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As market power increases, the distribution sector must become increasingly
efficient for the cost savings effect to dominate the market power effect. For example, in
monopoly / monopsony, λ = 2 , the difference in the mitigation effect and qualities must be
twice that in the perfectly competitive case, 2 > ( F − ( y − g ) − ( ∆k + ∆k ) ) for the cost
efficiency effect to dominate. When this mitigation effect does exceed product and
market qualities by more than 2, the decrease in aggregate quantity of local product
supplied resulting from distribution sector market power dominates, and aggregate
quantity supplied decreases. As market power increases in the distribution sector, the
more efficient the sector is, the more the sector can reduce quantity of local product and
extract rents.
Ultimately, policy makers should note that assuming a frictionless distribution
sector can suggest that a greater quantity is supplied to the FTS market than that if the
distributor is taken into account, depending on whether or not distributors introduce
efficiencies that reduce overall supply chain costs, and do or do not exert market power.
When distributors do have market power, the difference between the presumed quantity
supplied due to efficiency and the actual quantity supplied increase. Taken together with
evidence that intermediaries in between producers and consumers in the FTS supply
chain are highly concentrated, these results suggest that policy makers would be well
advised to consider the potential for market intermediaries to exercise market power to
reduce equilibrium quantities relative to the frictionless base case and counter to the goal
of increasing local foods supplied to FTS programs. It is possible that distributors enjoy
higher efficiency, perhaps as a result of economies of scale, which can increase the
quantity supplied to the market.
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6.4.2.5 Scenario B: Known Qualities, Labeling

In Scenario B, a typical distributor labels both the product as local, incurring
product labeling cost d , and the market as FTS, incurring market labeling cost b . Product
and market quality labeling allows SFAs to avoid the effort ν L associated with procuring
local product, and producers to avoid the transaction costs t s , ts associated with selling to
FTS markets, but still allows producers and consumers to know product and market
qualities. We assume that distributor labeling is more efficient and less costly than SFA
effort or producers transaction costs, so that

d <ν L

and

b < t s + ts ,

set ν L ,t s , ts

=0

equal to

zero to find inverse demand for local product
 κ X D + κ L X LD 
) κL −  W W
pL ( X LD , X WD=

M



.
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SFAs’ aggregate demand for wholesale product is again expressed as a function
of aggregate quantity of local and the fixed price for wholesale product, so that

p
X W ( X L , p W ) = M 1 − W
κ
W



 − XL


, SFAs’ inverse aggregate demand for local product is a

function of aggregate quantity of local and the fixed price for wholesale product,

X 
pL ( X L , p W ) =
∆κ 1 − L  + p W
M 


, and input supply with a not FTS buyer is

X

ps ( X L , p u ) = ∆k  L − 1 + p u + ∆γ
N


S
, which again follows X u=

N − X sS

. Labeling costs now

enter the Distributor’s profit function, so that the typical distributor’s profit function,
denoted with the superscript B , is
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Using the FOC we find the equilibria quantities sold to FTS and wholesale
markets. With perfectly competitive upstream and downstream markets, the aggregate
supply or local food to the FTS market is

X LB* =

MN [ ∆kg
+ ∆k − ∆ − y − d − b + g ]
,
N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ

(12.68)

which decreases as the conjectural variation of supply and/ or demand elasticity
increases,

pLB* =

∂X LB*
∂X B*
< 0, L < 0
∂λ
∂µ

. The equilibrium price of local food in the FTS market is

+ p W ) − N ∆ [ ∆ + ∆k − ∆ − y − d − b + g ]
( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ )( ∆kkkg
, which increases as the
N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ

conjectural variation of demand increases,

producer is

B*

ps

=

∂PLB*
> 0 , while the upstream price paid to the
∂λ

− ∆k ) + M ∆k [ ∆ + ∆k −
 ( M ∆k µ + N ∆kλ ) ( p u + gkg

∆kλ + M ∆k µ
N

s

as the conjectural variation of supply elasticity increases

s

− y − d − b + g]

∂PsB*
<0
∂µ




,which decreases

. The wholesale

aggregate supply of wholesale product to the NS market is
X WB* ( X LB* , p W ) =


+ M ∆k µ ) − N kkg
+ ∆k − s − y − d − b + g ) 
M (kkλ
W − pW )( N ∆
W (∆
.
kkλ
N ∆ + M ∆k µ
W
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6.4.2.6 Scenario B: Welfare

Consumer surplus in the local market is
+ ∆k − ∆ − y − d − b + g ] 
∆k L  MN [ ∆kg

 ,
M ∆k λ + N k L µ
2M 

2

CS LB =

and consumer surplus in the wholesale


+ M ∆k µ ) − N kkg
M  (kkλ
W − pW )( N ∆
W ( ∆ + ∆k − ∆ − y − d − b + g ) 
  . Similarly,


2kkλ
N ∆ + M ∆k µ

W 

2

market CSWB

=

total producer surplus is the sum of producer surplus in the FTS market and the NS
= PS + PS where FTS producer surplus is
market TPS
s

u

+ ∆k − ∆ − y − d − b + g ] 
∆k  MN [ ∆kg
=


2N 
M ∆k λ + N k L µ


B
PS L =

and producer surplus in the market with not FTS buyers

N ∆k
PS =
2
B
W

 M  (kkλ
+ ∆k − ∆ − y − d − b + g )   
W (∆
 W − p W )( N ∆ + M ∆k µ ) − N kkg

.
N ∆ + M ∆k µ
 kkλ

W

2

6.4.2.7 Scenario A versus B

The perfectly competitive comparative welfare outcomes of the Scenarios
presented above depend primarily on the relationship between the labeling costs and the
effort and transaction costs. A primary motivation that advocates cite for “scaling up”
FTS procurement by using established market intermediaries like distributors and foods
service management companies is the assumption that intermediaries have economies of
scale and technological expertise, and are therefore able to provide services that reduce or
eliminate transaction and effort costs, like the provision of quality information, more
cost-effectively than SFAs and producers.
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If we assume that the distribution sector is more efficient than producers and
SFAs in the provision of quality information, so that product labeling costs are less than
SFA effort to procure local,

d <ν L

and distributors market labeling costs are more

efficient than producers’ transaction costs incurred in selling to SFAs,

b < t s + ts ,

we find

that Scenario B provides a larger aggregate quantity of product and increased total
welfare compared to Scenario A, no matter the level of market power exerted by
distributors.

6.4.3 The Effect of Subsidies on Effort and Transaction Costs
How can policy makers increase the quantity of local foods that are served in
schools? Current policy focuses on subsidizing the effort that SFAs must expend to
procure local foods. We introduce subsidies into the consumers’ and producers’ indirect
utility functions to demonstrate the possibilities and challenges associated with policy
interventions like subsidies on SFA effort or producer transaction costs to support these
markets.

6.4.3.1 Subsidy on Consumers’ Effort Cost and on Producers’ Transaction Costs
First we introduce a subsidy, ρ , to Scenario A to supplement some portion of the
SFA’s effort in the FTS market channel such that ρ ∈ [ 0,1] . This subsidy is in effect the
current strategy to increase the quantity of local product in schools.
if the local product is bought
w + ψ g κ L − pL − ν L (1 − r )

w + ψ g κW − pW if the wholesale product is bought .

w
otherwise.


=
V 
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(12.69)

The indifferent consumer is now ψˆ


demand is X LD = M [1 − ψˆ ]= M 1 −


≡

pL − pW + ν L (1 − ρ )
∆κ

, and aggregate market

pL − pW + ν L (1 − ρ ) 
 . Next we consider the producers’
Dκ


profit function, and add a subsidy δ , to supplement some portion of the transaction costs
in the FTS market channel, where δ ∈ [0,1] , so that p s
We update the indifferent producer so that θˆi


market supply, X sS = N [1 − θˆ] = N 1 −


=

= ps − (c + γ + t s (1 − δ ) + γ s ) − FC − ts .

pu − ps + t s (1 − δ ) + ts + ∆γ
∆k

, and aggregate

pu − ps + t s (1 − δ ) + ts + ∆γ 
 .
∆k


6.4.3.2 Equilibrium with Subsidies

We refer back to Scenario A to provide context for an analysis of subsides, as
Scenario B has eliminated the FTS market specific costs that could be minimized
through subsidy policy. The aggregate quantity supplied to the FTS market is
X LA* =

MN  ∆k + ∆k − ν L (1 − ρ ) − t s (1 − δ ) − ts − ∆g − y + g 
N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ

in both a subsidy on effort

dX s*
MNν L
=
d ρ ( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ )

dX s*
MNτ s
=
d dkλ
( N ∆ + M ∆k µ )

. Equilibrium quantity is increasing

, and in a subsidy on transaction costs,

, suggesting that policy makers wishing to increase the

quantity supplied to the FTS market could consider policies to supplement either supply
or demand.
The resulting downstream price to the SFA is
pLA* =( ∆k − ν L (1 − ρ ) − pW ) −

N ∆kk
 ∆ + ∆k − ν L (1 − ρ ) − t s (1 − δ ) − ts − ∆g − y + g 
N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ
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. Equilibrium

market price, however, is increasing in a subsidy on schools’ efforts, but decreasing in a

dps*
subsidy on transaction costs, =
ν L 1 −
dρ




N ∆k

( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ ) 

and

N ∆kτ s
dpLA*
.
= −
d dkλ
( N ∆ + M ∆k µ )

To

the extent that the increase in equilibrium price is reflective of the value of the subsidy on
effort, the effect should be the same as any other subsidy – namely that demand increases
according to the value of the subsidy. Policy makers, however, must take into account the
effect of a subsidy on market price into account. A subsidy on SFA effort does increase
demand, but since price is endogenous this increase in demand results in an increase in
price. An increase in price past an SFA’s ability to pay due to budget restrictions will
result in a shift in a consumer’s indirect utility such that no consumer will demand the
local product.
Alternatively, policy makers could consider a subsidy on producers’ transaction
costs. In this case the equilibrium market quantity increases, but price decreases,
dps*
N kτ
L s
.
= −
d dkλ
( N ∆ + M ∆k µ )

A subsidy on transaction costs could counteract the increased

challenges that producers must meet to supply to the FTS market, and, in theory, could
fully offset these costs so that the indifferent producer would find FTS to be as profitable
as sales to an not FTS buyer.
Additional policy considerations could be to directly subsidize price to the SFA or
to the producer, or to increase marketing a market promotion to increase the perceived
quality of the market or the product. While some states have introduced legislation to
allow some portion of SFAs food budget to be purchased at market price without a bid, or
at a percentage above the market bid price, it is not likely to be politically feasible to for
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these policies to pass in any way that would have a significant ability to raise market
prices for local foods in FTS markets.
FTS market promotion has already been a significant focus of resources, with
federal, state, municipal and private funders investing the promotion of FTS markets,
primarily to schools. The quality of the market could be increased by this kind of
promotion, or by an increase in evidence that procurement of local foods does in fact
significantly and positively impact the short- or long-term goals of FTS, namely to
increase student learning about health and nutrition and to reduce health and diet related
disease and illnesses.
While upstream input price paid to the producer is
A*

ps

=

 ( M ∆k µ + N ∆kλ ) ( p u + t (1 − δ ) + t


s

s

− ∆k ) + M ∆k [ ∆ + ∆k − ν L (1 − ρ ) − t s (1 − δ ) − t s
+ ∆gk

− ∆g

− y + g]

N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ




.

We use the X LA* to find the equilibrium quantity in the wholesale market

X WA* ( X LA* , pW ) =


M ΓW ( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ ) − N kk
W ( ∆ + ∆k − ν L (1 − ρ ) − t s (1 − δ ) − t s − ∆g − y + g ) 
.
kkλ
N ∆ + M ∆k µ
W

6.4.3.3 Subsidies: Welfare

Total welfare is now the sum of consumer and producer welfare in two markets,
the FTS market for local product and the NS market for undifferentiated wholesale
product. Total welfare is the sum of Local and Wholesale Surplus, calculated from supply
and demand curves in each market, so that for Scenario A,
surplus in the FTS market for local food is
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A
TW
=
TS LA + TSWA .

Consumer

M ∆k  N ( ∆k + ∆k − ν L (1 − ρ ) − t s (1 − δ ) − ts − ∆g − y + g )  

 ,
CS =
2 
N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ


2

A
L

And consumer

surplus in the wholesale market is
+ ∆k − ν L (1 − ρ ) − t s (1 − δ ) − ts − ∆g − y + g )  
M  ΓW ( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ ) − N kk
W (∆

 ,.
=
N ∆ + M ∆k µ
2kkλ

W 

2

CSWA

Similarly, total producer surplus is the sum of producer surplus in the FTS market and
the NS market where FTS producer surplus is
A
PS L

N ∆k  M ( ∆k + ∆k − ν L (1 − ρ ) − t s (1 − δ ) − ts − ∆g − y + g )  


=
N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ
2 



market with NS

N ∆k
buyers=
PSuA
2

2

, and producer surplus in the

  M ( ∆k + ∆k − ν L (1 − ρ ) − t s (1 − δ ) − ts − y + g )  

1 − 
N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ



2

.

Welfare in the FTS market in Scenario A in the absence of market power is

TS L = PS L
A, PC

A

+ CS LA

=

MN  ∆k + ∆k − ν L (1 − ρ ) − t s (1 − δ ) − ts − y + g 

2

2 ( N ∆k + M ∆k )

.

Note that as the costs of effort, transactions, and local FTS distribution increase,
Total Surplus from local decreases, but increases in the quality difference of products and
markets, as well as distribution costs from wholesale product to the NS market. When the
distributor has monopoly/ monopsony power, Total Surplus decreases further to

=

A, Mono
TS L

A
PS L

+ CS

A
L

=

MN  ∆kn
+ ∆k − L (1 − ρ ) − t s (1 − δ ) − ts − y + g 
4 ( N ∆k + M ∆k )

2

. Welfare from the

wholesale product sold to the NS market is
A


+ M ∆k µ ) −  MGWA +u  
M GW ( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ ) − N kkkkλ
W GW +u  + N ∆
W ( N ∆
=
2
+ M ∆k µ )
2kkλ
W (N∆
2

A
W +u

TS
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2

, where

∆k + ∆k − ν L (1 − ρ ) − t s (1 − δ ) − ts − y + g =GWA +u . Equilibrium price, however, is

increasing in a subsidy on schools’ efforts, but decreasing in a subsidy on transaction
costs,

dps*
Mk sν L
.
=
d ρ ( N ∆kλ + M ∆k µ )

To the extent that the increase in equilibrium price is

reflective of the value of the subsidy on effort, the effect should be the same as any other
subsidy – namely that demand increases according to the value of the subsidy. Policy
makers, however, must take into account the effect of a subsidy on market price into
account. A subsidy on SFA effort does increase demand, but since price is endogenous
this increase in demand results in an increase in price. An increase in price past an SFA’s
ability to pay due to budget restrictions will result in a shift in a consumer’s indirect
utility such that no consumer will demand the local product.
Alternatively, policy makers could consider a subsidy on producers’ transaction
costs. In this case the equilibrium market quantity increases, but price decreases,
dps*
N kτ
L s
= −
d dkλ
( N ∆ + M ∆k µ )

. A subsidy on transaction costs could counteract the increased

challenges that producers must meet to supply to the FTS market, and, in theory, could
fully offset these costs so that the indifferent producer would find FTS to be as profitable
as sales to an not FTS buyer.
Additional policy considerations could be to directly subsidize price to the SFA or
to the producer, or to increase marketing a market promotion to increase the perceived
quality of the market or the product. While some states have introduced legislation to
allow some portion of SFAs food budget to be purchased at market price without a bid, or
at a percentage above the market bid price, it is not likely to be politically feasible to for
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these policies to pass in any way that would have a significant ability to raise market
prices for local foods in FTS markets.
FTS market promotion has already been a significant focus of resources, with
federal, state, municipal and private funders investing the promotion of FTS markets,
primarily to schools. The quality of the market could be increased by this kind of
promotion, or by an increase in evidence that procurement of local foods does in fact
significantly and positively impact the short- or long-term goals of FTS, namely to
increase student learning about health and nutrition and to reduce health and diet related
disease and illnesses.

6.5 Discussion and Conclusion

We develop a theoretical model of producer utility maximizing choice of market
channel with endogenous equilibria and welfare analysis markets for local food, and
apply the model to the case of FTS markets. A positive quantity of product can be
supplied by producers even when the market is not the most profitable market choice.
Producers who supply to the market even when it is not the most profitable choice are
those producers with strength of preference for a high quality market that may contribute
to other pro-social goals, like improved child health and nutrition or improved local
economic development. We find that increasing the quantity of local food to SFAs
increases the welfare in the FTS market for local food, but may decrease total welfare
due to welfare losses in the alternative markets.
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We then add a distribution sector and allow it to exert both upstream and
downstream market power, leverage efficiencies of scale to reduce overall supply chain
costs, and label product and market quality. We find that adding a distribution sector does
introduce the possibility of reduced supply chain costs under certain assumptions, but that
the upstream and downstream actors may not benefit fully from these efficiencies when
market power is present. We note that even in the case where efficiencies are passed
through, policy makers and advocates may over-estimate the quantity of local food that is
supplied and under-estimate the market price paid by omitting the role of market power
in the distribution sector from policy considerations. We explore the effect of the most
prevalent market support, subsidies on SFA procurement effort, and find that while the
subsidy does increase quantity supplied, it also increases the equilibrium price, which
may limit the effectiveness of the subsidy. Alternatively, policy makers could subsidize
producers’ transaction costs, which would both increase the quantity supplied and
decrease the market price to SFAs. Policy makers may also wish to encourage
distributors to adapt to the role of providing upstream information to producers regarding
the end consumer and more traditional downstream information regarding product
attributes, including product origin, but note that in the presence of market power and
with the limited opportunity for oversight this could result in mislabeling.
Future work will include modeling producers’ choice to sell to an unlabeled
market under the expectation that some portion of product supplied will go to an SFA,
even in the absence of transaction costs and labeling. This additional scenario and the
effect of subsidies will be compared to the results in which a distribution sector is
included to provide a comparison that is relevant for policy makers going forward. We
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will conduct simulations that allow for different parameter values. While there is
substantial evidence in social sciences literature that producers make utility maximizing
choices in markets for local food, additional work is needed to demonstrate the external
validity of this model. We intend to test the assumption that producers have strength of
preference for market quality, as developed in this paper, via choice experiments with a
convenience sample of agriculture producers with existing sales of locally branded
products, and to test the market equilibria in an experimental lab with undergraduate
students. Finally, will we consider the possibility that policy makers may be able to
increase the quantity of product in the market by decreasing the value at which producers
are indifferent between the two market channels, θˆ , through the use of nudges.
The case of producer choice to sell locally differentiated products to schools
highlights a number of potential trade-offs that often go unexplored in local foods
research but that can be addressed through our approach. In particular, in the case of
Farm to School markets, there are trade-offs between increasing the quantity of local
foods supplied to schools and total welfare. In addition, policy subsidies for FTS
implementation at SFAs intended to increase the quantity of local foods in Farm to
School programs might have improved success if they were used to support producer
supply. The Farm to School case highlights that policy interventions like subsidies to
reduce FTS market costs to support social outcomes of local foods systems might be
most effective if applied to producers instead of SFAs, and highlights the need for more
rigorous economic theories that can incorporate different dimensions of local foods
systems.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I combine field research, econometric methods, and economic
theory to analyze a market in which both firms’ and consumers’ choices are motivated by
social preferences. This work contributes to the fields of behavioral economics, industrial
organization, and local food systems economics. The dissertation expands the growing
literature on social preferences to incorporate firms’ choices that are motivated by utility
maximizing objectives in an environment that allows endogenous equilibrium prices and
quantities.
This dissertation attempts to develop a framework for understanding the
relationships among market forces that operate to improve economic efficiency and those
that operate to achieve pro-social values in a way that allows prices and quantities to be
endogenous. In addition to contributing to theory that advances the application of
behavioral economics to firms in a competitive market environment, I seek to provide
policy makers with a framework through which the effect of policies to promote local
foods can be evaluated. To provide a concrete application, most of this dissertation
focuses on understanding the key components of a specific value chain – the Farm to
School market for local foods. The second chapter veers from the Farm to School
application to provide empirical evidence of how human values can influence consumer
decision making in markets for local foods.
In the second chapter this dissertation, “Consumers’ Human Values and
Preferences for Social Outcomes of Regional Food Attributes,” written with Gianni
Cicia, (2018) we investigate heterogeneity in consumers’ human values and willingness
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to pay (WTP) for social outcomes of credence process attributes that might have some
positive social impact on purchases of early potatoes in Italy and Germany.
In the third chapter, “Food Service Authorities’ Motivations to Buy Regional
Food,” and fourth chapter, “Market Channel and School Meal Costs in Farm to School
Programs” written with Jeffrey O’Hara, I analyze school food authorities’ local food
procurement choices. The third chapter uses primary historical data from the
Massachusetts Farm to School program to analyze how different social forces converge
to promote a common goal of increasing the volume of local food in Massachusetts’
schools. The fourth chapter analyzes perceptions of costs of procuring local foods in
regards to school food authorities’ choice of procurement channel. We combine two
years’ of USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service national Farm to School Census data with
USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service Census of Agriculture to test, among
schools participating in farm to school programs, whether procuring directly from
producers is more likely to lower costs than procuring through a distributor.
In the fifth chapter, “Producer Costs and Returns from New England Farm to
Institution Sales,” I present the results of field research from interviews with producers in
six New England states who market at least some product to Farm to Institution markets.
I gather information about producers’ costs and returns in selling to farm to institution
markets. Notably, while very few farm operations specifically track costs and returns to
farm to institution marketing, only two producers target this market for future growth.
The barriers cited to increased participation include low prices, volume requirements, and
logistical challenges.
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The sixth chapter, “Equilibria and Welfare in Markets With Social Preferences,”
written with Nathalie Lavoie and Dan Lass, develops a behavioral model of producer
choice for high-quality local food markets in which marketing choices may be influenced
by social preferences, while allowing price and quantity to be determined in the market.
We draw upon theory from behavioral economics and industrial organization, as well as
field research results, to develop a theoretical model that advances the existing literature
on producer choice of market channels, in which price is treated as exogenous. Nonpecuniary motivations in marketing choices are increasingly identified in the literature as
relevant to producer decision making. The paper provides a theoretical framework to
model the potential effects of policy interventions when producers may be motivated by
non-pecuniary factors and downstream intermediaries may exercise oligopsony power.
We apply the model to producer marketing choices in farm to school markets, which
policy makers currently provide demand-side support by subsidizing school food
purchasers’ procurement of local foods. We find that if policy makers wish to increase
the quantity of local product supplied to schools, supply-side interventions are likely to
more effective. Effective interventions could include mitigating producers’ transaction
costs. We also find that market power in the distribution sector may, in certain cases,
serve to counteract policy-makers’ goals to increase quantity of local foods supplied to
schools. It is also possible that distributors enjoy higher efficiency, perhaps as a result of
economies of scale, which can increase the quantity supplied to the market. Future work
using this framework will include evaluating interventions like promoting farm to school
markets to producers, or providing technical assistance to producers, to establish
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contracts with intermediaries that support price pass-through and communicate
information about downstream market activity.
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APPENDIX A

LOCAL FOOD PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS (2013-2014)

Number

Percent

553

12%

552

12%

275

6%

Lack of reliability in delivering ordered items

874

19%

Getting on time deliveries
Having quantity delivered equal to quantity
ordered
Price

393

8%

381

8%

Higher prices

1,810

38%

Unstable product prices

729

15%

Hard to find year-round availability of key items

2,674

57%

Local items not available from primary vendors
Vendors for local items don't offer a broad range
of products
Lack of availability of processed/precut products
Getting product delivered that meets your quality
requirements & other specs (i.e., size)
Transaction

1,268

27%

1,033

22%

709

15%

718

15%

Local producers aren't bidding
Hard to coordinate procurement of local with
regular procurement
Hard to find new suppliers/growers or distributors

774

16%

1,208

26%

909

19%

Hard to get information about product availability

736

16%

On-Site
Lack of kitchen equipment to process/prepare
local foods.
GAP or other food safety requirements
Lack of compliance with your institution's
purchasing regulations and policies
Delivery

Product

Hard to place orders with vendors

298

6%

Resolving problem deliveries
Inability to pay farmers according to farmers'
needs due to school district payment procedures
No Reported Problems

171

4%

363

8%

1,203

25%

Total

4,718
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APPENDIX B
LOCAL FOOD PROCUREMENT CHANNELS (2013-2014)
Direct
At least one direct channel

2,832

60%

Individual producers ( Farmers, fishers, ranchers)

1,886

40%

Farmer, rancher, or fisher cooperatives

798

17%

Farmers markets

373

8%

Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) model

157

3%

At least one intermediated channel
Food processors and manufacturers

2,995
1,772

63%
38%

Distributors

2,995

63%

Food buying cooperative

647

14%

Food hub

403

9%

Food service management companies

101

2%

Dept. of Defense Fresh Program vendors

1,379

29%

USDA foods

1,440

31%

State Farm to School program office

142

3%

Total

4,718

Intermediated
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APPENDIX C
2015 NEW ENGLAND FARM TO INSTITUTION COST & RETURNS
INTERVIEW
Section
1

Social Preferences
A.

Beliefs
Agree
Strongly

1.

Increasing the sales of New England food to New England
consumers benefits the environment.

2.

Increasing the sales of New England food to New England
consumers helps preserve the region's working landscape.
Increasing the sales of New England food to New England

3. consumers decreases the environmental impact of large-

scale agriculture.
4.

Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a driver of
local economic development

5.

Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a driver of
regional economic development.
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods to consumers

6. in New England could improve health and nutrition

outcomes.
7.

Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could
improve health and nutrition outcomes for students k-12.

8.

Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could
improve health and nutrition outcomes for the elderly
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could

9. improve health and nutrition outcomes for incarcerated

individuals
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could
10. improve health and nutrition outcomes for hospital

patients.
11.

Small and medium sized farms are important drivers of rural
economies.
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Agree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Disagree

Disagree
Strongly

Can't Choose

Section
1

Social Preferences
B. Rating of Organizations
Very
Effective

Effective

Neither
Effective nor
Ineffective

Ineffective

Very
Ineffective

Extremely
Familiar

Moderately
familiar

Somewhat
familiar

Slightly
familiar

Not at all
familiar

1. How effective are the following organizations?
a.

Sierra Club

b.

Appalachian Mountain Club

c.

National Audubon society

d.

State Natural Resources Council

e.

Local Fire Department

f.

Local Hardware store franchise

g.

Local or regional economic development organization

h.

Feed the Children

i.

Children's Hospitals Associations

j.

Feeding America

k.

American farmland Trust

l.

Farm Aid

2. How familiar are you with the following organizations?
a.

Sierra Club

b.

Appalachian Mountain Club

c.

National Audubon society

d.

State Natural Resources Council

e.

Local Fire Department

f.

Local Hardware store franchise

g.

Local or regional economic development organization

h.

Feed the Children

i.

Children's Hospitals Associations

j.

Feeding America

k.

American farmland Trust

l.

Farm Aid
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Unsure/ Not
familiar with
organization

Section 2 Markets & Marketing Contracts
A.
B.

What was your gross farm income for 2014? (Schedule F, line 9 or 50)?
What was the net income or loss from the sale of business assets for 2014?

C.

In 2014, what was your principle crop or activity?
1. Principal Crop or Activity (Schedule F, Line A)

D.

How/ to whom did you sell your products in 2014?
"0" if did NOT sell to this market, "1" if DID sell to this market.

$
$

2. Code from Part IV (Schedule F, Line B)

1 Direct to consumer (fresh or processed)
a. Farmstand
b. CSA
c. Farmers' market
d. PYO

"Direct" marketing is defined as sales from the
producer directly to the end consumer of the product.
"Intermediated" marketing is defined as any sales
where an additional business or organization owns
the product before it reaches the end consumer.

2 Intermediated (fresh or processed)
a. Direct to restaurant
b. Direct to retail
c. Direct to buying club
d. Direct to aggregator
e. Direct to processor

i. public k-12 ii. pre-school iii. private k-12 iv. private college v. public college/univ vi. hospital vii. other
f. Direct to institution
g. Wholesaler
h. End buyer known?
if "yes" to g. :
i. institution ii. retail
i.

iii. restaurant

iv. buying club

v. processor

vi. other

Section 3

Acreage, Production, Marketing and Income

Crop

Vegetables, Potatoes and
Melons
Carrots

Fruit and Nuts

Berries

Code

How many
acres were
harvested?
(acres and
tenths)

Code

Acres Tenths

0397

10

Total
Unit Code
production
(C&R
/ Quantity
Section D)
Harvested?

3

Quantity

2000

DIRECT to Institution

WHOLESALE to Institution

FINAL
MARKETING
What
PRICE /FEE
Total
Contract = Quantity RECEIVED
dollar
"1",
of this
per Unit
amount
PRODUCTION product
by this
contract=
was
operation received
in 2014
"2", Cash or delivered for this
Open Market through
product from this
sales = "3",
this
marketed contract?
Other ="4" contract? under this
contract?

MARKETING
Contract =
"1",
PRODUCTION
contract= "2",
Cash or Open
Market sales
= "3", Other
="4"

Value
[1,2,3,4]

Code

1

Quantity

3

400

Dollars &
cents

0.4

Total
Dollars

160

Value
[1,2,3,4]

FINAL
What
PRICE/ FEE
Total
Quantity RECEIVED
dollar
of this
per Unit
amount
product
by this
was
operation received
in 2014
delivered for this
through
product from this
this
marketed contract?
contract? under this
contract?
Quantity

2

600

Dollars &
cents

0.37

Total
Dollars
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Section 3, Acreage, Production, Marketing and Income
cont.

Crop

Code

How many
acres were
harvested?
(acres and
tenths)

Code

Acres Tenths

Total
Unit Code
production
(C&R
/ Quantity
Section D)
Harvested?

Quantity

Code

DIRECT to Institution

WHOLESALE to Institution

FINAL
MARKETING
What
PRICE /FEE
Total
Contract = Quantity RECEIVED
dollar
"1",
of this
per Unit
amount
PRODUCTION product
by this
contract=
was
operation received
in 2014
"2", Cash or delivered for this
Open Market through
product from this
sales = "3",
this
marketed contract?
Other ="4" contract? under this
contract?

MARKETING
Contract =
"1",
PRODUCTION
contract= "2",
Cash or Open
Market sales
= "3", Other
="4"

Value
[1,2,3,4]

Quantity

Other field crops, hay, trees
& maple syrup, nursery

Cattle and Calves

Hogs and Pigs

Poultry

Equine, Sheep & goats,
Aquaculture, Bees, other
livestock & livestock
products

* public k-12, pre-school, private k-12, private college, public college/univ, hospital, other

Dollars &
cents

Total
Dollars

Value
[1,2,3,4]

FINAL
What
PRICE/ FEE
Total
Quantity RECEIVED
dollar
of this
per Unit
amount
product
by this
was
operation received
in 2014
delivered for this
through
product from this
this
marketed contract?
contract? under this
contract?
Quantity

Dollars &
cents

Total
Dollars

Section 4 Other Farm-Related Income
1 In 2014, what was the total income received by you and all partners for the following:
a. custom work, machine hire, and other agricultural services provided by this operation $
b. grazing of livestock? (Exclude contract arrangements previously reported.)
$
c. recreational and agri-tourism activities such as hunting, fishing, farm tours, hospitality
services, petting zoos, etc.
$
d. sales of all forest products? (Include firewood, timber, etc. Exclude maple syrup and
$
Christmas trees.)
e. sales of farm machinery and vehicles? (farm share only)
$
f. proceeds from sales of farmland and other farm real estate owned by this operation
only
$
(i) recognized gain/loss on sales of farmland and other farm real
$
(ii) Were the sales of any farmland or other farm real estate made to :
1 a non-relative
"0" if NO, "1" if
2 a relative
YES.
3 both non-relatives and relatives
g. Federal crop and livestock insurance payments?
$
h. other crop and livestock insurance indemnity payments?

$

i. cooperative patronage dividends and refunds?

$
j. sales of value-added goods produced (e.g. cheese, cider, jams, jellies, wines, and other
prepared farm commodities?) EXCLUDE if this is a separate business.
$
k. income from royalties or leases associated with energy production (e.g. natural gas, oil
and wind turbines)?
$
l. all other farm related sources of income? [This may be a negative (-) number for
hedging losses.]
$
"0" if NO, "1" if yes

2 Did you:

a. apply for any grants that were received all or in part for expenses incurred in 2014? (Include
operating, capital, technical assistance and training, workshop waivers etc.)
b. receive any grants all or in part for expenses incurred in 2014?
i. Grant titles
ii. Granting Organizations
iii. Total Dollar amount of Grants

iv. % total Dollar amount
Received for Direct to
Institution Marketing

v. % total Dollar Amount
Received for Wholesale to
Institution marketing

$
c. request and receive any in-kind services from public, private sector for and non-profit sources in
2014? (Include marketing, professional or public sector services)
i. How many hours of assistance did you receive?
ii. Estimated Dollar value of services
received
$
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iii. % total $ Received for
Direct to Institution
Marketing

iv. % total $ Received for
Wholesale to Institution
marketing

Section 5 Labor and Wages.
A.

What were the total cash wages paid in 2014? Please add to this any cash bonuses paid to all hired
workers during 2014. (Include payments to the operator, family members, and corporate officers,
but exclude cash draw, partnership draw, contract labor, housework, custom work, and social
security on the owner operator.)
Total Cash Wages

B.

$

Of the total cash wages paid (question 1), how much was paid to the following? Report the wage
rate and units (eg., $/hour, $/week, or $/month) for the following. If no wages were paid for a line,
please enter 0.
Number of Total Cash
Employees Wages ($)

Wage Rate
(indicate units)

1. Operator(s) or Managers(s)
2. Family Members (not operators)
3. Other salaried employees
Other full-time employees paid
hourly.
Other part-time employees paid
5.
hourly.
4.

6.

Compensated Apprentices or
Interns (please specify terms)

7. Contract labor
8. Custom Work
Professional or Farm management
services such as record keeping,
9.
accounting, tax and business
planning, farm product advice
10. Interns
Total (Total cash wages should
11 equal question 1).
C.

What were the total cash draws on the farm business during 2012?
$

D.

What were the total payroll taxes for hired labor?
$

E.

What were the total expenses for fringe benefits provided for hired workers for: life or health
insurance, pension or retirement plans, employer’s share of social security taxes, workman’s
compensation and unemployment compensation? If no fringe benefits were provided, please
enter zero.
$
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Section 5, Labor and Wages.
cont.

F.

Were any non-cash benefits provided for hired workers?
(Meals, other foods, housing, fuel, vehicles, utilities, etc.)

"0" if NO, "1" if yes

If yes, enter estimated value of benefits for all workers combined below.
G.
i. Benefit

ii. Meals or
iii. Housing
other food

iv. Fuel

v. Vehicle Use

vi.
vii.
viii.
Utiliti Farm
Other
es Produ

Estimated
Value ($)
H.

On average, how many hours per week did you (the operator) and any other operators work with
or without pay on this operation during each month of 2014? Indicate all hours worked even if not
paid.
Month (2014) Operator 1 Operator 2 Operator 3 Operator 4 Operator 5
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

I.

Please estimate the average number of hours per week your hired or salaried employees worked
on this operation during each month of 2014. Do not include salaried personnel that were already
listed as operators in question 6.
Month (2014) Employee 1 Employee 2 Employee 3 Employee 4 Employee 5
Employ Employee 7
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
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Section 5, Labor and Wages.
cont.

J.

Did anyone else, not reported above, do farm work in 2014 on this operation without pay
or other remuneration? Please indicate the average number of hours worked per week
without pay on this operation during each month of 2014. Please indicate whether labor
was manual = "1", Professional/ farm management Services = "2", or other = "3"

"0" if
NO,
"1" if
yes

If yes, please complete the table below.
Month (2014) Worker 1
Under 16 (ü)
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
K.

Worker 2

Worker 3

Worker 4

Worker 5

Worker 6

Did anyone else, not reported above, do farm work in 2014 on this operation with payment
"0" if
in the form of academic credit or internship experience? Please indicate the average
NO,
number of hours worked per week without pay on this operation during each month of
"1" if
2014. Please indicate whether labor was manual = "1", Professional/ farm management
yes
Services = "2", or other = "3"
If yes, please complete the table below.
Month (2014) Worker 1
Under 16 (ü)
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

Worker 2

Worker 3
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Worker 4

Worker 5

Worker 6

Section
Farm Operating Expenses
6
A. Farm Operating Expense. How much was spent during 2013, including operator, partners and custom expenses for
the categories below. Please list the cash expenses. Do not include personal living expenses such as taxes, insurance,
repairs, etc., on your home. If no expenditure was made for a particular item, please enter 0. Include the costs
incurred from producing value-added products. (Note: Schedule F line numbers included below.)
Expenses ($)
1. Car and truck expenses (Schedule F line 10)
2. Chemicals (Schedule F line 11)
3. Conservation expenses (Schedule F line 12)
4. Custom hire (machine work, etc.) (Schedule F line 13)
5. Depreciation (Schedule F line 14)
6. Employee benefit other than pension and profit-sharing plans
(Schedule F line 15)
7. Feed (grains, hay, haylage, silage, minerals and other purchased
feeds.) (Schedule F line 16)
8. Fertilizers and lime (Schedule F line 17)
9. Freight and trucking (include product hauling) (Schedule F line 18)
10. Gasoline, fuel, and oil (Schedule F line 19)
11. Insurance other than health (Schedule F line 20)
a. Food safety liability insurance (related capital Expenses below)
12. Interest and service fees on farmland, buildings and other real
estate debt (Schedule F line 21a??)
13. Interest and service fees on operating loans. (Schedule F line
21b??)
14. Labor hired (Schedule F line 22)
15. Pension and profit-sharing plans (Schedule F line 23)
16. Rent or lease of any farm machinery, equipment or structures
(Schedule F line 24a)
17. Rent or lease of any farm land, animals, etc. (Schedule F line 24b)
18. Repair and maintenance (items a and b below should sum to this
line) (Schedule F line 25)
a. Repair and maintenance to buildings
i) Expenses required for GAP certification or state equivalent
ii) Expenses required for Approved Vendor Status certification
iii) Expenses required for other state/ federal food safety licensing
b. Repair and maintenance to machinery and equipment
i) Expenses required for GAP certification or state equivalent
ii) Expenses required for Approved Vendor Status certification
iii) Expenses required for other state/ federal food safety licensing
19. Seeds and plants purchased(Schedule F line 26)
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% total Expenses % total Expenses
Direct to
Wholesale to
Institution
Institution

Section
Farm Operating Expenses
6, cont.

20. Storage and warehousing (Schedule F line 27)
21. Supplies purchased such as acid, soap, paper towels, etc.
(Schedule F line 28)
22. Taxes (items a and b below should sum to this line) (Schedule F
line 29)
a. Real Estate Taxes
b. Other property and excise tax
23. Utilities (electricity, water, telephone, etc.) (Schedule F line 30)
24. Veterinary, breeding, hoof trimming and medicine
expenses(Schedule F line 31)
25. Accounting and tax preparation
26. Dues
27. Other marketing expenses
28. Promotion
29. What was the market value of commoditites produced and used
on this operation for home or employee/ volunteer consumption?
30. What was the market value of in-kind services provided to
community groups, employees or volunteers?
31. GAP certification or state equivalent (Capital expense below)
a. Annual Fees
b. Consultant services
32.Expenses associated with becoming an approved vendor for a FtI
Distributor or Wholesaler
34. Additional expenses not recorded above (please list items)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Total (line 33 from 1040 Schedule F)
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Section
Farm Operating Expenses
6, cont.
B. Capital Expenses

Expenses ($)

% total Expenses % total Expenses
Direct to
Wholesale to
Institution
Institution

1. Improvements on land such as land preparation, irrigation
improvements, well drilling, ponds, feedlots, trench silos, lagoons,
new fences etc
i) Expenses required for GAP certification or state equivalent
ii) Expenses required for Approved Vendor Status certification
iii) Expenses required for other state/federal food safety licensing
2. New Construction and remodeling of dwellings (exlcuding
operators dwelling) barns, buildings, storage facilities, livestock
facilities, sheds, silos, etc.
i) Expenses required for GAP certification or state equivalent
ii) Expenses required for Approved Vendor Status certification
iii) Expenses required for other state/ federal food safety licensing
3. New construction or remodeling of the operator's dwelling, if
owned by operation?
4. Cars and trucks (before trade)
a. What percent of this item was the farm's share?
5. Machinery, implements and livestock equipment (please list)
6. Land
7. Other Capital expenses
i) Expenses required for GAP certification or state equivalent
ii) Expenses required for Approved Vendor Status certification
iii) Expenses required for other state/ federal food safety licensing
C.

Capital Assets. Please indicate the value (a fair market value) of the capital assets listed as of January 1, 2013 and as of
December 31, 2013 and changes that occurred during 2013.
Market Value
Market Value
(January 1,
(Dec. 31, 2013)
2013)
a. Owned farm land
b. Operator dwellings (if on farm)
c. Other dwellings
d. Farm buildings and structures
e. Machinery and equipment
f. Livestock (include all types)
g. Other capital assets not listed:
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Net Change

Section
Farm Operating Expenses
6, cont.
D.

Operating Assets. Please indicate the value of the operating assets listed as of January 1, 2014 and as of December 31,
2014 and changes that occurred during 2014.
Market Value
Market Value
(January 1,
(Dec. 31, 2014)
2014)

Net Change

a. Supplies (packaging, labeling,soap etc.)
b. Accounts receivable
c. Product on hand
d. Seed and plants purchased
e. Feed
f. Chemicals, Fertilizer and Lime
g. Other operating assets not listed:

E.

Farm Liabilities and Debt. Please indicate farm liabilities as of January 1, 2014 and as of December 31, 2014, and
changes that occurred.
Liability Value Liability Value
Net Change
(January 1, (Dec. 31, 2014)
a. Production loans
b. Accounts payable
c. If you have an established line of farm credit with a lender, how
much did you borrow in 2014?
d. What was the total amount of all farm business loans taken out
and repaid in 2014?
e. How much did this operation owe money to any banks, co-ops,
individuals, merchants or Federal agencies on december 31, 2014?
f. Other liabilities (please list):
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Section
Operator Information
7
Farm Name
Farmer(s) Name(s)
Street Address
Town
State
Zip
Telephone Number
Cell Phone Number
fax Number
Website
Email Address
Sex
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